Georgia, protests and repression

Georgia has been gripped by uninterrupted protests for more than two months now: there has been no shortage of violent acts by the police, arrests and strong censorship of media critical of the government. The case of journalist Mzia Amaghlobeli.

20/02/2025 – Marilisa Lorusso

In Georgia, there have been more than seventy days of uninterrupted mobilisation, from massive crowds to more limited and category-based protests – over one hundred days if we consider the first wave, that is, the protest that started on October 28, when the preliminary results of the parliamentary vote on October 26 returned a picture considered not very credible.

In its fourth term and after months of heated criticism of the government, the Georgian Dream was declared the winner with 54% of the preferences by a central electoral committee largely reshuffled during the last term and purged of opposition elements. This first wave saw the mobilisation of the opposition and students, mainly in Tbilisi and Batumi.

The second wave – with a much larger and wider participation – began on November 28, and is still ongoing. On this date, the Prime Minister appointed by the Georgian Dream, Irakli Kobakhidze, declared the suspension of negotiations for integration into the European Union until 2028.

It should be emphasised that, despite the terrible relations it has established with Western partners, and with the European Union in particular, the Georgian Dream has never declared that it does not have entry into the Union as its goal. On the contrary, it has built an entire reality – parallel to what is happening in bilateral relations – on the actual advancement of the position in the country and has promised its electorate entry into the EU in 2030.

Obviously, a suspension of negotiations and then entry within two years is an unbelievable plan, which has produced a wave of uninterrupted and widespread mobilisations that are unprecedented in the history of the country. Protests have been marked by extremely violent repressive actions.

The media

The parallel reality of the Dream propaganda is built on careful and coordinated control over information. The main protagonists of this campaign are the Imedi television channel and the public broadcaster of Georgia, which however usually has a smaller audience.

While the former interviewed several protesters, the latter was the object of heated controversy and pickets by the protesters who managed to obtain some visibility, sacrificed to the night hours, which did not satisfy their demands.

Censorship of the information sphere close to the opposition began with the Law on foreign agents last spring, which could be considered at the time as the final act of a path of repression that characterised the relations of the governing party and the non-aligned media.

In fact, the current government has created a new repressive and regulatory framework that should further silence dissident voices.

Journalists have been targeted. Some have been arrested or detained, together with hundreds of others who have already been convicted or are awaiting trial. Many show signs of violence and/or torture.

Among the media workers in this situation, the fate of Mzia Amaghlobeli has caused particular outrage and concern.

Amaghlobeli is a journalist, co-founder and director of the online media Batumelebi and Netgazeti, two media that have covered the protests with maximum visibility, both in Batumi, the second epicentre of the protests, and in Tbilisi.

On January 12, during a protest and after having previously been detained, Mzia Amaghlobeli was arrested on charges of slapping the Batumi police chief, Irakli Dgebuadze.

The incident followed a tense situation characterised by heavy verbal abuse by Dgebuadze, who then took revenge during the arrest by denying the journalist access to water and the bathroom. Amaghlobeli has been in pre-trial detention since January 14. The article she was charged with carries a prison sentence of four to seven years.

Amaghlobeli is now engaged in a hunger strike that is undermining her health, and it has become necessary to transfer her to a clinic. In solidarity with the journalist, other prisoners have started their own hunger strike.

According to Transparency International Georgia , an NGO also in the eye of the regime’s storm: “It is clear that Mzia Amaghlobeli is not being punished for having committed an act of grave danger, but for having denounced the corruption of the regime and its involvement in illegal activities over the years. It can therefore be said that Mzia Amaghlobeli is a political prisoner, according to the definition established by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe”.

Hungary and Italy

In the meantime, Georgia has left that very assembly.

Behind the Dream’s propaganda, the regime is increasingly isolated. The new government and the new president have received recognition from few countries, including neighbouring Iran, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The Dream had hoped for a change of administration in Washington to support its legitimacy, but at Donald Trump’s inauguration the only person present was outgoing president Salome Zourabishvili, at the invitation of Senator Joe Wilson, a Republican and a great supporter of the sanctions against the Dream.

Numerous sanctions have been imposed on the government team, including suspended diplomatic visas to Europe, with some European countries taking the initiative to also impose numerous bilateral measures to suspend collaboration and sanctions against individuals.

The exception is Hungary which, in stark contrast with EU foreign policy, fully recognises the Dream’s government.

Italy has followed in Hungary’s steps. Ambassador Massimiliano D’Antuono met with the Foreign Minister nominated and elected by the Dream to discuss bilateral relations, the importance of collaboration within international forums, national developments, regional and global challenges and future prospects, thus legitimising the government of the Dream and breaking the common European front.

This was denied in the debate of the foreign affairs committees of the Italian parliament, during which Italy’s alignment with the European position and condemnation of the repression and violence in Georgia were emphasised.

However, it remains an act for internal use, which is issued when the Italian embassy had already officially circulated a message fully cooperative with the Dream’s government.

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USAID suspension in BiH, a hard blow to media…

USAID suspension in BiH, a hard blow to media and civil society

The suspension of the US government’s international aid programmes, one of the first decisions taken by Donald Trump after taking office, has triggered a wave of uncertainty around the world, and Bosnia and Herzegovina is no exception.

By Darko Kurić

Originally published by OBCT. Also available in ITA and BHS

The aid freeze wanted by Trump also concerns the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which in the last four years has allocated 1.7 billion dollars to the Western Balkan countries, including over 400 million destined for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

According to the data released in 2024 by the US Embassy in Sarajevo, since 1995 the United States has invested approximately two billion dollars in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2024 alone, the funding destined for Bosnia and Herzegovina amounted to approximately 40 million dollars, and in previous years it was almost even higher figures.

A significant part of these resources has been directed to support independent and investigative media and projects to combat corruption. The suspension of US foreign aid could have long-term negative consequences, compromising the protection of vulnerable groups, the development of investigative journalism and the fight against corruption.

NGOs and the media

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, several media and civil society organisations have suspended projects and activities that were previously supported by USAID funds.

Two large Internews programmes and one by the Centre for the Promotion of Civil Society (CPCD) designed to support local media across Bosnia and Herzegovina have been put on hold. Many ongoing or planned projects to fight corruption and support investigative journalism, areas in which USAID has invested large sums of money in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in other countries in the region, are also at risk.

Some media organisations are funded entirely or partly by USAID funds. Others, such as the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network BiH (BIRN BiH), are in a more favourable situation because, in addition to USAID-funded projects, they also rely on other sources of funding.

Many other media, especially local and independent ones, face a more complex situation. According to information provided to OBCT by media representatives and trade associations, several media outlets are unable to pay their employees their February salaries, and some are even forced to give up accounting and IT support services.

Investigative journalism is particularly affected, as it is difficult for newsrooms to compensate for the loss of investigative journalists.

Experts warn that the financial limbo caused by the US aid freeze threatens objective and critical journalism and could pave the way for biased media, toxic narratives and disinformation. There are fears that this vacuum could be filled by financial interventions by other powers, such as China and Russia.

The Bosnian-Herzegovinian media are already looking for alternative sources of funding, looking to the EU, international organisations operating in BiH and embassies of Western countries. The goal is to ensure the resources needed to cover essential expenses in order to overcome the period of uncertainty – caused by the decision of the new US administration to block foreign aid for three months – and to limit the negative effects on independent and investigative journalism.

Poorly protected by the state, vulnerable categories in Bosnia and Herzegovina depend largely on international aid. US funding has provided fundamental support to all those entities that the Bosnian-Herzegovinian authorities have never supported as a common good due to a lack of resources, understanding or political will. Consider, for example, large infrastructure projects, human rights organisations and those for the protection of vulnerable categories, shelters, etc.

The Mensana association, which provides support to people with mental disorders and intellectual disabilities, based in Sarajevo, is one of the many entities that have been forced to suspend their activities. Menssana announced on its Facebook profile that, due to the suspension of USAID funding, it is forced to close the day rehabilitation centre, where assistance was provided daily to more than eighty beneficiaries.

Many non-governmental organisations in BiH are experiencing a moment of great uncertainty and are still undecided on what to do. If this situation were to continue, NGOs could be forced to lay off workers or even shut down.

The mirage of public intervention

In BiH, power bodies at all levels have never shown interest in investing in common goods, such as investigative journalism. Indeed, it seems that all the governments that have succeeded one another over the last thirty years have been united by the propensity to attack journalists and the media, especially those who express criticism and denounce corruption. A propensity that manifests itself in various ways, from verbal attacks to the use of various repression mechanisms.

In the past, independent media have relied mainly on donations from other countries and international organisations, also because Bosnian-Herzegovinian institutions have almost always favoured aligned media in the allocation of state subsidies.

It is not to be expected that this practice will be abandoned. In fact, nothing suggests that the government will decide to support NGOs and media at risk.

What is causing further concern is the fact that some high-ranking Bosnian-Herzegovinian officials do not hide their satisfaction with Trump’s decision to suspend international aid.

Milorad Dodik, president of Republika Srpska, has stated that in BiH USAID has spent about 800 million marks (400 million Euros) to destabilise the country, including by giving bribes. Dodik accused the US agency of using financial resources to rig elections in BiH.

The president of Srpska announced an investigation to establish “what they did and what transfers they used, who they gave the money to and for what”, insisting on the need to clarify the matter at the BiH level because most of the USAID funds were used for illegal and criminal activities.

This rhetoric is in stark contrast to that of previous years, when Dodik had praised the US agency. In addition to civil society, USAID has also significantly supported Bosnian and Herzegovinian institutions, funding several reform projects at all levels of government, including Republika Srpska.

The suspension of US aid has further encouraged Dodik to revive the proposal for a law on the special register and transparency of the work of non-profit organisations, colloquially known as the “law on foreign agents”.

The legislative proposal was withdrawn last year following widespread criticism from local and international organisations that denounced an attack on civil society and freedom of expression.

During its session on February 6, the government of Republika Srpska approved the bill, which should now be included in the agenda of the RS People’s Assembly.

This is not a new phenomenon, it is the latest chapter in a long campaign of repression against independent media, NGOs and all dissenting voices, especially in Republika Srpska.

Among the Bosnian-Herzegovinian officials who welcomed the blocking of American aid, the name stands out of Staša Košarac, Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations of BiH and member of the SNSD, who in recent years had collaborated with and asked for help from USAID.

Another paradigmatic example is Fadil Novalić, former prime minister of the Federation of BiH, who is serving a four-year prison sentence for the so-called “respirator scandal”.

On his Facebook page, Novalić expressed satisfaction with the announcement of the closure of USAID, calling it “a criminal organisation” that, according to the former minister, played a crucial role in orchestrating the criminal proceedings against him.

Similar discourses have been fuelled by numerous media outlets close to those parties that are celebrating the blocking of USAID. Thus, Alternativna TV, blacklisted by the United States because of its ties to Dodik and the SNSD, reported that funding has been suspended for organisations and media outlets that have tried to “sell out” and “hit” Republika Srpska.

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Trentino, journalism and gag complaints

Between announced complaints and warnings, we heard from 4 newspaper editors, the union and an investigative journalist. First part of an investigation into the SLAPP phenomenon in Trentino.

By Paola Rosà

Originally published by OBCT. Also available in ITA.

“The way these complaints were written, I think they have one motivation: to try to stop the pen. They are written so poorly that they don’t stand a chance, but their intent is to send a message, to instill fear in the other party”. There is clarity and acumen in the words of the editor of the online newspaper Dolomiti, Luca Pianesi. All the complaints of the last few years – shelved and never brought to court – fit the definition of SLAPP, Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation.

The cases recalled by Pianesi share a harassing strategy, a casual use of the judicial system and an intimidating intent as well as the attempt to silence the debate. Like the SLAPPs, the 7 complaints and several warnings received by Pianesi over the last eight years (Dolomiti has been online since December 2016) have also shown much less noble objectives than defending the good name of those who claimed to feel damaged by the newspaper: “At the beginning we were subjected to much more pressure, phone calls, letters, but now I have thick skin. In 2022, for example, I received 4 complaints and 2 warnings, basically every two months I received a notfication. Yet I have never ended up in court”.

The underworld: unknown numbers and differing perceptions

While relatively little is heard about gag complaints in Trentino, credit goes to Luca Pianesi for touching on the subject publicly.

In a column dated November 21, Pianesi retraced the over two years that had passed between when he was notified of a senator’s complaint and when the judge for preliminary investigations decided to shelve the case, after the senator had opposed a similar decision by the public prosecutor: “For us, who have been hanging on this story for 2 years, all that’s left to do is write. Tellwhat happened”, he wrote.

“But for every one we talk about, there are 15 others that one has to deal with”, Pianesi, whom we met in the editorial office in Trento, tells us. “There’s an underworld that a journalist, a newspaper editor, supports on their shoulders, with their family, with their colleagues”.

Unfortunately, the extent of this “underworld” is unknown. Journalists here are reluctant to talk about it with outsiders, and when asked, they tend to downplay the extent of the phenomenon, as if the number of lawsuits were an indicator of poor quality journalism: complaints – even those filed by individuals in bad faith – still seem to be considered a professional disgrace, and each case is archived in silence, perhaps breathing a sigh of relief but without celebrations.

This seems to be confirmed by the director of the daily newspaper l’Adige, Pierluigi Depentori, who has been at the helm of the longest-running newspaper in the province for two years, and who claims that he has not yet ended up “in court for lawsuits filed during my time as editor”, as “in most cases we receive threats of lawsuits” (also part of an intimidation strategy).

According to Depentori, to protect themselves, journalists must keep up to date on legal rules and mechanisms: “To keep colleagues updated, I plan to repeat the training course with the lawyer who assists us”. But when faced with individuals who act “with bad faith and gross negligence”, as stated in Article 96 of the Civil Procedure Code on frivolous litigation, there is no training that can help: even the most careful and respectful journalist can be the victim of a specious lawsuit.

In Trentino, the situation seems to be in line with the rest of Italy. 4 newspaper editors (Pierluigi Depentori of l’Adige, Luca Pianesi of Dolomiti, Simone Casalini of T Quotidiano, Ettore Paris of the monthly investigative magazine Questotrentino) and journalist Laura Mezzanotte, with different nuances, report a professional risk that puts work serenity to the test. They confirm

the abundance of at least warnings and, even though the cases are not many, they take very seriously the intimidating power of each individual complaint or request for compensation for damages.

Ettore Paris, despite enjoying the free assistance of several lawyers since the 1980s, recalls the tense climate in the editorial office, every time, even if the case is then shelved or acquitted: the request for damages of 800 million liras by a construction company, the 50,000 Euros requested by an MP, the complaint by a winery’s CEO, the lawsuit filed by Licio Gelli’s son. “It’s not about numbers, the intimidation is always there”.

The perception at the union is more serene. Rocco Cerone, reconfirmed as regional secretary of the National Federation of the Press for Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol, lets us know: “Although the phenomenon is alarming at a national level, on a regional basis it doesn’t seem to be so serious: at least there aren’t as many reports as in the rest of Italy”.

Promised complaints and warnings

The number of threatened complaints is impossible to estimate: warnings, emails, registered letters or even just phone calls that, in Pianesi’s summary, say: “Don’t talk about me, or I’ll sue you”.

This is far from a marginal phenomenon in the galaxy of “legal” intimidation and the forcing of the legal system, a phenomenon that a few years ago the Otto Brenner Foundation of Frankfurt, in collaboration with the Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte e.V. (GFF) of Berlin, analysed in the volume “Wenn Sie das schreiben, verklage ich Sie!”. Studie zu präventiven Anwaltsstrategien gegenüber Medien (“If you write that, I will sue you! Preventive strategies of lawyers against media”).

According to the research, carried out in 2018 by consulting databases and interviewing 40 journalists and 20 lawyers in Germany, each newspaper receives on average at least 3 warnings per month. “These preventative strategies, which are increasingly frequent, increasingly aim to block the publication of an article or to influence public perception on the subject”.

Interference in journalism, and therefore in the right of citizens to be informed, is thus obvious, but known to few, as it is entrusted to the usually confidential correspondence between an external subject and the publisher, or director of the newspaper. But the phenomenon, as everyone in Trentino confirms, is quite widespread.

Luca Pianesi recalls an actual warning by one of the leaders of the Autostrada del Brennero: “Luckily that time we were not the only ones to have been warned, there were also our competitors from the daily newspaper l’Adige. And this allowed us to develop a common strategy and not be afraid”.

Having a legal office behind that assists the newspaper without the costs falling on individual journalists is obviously the recipe for serenity. “For us, as a cooperative – explains Pianesi – legal costs are a considerable burden. If it comes to a trial and an acquittal, the plaintiff can be ordered to pay our costs as well. But when the case is shelved, we have to pay the lawyer in full, like those two years with the senator that cost me 2000 Euros”.

An original case concerns a complaint that was only announced by MP Vittorio Sgarbi, president of the Mart museum of contemporary art of Rovereto and Trento. Simone Casalini recalls an email received from his publisher: Sgarbi contested some data published by the newspaper and said he was “forced to file a complaint”. Which in the end he did not.

“The message is always the same: I’ll let you know that I can sue you, but if you stay quiet I won’t”, explains Casalini, recalling how in these cases a “strong” publisher, in solidarity with the editorial staff and not willing to bend, is fundamental. “A large role is played by the dialogue between the editorial staff and the publisher”, he explains.

Monitoring, an impossible task

However, the issue with numbers seems to be above all their lack. “The communication strategy on complaints is decided by the lawyer”, confirms Laura Mezzanotte, a journalist for the monthly Questotrentino, sued in 2023 by the mayor of Riva del Garda and still awaiting a decision from the judge. “There are cases in which the lawyer recommends a settlement and paying, even if you could win in court. It is done for the sake of time, of convenience in relationships. In my opinion, the decision to speak publicly about a complaint depends only 10% on the individual journalist”.

Instead, according to Mezzanotte, we should think about a public register of gag lawsuits involving journalists, cases shelved or acquitted should be made public to provide a deterrent.

This is essentially what the European Commission asked for in the Recommendation on SLAPP of April 2022, together with the issuing of what would become the directive adopted by the EU last spring, which however only concerns transnational cases because the Member States preferred to retain jurisdiction over national cases. The Commission had also sent Member States a list of wishes and indications for them to adopt “effective, appropriate and proportionate measures to address manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings against public participation and protect in particular journalists and human rights defenders against such proceedings”.

The paragraph on “data collection, communication and monitoring” opens as follows: “Member States should, taking into account their institutional arrangements on judicial statistics, entrust one or more authorities to be responsible to collect and aggregate, in full respect of data protection requirements, data on manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings against public participation initiated in their jurisdiction. Member States should ensure that one authority is responsible to coordinate the information and report the aggregated data collected at national level to the Commission on a yearly basis starting by the end of 2023”.

Over a year after that deadline, the Italian government does not appear to be drawing up that list, while monitoring is carried out by independent entities and NGOs, whether the trade union, associations or consortia like MFRR of which OBCT is a member. Monitoring untold cases is, however, an impossible task, as it is necessary to rely on the stories of the protagonists, who for various reasons often remain silent.

“For the most important cases, in the past, we published articles to tell readers about our acquittal regarding a defamation complaint”, the editor of l’Adige confirms; sometimes it happens, not always, and in any case very rarely during an ongoing proceeding.

From mayors to magistrates

A lawsuit still in progress involves Laura Mezzanotte, a journalist from Questotrentino sued by the mayor of Riva del Garda. Here the timing is very anomalous, and perhaps the “Romeo” investigation into the connections between business and politics, conducted by the Carabinieri of the ROS and the Guardia di Finanza and coordinated by the District Anti-Mafia Directorate of the Trento Prosecutor’s Office, plays a role. The case also involved the mayor, who ended up under house arrest in December 2024.

The contested article, in which Laura Mezzanotte asked who had financed the electoral campaign in Riva del Garda, was published in February 2023; in April the mayor filed a complaint for defamation; only over a year later, in September 2024, did the journalist receive notification. In the meantime, QT continues to write about the events in Garda (“There was no SLAPP effect here, we didn’t know we were being sued”, explains Mezzanotte).

The climate at the local level is tense, and when we ask our respondents who they fear most, they answer almost in unison: “The private sector”. While politicians “are more familiar with the game” (as Luca Pianesi puts it), accept the challenge of communication and somehow know how to take criticism, private companies are more “sensitive”, have powerful lawyers and are therefore more dangerous.

Magistrates have also targeted the press with legal actions. “I had not yet heard of it”, says Simone Casalini, director of T Quotidiano, “but this is exactly what is happening to us: two magistrates are suing us for defamation, and this only because, in a very balanced and sober judicial news article, we reported three lines from a leaflet critical of them”.

The territorial jurisdiction in this case has obviously been changed, and the editor is answering to the court of Brescia while waiting for the decision of the public prosecutor. “It is difficult for us to understand the reasons for an action of this kind, that article seemed truly watertight to me. Let’s see how it ends”.

Proposals and ideas in line with the EU

The wait, the tension and the actual costs of legal assistance are key elements of SLAPPs, and media workers are very clear about what the solutions could be, not so much to avoid complaints, which remain a right of readers, but to streamline procedures, to make things less traumatic, to reduce costs.

Among our respondents, even those who have not read the 2022 Recommendation, even those who were not aware of the activity of CASE, the European coalition against SLAPPs, and even those who had never heard of SLAPPs, end up suggesting solutions perfectly in line with the proposals of the European Union. Perhaps the only divergence concerns the decriminalisation of defamation. “God forbid – writes Laura Mezzanotte on QT – that instead of a criminal complaint someone who wants to silence you brings a civil lawsuit against you. There it is even worse: defense times and costs are much higher. And there is not even a filter of a judge who can decide to drop the case: the civil judge must continue the case in any case”. The journalist’s fears refer to the current situation, whereby the media are more willing to deal with criminal cases (according to data, archived at over 70%) than with civil cases (more expensive because a trial must be faced in any case, even five years after the publication of the contested article, while for the crime of defamation the complaint must be filed within three months). To bring Italy in line with international standards on freedom of expression, whereby there should be no crimes of opinion, the decriminalisation of defamation is instead requested by the bodies that deal with the issue, including the CASE coalition: in light of the recent Recommendation of the Council of Europe, any decriminalisation should in any case be accompanied by a simultaneous inclusion in civil law of those guarantees that are currently lacking. For the rest, the solutions proposed by journalists and directors interviewed for this overview of Trentino touch on the same issues, perhaps with a few more ideas, from reimbursement of expenses to the humanisation of the notification procedure.

“On a procedural level, we should be able to make the plaintiff pay the lawyer’s fees even in the event of dismissal”, suggests Pianesi of Dolomiti. “If it were known that in the event of dismissal the plaintiff must also pay the lawyer of the other party, there would be fewer complaints”. Those who defend themselves from a totally specious accusation, and formulated in bad faith, should be rewarded in some way; but if the case is dismissed, there is no one who can ascertain the plaintiff’s bad faith. “The compensation that arrives at the end of the trial is too late”, agrees Laura Mezzanotte, “in the meantime I had to pay the lawyer for who knows how many years”.

Timing remains the key point. Simone Casalini from il T suggests “faster trials, which lead to a reduction in costs and eliminate the real reasons for the complaint: if everything is resolved in three months, the editorial staff will be under no one’s thumb”.

“Sensitivity towards the problem – adds Laura Mezzanotte – should lead the prosecutors to take charge of the matter immediately. At the moment there is no fast track for matters of public interest or for journalism, so the times are completely arbitrary and such arbitrariness is risky”.

Some hope for a change in the way in which one is informed of a complaint or a request for compensation: “One of the things that bothered me the most – says Luca Pianesi – is the method of notification of the complaint which is absolutely unpredictable: once the carabinieri arrived at my house in uniform, my partner was there with my child. The notification may arrive by mail at home, or at the editorial office, or via phone call from the barracks. Each time a different procedure, you never know… not to mention the notification notice that you have to go and collect at the post office after three days. When it’s a fine I’m very happy, I breathe a sigh of relief!”.

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How journalists became targets of police violence

During the ongoing protests against the Georgian Dream government’s decision to halt EU negotiations, over 90 incidents were reported in which journalists covering the rallies faced assault and obstruction of their professional duties by law enforcement officers.

In several instances, dozens of journalists and cameramen were exposed to tear gas and pepper spray deployed by riot police. Some journalists were severely beaten, either by police officers themselves or by masked individuals, with the police standing by and taking no action.

Despite ongoing investigations into these incidents, no arrests have been made, leading many journalists to believe that the violence is being encouraged or allowed by the state.

Article by Mariam Bogveradze

23 December 2024

Aka Zarkua, editor at the online outlet Real Politika, is one of the journalists who was assaulted by the police while live-reporting from the rally on the night of November 30. Zarkua recalls that masked officers approached him and ordered him to leave the area using degrading language:

“I asked them if I violated anything. After that, several officers rushed at me and started beating. The only phrase I repeated was that I am a journalist, which provoked even more aggression from them. I heard phrases like, ‘we are beating you because you are a journalist’” – he says.

Zarkua recalls that while the police were beating him, someone—likely their commander—approached and attempted to shove the press card he was wearing into his mouth.

The day before, another Georgian news outlet, Netgazeti, reported that journalist Givi Avaliani was injured while covering the protests. Avaliani was working on the street next to the Parliament building, where the rally was taking place.

He recalls that around 1:30 AM, special forces had already been mobilized, and masked officers had formed a cordon on Chichinadze Street, with protesters standing just a meter away. Avaliani describes the atmosphere as tense, with the situation escalating periodically.

“The aggression seemed to stem from the fact that the officers were filming the protesters with their phones and, at times, verbally insulting them,” he says. “In one instance, the police attempted to arrest a peaceful protester standing nearby. As they tried to drag him away, other protesters intervened, pulling him back in an effort to prevent the arrest. This reaction was based on past experiences, where people were often beaten first during the arrest and then again in the police car.”

Avaliani was positioned in the front row, filming the excessive force and the police’s verbal abuse when suddenly, one of the masked officers in the back row reached forward and sprayed pepper spray at him and several others. “I was clearly marked as a journalist, wearing a helmet with the word ‘PRESS’ on both sides and a press badge,” he recalls.

In the days leading up to and following this incident, Avaliani noticed that the special forces, particularly the riot police unit, were unusually aggressive toward journalists covering the events at the epicenter. He believes this was a coordinated tactic, with the impression that their superiors had instructed them to physically intimidate the press to prevent footage that might expose the violence of the system.

“Given the circumstances, I can’t help but feel that the pepper spray incident was intentional,” he says.

Along with physical assaults and the use of special equipment against journalists, some press representatives were arrested while performing their professional duties. Giorgi Chagelishvili of Mautskebeli was one of them.

Chagelishvili recalls that on the morning of December 2, after police special forces raided the demonstration, protesters began fleeing toward Rustaveli Metro Station in a visible state of panic. Suddenly, riot police charged in from a side street, escalating the chaos.

“A number of people rushed into the Rustaveli Metro station, jumping over the turnstiles and sprinting down the escalators. I followed them into the subway but decided not to go down. Instead, I stopped and turned on my phone to record the scene. I moved to the corner, trying to stay out of the way, when they grabbed me and shoved me to the ground. I quickly hid my phone in my pocket and covered my head as several officers ran over me. I lay on the ground for a few seconds before they pulled me up and dragged me outside,” he recalls.

As they dragged him away, Chagelishvili explained he was a journalist, but the officers dismissed his claim, replying, “Everyone is saying that.”

“They confiscated my phone, threw me into a police van, and took me to the station,” he says. “Once there, they falsely accused me of swearing at them. I refused to sign any statement admitting to this. They pressured me, saying it would be ‘better for me’ if I signed, but threatened that if I didn’t, I would be detained longer. The entire ordeal lasted about an hour and a half. I requested a lawyer, but they told me I wasn’t entitled to one.”

According to Chagelishvili, during the search at the station, his press card was discovered, yet he was still detained.

“In court, the officers changed their story,” he says. “They no longer claimed I had cursed at them but instead accused me of resisting arrest. One officer even told the court, ‘When you hear the siren telling you to disperse, it doesn’t matter if you’re a journalist or not, you should leave.’ As a result, I was fined.”

Several journalists have reported instances of their equipment being stolen or damaged by police forces during the protests. Nino Ramishvili, a reporter for Studia Monitori, an investigative outlet, is one of them. She states that a police officer grabbed her phone while she was covering the rally on the night of December 3.

By 2 AM, Ramishvili was at the rally with her colleagues, documenting the unfolding events. At that point, the demonstration had already been raided, tear gas had been deployed, and many protesters had fled from Rustaveli Street to nearby Besik Street. Knowing that special forces were stationed just around the corner, Ramishvili followed them. As the protesters reached Besik Street, the situation quickly escalated. Special forces surged out from a nearby building and began arresting protesters, using force to subdue them.

Ramishvili recalls that the situation intensified when the officers emerged unexpectedly from a building, unnoticed by the protesters. “The distance between the police and the demonstrators was minimal,” she says. “While some protesters managed to escape, one was caught and beaten by the police.”

“I started filming the special forces as they beat the detained protesters. As I took a photo, one of the officers charged at me, grabbed my phone, and began to confiscate it. At the time, I was clearly marked as press: I had a helmet with the word ‘PRESS’ on it and a press card. I immediately asked why my phone was being taken, explaining that I was a journalist. Initially, the officer ordered me to delete the footage. Before I managed to answer he handed my phone to another officer, telling him not to return it to me, as if I might chase him to get it back,” she explains.

Ramishvili repeated that she was a journalist and showed her identification, approaching other officers to make the same point. However, the police were dismissive, responding rudely and indifferently.

“My status as a journalist seemed irrelevant to them,” she says. “They made sexist comments, telling me to ‘go home and take care of my family.’ Their attitude was openly cynical. The verbal abuse wasn’t limited to me. A neighbor who had come outside attempted to intervene, asking the officers to stop using vulgar language against the protesters. An elderly woman was also subjected to deeply insulting and derogatory remarks.”

After returning to the office, Nino contacted the press office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to report the incident. Later, she checked the location of her phone using her laptop and found it registered just a few meters away from where the special forces had been stationed. The next morning, the location still showed her phone inside the Ministry of Internal Affairs building at 9 Gulua Street, where it remains to this day.

“The following day, I attended a briefing held by Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Aleksandre Darakhvelidze. When I raised the issue with him, he assured me that they were aware of the situation and were actively searching for my phone. When I told him I had checked the phone’s location and it was still inside the Ministry building, he had no response. His only reaction was to show clear displeasure with what I had said,” Ramishvili adds.

One of the most severe instances depicting journalist assaults occurred on December 7th, when unidentified masked individuals attacked the Tv Pirveli team, including journalist Maka Chikhladze and her cameraman Giorgi Shetsiruli.

During a live broadcast, dozens of masked individuals attacked Maka Chikladze from behind and pulled her to the ground, before severely beating cameraman Giorgi Shetsiruli, leaving both of them with concussions. Chikhladze adds that her cameraman required numerous stitches on his head and that his hand was severely wounded, preventing him from grabbing a camera for a long time. After beating the journalists, the assailants took their equipment.

On the morning of December 2, after the police had already raided the demonstration in front of Parliament, some citizens decided to continue the protest at another location. A section of the road near Vake Park, about 4.5 kilometers from the Parliament building, was blocked. Giorgi Baskhajuri, a reporter for Media Aprili, was covering the scene.

He recalls that, at that moment, the police appeared lightly armed, and the riot police had already left. The officers wore masks to conceal their identities as they began chasing the protesters.

“I was walking past the police, taking photos, when I noticed some protesters seeking shelter in nearby buildings and alleys to avoid arrest. I saw a group of demonstrators enter one of the alleys, and the police quickly followed. Given the tense atmosphere and the events of the previous days—when protesters had been brutally beaten during arrests—I realized that no cameras would be allowed in this area, and there was a real risk of physical abuse. That’s when I decided to document the situation,” he says.

By the time Baskhajuri arrived, one detainee was already being escorted out, and he began filming. “I was clearly marked as press, wearing a helmet and a vest labeled ‘Press,’ with my press card visible,” he says. He moved slightly aside to avoid obstructing the police and asked one of the officers on what grounds they were detaining the individual.

“At that moment, an officer who wasn’t in uniform approached me. He shoved me against the wall, attempting to prevent me from taking photos or seizing my phone. He physically assaulted me, pushing me harder against the wall. Realizing the situation was escalating, I tried to retreat. As he pushed me further into the wall, I managed to escape and ran into the yard behind a nearby building. After a short time, I resumed filming.”

Baskhajuri recalls that the officer’s face was only partially covered, allowing him to identify him. However, he fears that by the time the investigation proceeds, he won’t be able to recognize the officer.

“I’ve been through this process before,” Giorgi explains. “In the spring, during a rally against the Foreign Influence law, I was chased and physically assaulted by the police, who broke my nose behind Parliament. At that time, I was also wearing all the identifying marks of the press. There should have been cameras in these areas. I’ve filed complaints for the previous incident, and despite being designated as a victim in the case, I’ve had no communication with the authorities since April.”

Baskhajuri notes that when he wrote his complaint, he pointed out that he could identify the most aggressive officers, but nothing has been done.

“Given the lack of action in the past, I have no hope that this current investigation will lead to anything meaningful. I’m left waiting for the day when this government is replaced, and my violated rights are finally restored,” he says.

Although the Special Investigative Service, the body responsible for investigating crimes committed against journalists, has initiated investigations into each case, none of them have led to any meaningful results. The local NGO Media Ombudsman, which has been handling the cases of over 20 journalists since the protests erupted on November 28, states that there are strong indications these assaults on the press are not only intentional but may be actively supported by the state.

Media Ombudsman’s lawyer, Jano Chkadua, underscores the state’s clear responsibility in allowing police officers to wear masks. He points out that, unlike special forces who are equipped with helmets and shields for tactical purposes, the only function of these masks in the hands of regular police officers is to conceal their identities while assaulting journalists.

“It is precisely these masks, along with the fact that no law enforcement officers have been held accountable for crimes against media representatives and other citizens, that encourages such violent acts. This impunity gives them the sense that they can act without fear of consequences,” he states.

According to the lawyer, this is the first time they have encountered cases of robbery by the police. Many journalists have reported having their mobile phones, cameras, tripods, and other equipment taken. To this day, the whereabouts of this equipment remain unknown.

“It turns out that law enforcement bodies, which are meant to protect journalists’ rights and should never interfere with their work, instead engaged in acts of interference, violence, persecution, and robbery targeting journalists. This is especially serious because, in the past, journalists were considered ‘untouchable’ in such situations. Now, however, they have become the targets of the police, with active violence being committed against them,” he says.

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Self-defence against SLAPPs in Serbia

In Serbia, the investigative newspaper KRIK is the target of frequent legal harassment. To counteract it, the editorial team has developed strategies based on civil society solidarity, public denunciation and monitoring of trials

By Massimo Moratti

Originally published by OBCT. Also available in ITA.

In Serbia, SLAPPs (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) against independent journalists are causing increasing concerns.

What caused a stir was the start of the trial against the investigative journalism portal KRIK by a judge of the Belgrade Court of Appeal, Dušanka Đorđević, who filed both a civil and criminal case against the journalists, demanding, among other things, a ten-month prison sentence and the imposition of an accessory penalty, a two-year ban from practicing the profession.

The charge? Publishing data on the judges’ assets, which were already public. The data in question are part of KRIK’s online database “Prosudi ko sudi” (which can be translated as “examine those who judge”), which discloses to the public the properties and financial status of judges presiding over highly sensitive cases, such as the murders of Prime Minister Đinđić and journalist Ćuruvija, or cases against prominent politicians and possible connections with the criminal world.

KRIK and SLAPPs

This is not the first harassing action targeting KRIK. In fact, the portal has collected 16 of them, most of which are civil cases, but there are also criminal or commercial cases.

Over time, KRIK journalists have become accustomed to it. They know that when they write about certain topics or mention certain people, they soon find themselves facing new legal harassment. Nonetheless, journalists seem to have found a way to coexist with SLAPPs and above all a way to combat and discourage them.

Distrust in the authorities

Many SLAPPs come from individuals close to the majority party or from members of the government majority. For this reason, despite the fact that the lack of media freedom is a sore point for Serbia and one of the obstacles to accession to the European Union, as found in the most recent EU Progress Report , KRIK journalists do not believe that there is good will on the part of the Serbian authorities to contain the phenomenon.

Even if the government decides to adopt measures that reflect the content of the recent anti-SLAPP directive, as recommended on several occasions, “it is more than legitimate to suspect that such measures would in fact distort the content of the directive and turn it into another tool to muzzle the media,” as Bojana Jovanović, deputy editor-in-chief of KRIK, tells us.

Unfortunately, based on their experience, KRIK editors are doubtful about official initiatives and believe that, at best, they are merely formal efforts without any genuine will to solve the problem.

Per questo motivo, è molto meglio organizzarsi da soli e porre in atto strategie, tra organizzazioni della società civile, volte a sostenersi a vicenda e a contenere l’impatto delle SLAPP.

The strength of civil society

For this reason, it is much betterf or civil society organisations to self-organise and implement strategies aimed at supporting each other and containing the impact of SLAPPs.

KRIK’s experience is also useful for other organisations that are facing legal harassment and need to prevent those forms of intimidation that progressively lead to self-censorship and loss of quality of investigative journalism.

KRIK’s strategies are essentially based on solidarity among civil society organisations and on the public denunciation of SLAPPs. They clearly cannot replace the necessary legal assistance or material and psychological support among journalist organisations, but rather complement and strengthen them. These strategies consist of simple measures.

First, when KRIK journalists are informed that legal action has been initiated against them, they report the fact without trying to hide it, but publicly inform partners and donors that yet another SLAPP has been initiated.

In this way, the perpetrators of the harassment are exposed to the public and KRIK readers have the opportunity to show support and solidarity. This sends a clear signal that KRIK is not alone in facing legal harassment, but enjoys the support of other parts of civil society, international organisations and even diplomatic representations that care most about media freedom in Serbia.

As the case progresses and approaches the actual trial, it is very useful for the fairness and transparency of the proceedings to have independent observers following the case in court. They can be members of other professional organisations, civil society organisations, members of diplomatic representations and international organisations, both governmental and non-governmental.

Practice suggests that when there are observers present in the courtroom, tensions are reduced and the proceedings tend to follow the normal procedure, resulting in fairer treatment for defendants.

In order to better deal with SLAPPs, KRIK has joined forces with other organisations in the sector such as the Slavko Čuruvija Foundation and BIRN (the Balkan Investigative Journalism Network).

When one of these organisations is the target of a SLAPP, the others report the case through their channels and bring it to the attention of their readers.

The three organisations have decided to extend this media coverage also to local initiatives that find themselves facing similar situations.

Outside Belgrade, in fact, there are many journalists who are targeted by SLAPPs and their economic situation makes them even more vulnerable than the media in the capital, as the disproportion of forces is even greater. For this reason, when they learn of harassment against smaller outlets, in agreement with the interested parties, they report the news at the national level to discourage those who started the SLAPPs.

Finally, demonstrating that you are not intimidated by lawsuits and that you continue to do your job is another way to discourage SLAPPs. Showing that they do not have the desired effect and that journalists continue to write anyway removes the incentives to start new lawsuits.

Greater awareness of SLAPPs

In conclusion, it is also important to remember that, as Bojana argues, “now there is greater awareness of SLAPPs and not only those who work in the sector, but also the general public is learning to recognise them as another gag on the independent press”.

In the past, this was not the case; it was believed that these were limited cases and that the plaintiffs could have legitimate motivations, which could be proven in court. Now, however, we know that these lawsuits only intend to intimidate journalists and block their activity and are therefore rightly perceived in this light.

In this sense, it is important to continue to educate the public and spread awareness about this form of legal harassment.

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Polish journalism stuck at the crossroads

On 16–17 September 2024, the MFRR partner organisations conducted an advocacy mission to Warsaw, Poland, as a follow-up to the fact-finding mission of 2023. In light of the change in government, the focus of this year’s mission was on measures to reform public service media, protect journalists from Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), and propose reforms to the media landscape in line with the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA). For this purpose, the MFRR asked Krzysztof Bobinski to provide an overview of the dilemmas and challenges facing the Polish media community, media regulators, and the government.

Bobinski is President of Unia & Polska, a pro-European think-tank and member of the Polish Society of Journalists. Formerly, he was the Warsaw correspondent of the Financial Times of London until 2000, during which time he also contributed to the Washington Post, Baltimore Sun, the Economist, and the BBC.

Poland’s parliamentary election in October 2023 saw the victory of a pro democratic coalition over the populist Law and Justice (PiS) party in power from the autumn of 2015. Once elected, PiS seized control the country’s public service media (PSM) – television (TVP) public radio (PR) as well as the Polish Press Agency (PAP) . The government also sought to influence private media (both local and foreign owned) combining intimidation with bribery based on promising the placement of government advertising to win the favour of newspapers, broadcasters and magazines. PSM management appointments came under ruling party control. Under PiS daily newscasts consisted of pro government propaganda reaching a crescendo at election times when aggressive propaganda was aimed against democratic opposition candidates and the government politicians’ election pledges were presented in mellifluous tones. Journalistic standards hit rock bottom and any notion of an impartial, fair minded and informative PSM thought to be essential to a well functioning democracy became a distant dream.

Listeners, viewers and readers came to rely on private media both local and foreign such as the US owned TVN television station or the locally owned TOK FM talk radio and the independent Gazeta Wyborcza to provide an alternative view. But the private sector also had its black sheep as major broadcasters like RMF owned by Bauer , the German media conglomerate, or Polsat TV owned by Zygmunt Solorz, a Polish oligarch owning major energy businesses, toned down critical coverage of the government in return for favours in the form of government funded advertising and assurances that no hostile moves would be made against them by official tax or other controllers. Wirtualna Polska, a locally owned internet company, made a habit of running pro government content under journalistic pseudonyms in return for government funding.

Information about these practices has appeared since the fall of the PiS government, and key executives responsible for these practices have been quietly sacked, Wirtualna Polska has engineered a complete makeover to re-establish its reputation and Polsat TV has returned to impartial news reporting. But maybe predictably the industry’s private sector as a whole has failed to analise how it defended or failed to defend journalistic standards at this difficult time. The Izba Wydawców Prasy, (the Chamber of Press Publishers) which represents the Polish newspaper publishers and other media organisations has avoided any public discussion of these issues and newspapers have, in the main, avoided any analysis of the implications of what really went on between 2015 – 2023, This is a major failure as we seek to restore journalistic standards in Poland.

It would appear that setting the public service media to rights would be simpler than rebuilding journalistic standards in the private sector.

But the task facing reformers of TVP and PR is more of a challenge because any legal change requires new legislation which can be delivered by the two houses of parliament where the democratic coalition has a majority but Andrzej Duda, the president who favours the former Law and Justice regime and holds the right to veto legislation. He is in power till May 2025 and progress can only be made on reform if a pro democracy candidate is elected in May next year.

With support for PiS running at 30 percent at the same level as that of the Civic Coalition (KO) which heads the democratic coalition, Donald Tusk , the KO leader has to be careful not to give PiS supporters cause for criticism as he seeks to build a majority for the democrats. This appears to be his plan which is reminiscent of Sir Robert Walpoles, Britian’s first prime minister’s famous dictum “let sleeping dogs lie”. Thus Donald Tusk wants to avoid a row with PiS which continues to maintain that their model of the PSM was the most democratic and pluralistic model ever.

Thus work will continue slowly on new PSM legislation and it seems drafts will only be sent to parliament for approval only when Poland has a new president.

Initially the new government dismissed the old pro PiS management from TVP and PR thanks to a legal device under which they put both organisations and PAP into liquidation and then appointed a liquidator of their choice. These liquidators thus run the PSM companies as director generals seemingly in finitum or at least until new legislation is passed.

The greatest challenge, though, is to put in place a system in which the PSM are independent of external pressure which includes government officials, politicians, lobbyists working for powerful corporations and others who would like influence the public message. Politicians are the greatest threat.

The record so far is not encouraging. The process by which the current directors of PSM (the liquidators) were appointed was not transparent. It seems that they were appointed on the basis of recommendations from coalition politicians. Each of the three parties sought to make sure that they would have their supporters in key positions. The new appointees then proceeded to appoint people they knew to replace journalists tainted by their support for PiS. Also it seems that many PiS supporters are still in place. These methods do not bode well for the future when a new management structure will be put in place.

The Ministry of Culture and National Heritage (MkiDN) which is responsible for PSM and has been mandated to prepare legislation transposing the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) into Polish law admits in a recent consultation document that legislation in place till 2015 regulating management appointments in PSM while ‘formally guaranteeing PSM independence’ nevertheless has procedures which mean that ’PSM are dependent on external actors who enjoy unlimited possibilities of influencing their management’.

These consultations close on September 23 but whatever their outcome it seems that Donald Tusk, the prime minister will have the final say on the degree to which PSM will be independent.

Unfortunately it seems that Tusk and consequently his party (KO) give little priority to media freedom issues. His main concern up till now has been to make sure that the stream of PiS propaganda put out by PSM be stopped and that has happened. Further than that, he has in the past showed little interest in PSM putting his trust more in private broadcasters whose owners he felt would be more inclined to support his free market policies. KO events in the past eight months have devoted little time to freedom media issues. If anything, Tusk fears that in future a reformed public media might be taken over again by a populist party and repeat the PiS performance of 2016 – 2023.

If truth be told the PSM cause currently attracts little interest in the population at large. When PiS was in power opponents of the PiS government watched TVN and listened to private radio stations while TVP and PR were favoured by PiS supporters. After the election in 2023 the pro democracy electorate stayed with TVN and tended to ignore the new politically correct but lack lustre PSM news casts now free of PiS control. Meanwhile unhappy and fiercely loyal PiS supporters migrated from TVP and PR to Republica, a tv station owned by PiS, which now broadcasts the rabid propaganda which was pumped out by the PiS controlled PSM. On top of this there are signs of ‘news fatigue’ in the population at large with over half of the below 34 year olds not watching television at all. Those who do watch TV are the the over sixties. 93 per cent of this age group switch their sets on every day.

Thus the challenge is not only to keep the politicians from threatening PSM independence but also to reinvent the public service media as the go to medium for news and by the population at large. So far no one is asking what, actually, the PSM are for, yet. But they soon will.

Amidst these major audience shifts and desultory debates about the future shape of PSM several media related issues are being completely ignored. But they are important to the future of journalism in Poland.

One major issue which has to be addressed by anyone who is looking to reform Polish journalism as it emerges from eight years of rule by politicians who did not respect media freedom. This is the problem of the working conditions of media people, their remuneration and newsroom relationships between management, editors and rank and file journalists. This also about the conditions which women journalists have to suffer at work. It is also about respecting the right of journalistic staff to have some influence over editorial policies, even the appointments of their bosses and the future of the companies they whom they work. This includes guarantees for the right of professional journalists to write the truth within the confines of a general editorial policy agreed consensually with media owners. Such mechanisms could be in line with recommendations originally attached by the European Commission to its draft regulation which seem to have been forgotten in the general debate about EMFA.

The problem in Polish journalism though is that while owners of media organisations and senior journalists have no interest in democratising management practices rank and file journalists also don’t appear to be very interested. One veteran journalist remarked when asked about giving writers and editors a say in the election of the chief editor remarked “what you mean asking the actors to elect the theatre director?”.

Another huge subject is mobbing and sexual molestation which have been rife in Polish news rooms. While individual cases do get written up in the media, victims of such practices generally fail to report them. A study of sexual harassment conducted by Poland’s Zamenhof Institute in 2023 (www.zamenhof.pl) asked 268 women journalists about their experience at work. 59 per cent replied that they had experienced sexual molestation of some kind at work while 5 per cent reported that they had been actually forced to have sex against their will. The report failed to attract much media attention.

Paulina Januszewska, a working journalist, earlier this year published a book called “Gównodziennikarstwo” (Shitjournalism) which chronicles the various pathologies in Polish journalism. Mainstream media have, so far, paid it scant regard.

It is essential that media owners take steps to limit this kind of behaviour. Pay scales must also be adjusted to eliminate the exploitation of young reporters and improve wage levels across the board which would include limiting huge salaries for well known journalists. This would help to make newsrooms happier places and if management were to pursue policies aiming at establishing civilized relationships between the rank and file and senior editors. Only then would journalists be able to do their jobs properly and respecting ethical standards and resisting attempts to undermine their independence.

Attention to introducing laws and regulations, transparency and the establishment of institutional safeguards against attempts to capture media by external actors are important. However these mechanisms will only work if reasonably well paid professional journalists enjoy the respect of their superiors at work. Only then can Polish journalism play the role that is required of it in a well ordered democracy.

Krzysztof Bobinski, Society of Journalists, Warsaw

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Malta risks missing the opportunity to safeguard journalists

By IPI contributor Elizabeth De Gaetano

On October 2, Prime Minister Robert Abela announced that he would publish a white paper on proposed laws for the media in Malta. This declaration came as he tabled in Parliament the final report of the Committee of Media Experts he had appointed last year to advise on reforming media laws in Malta.

Government officials touted this announcement as the culmination of a transparent and inclusive public consultation towards unprecedented reforms to safeguard the media in Malta following the death of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia.

Caruana Galizia was killed by a car bomb in Malta on October 16, 2017, and, to date, three men have been convicted, and three other suspects await trial, including the alleged mastermind.

Two years following her death and after pressure from the Caruana Galizia family, civil society and international media freedom organisations, the government commissioned a public inquiry to investigate the circumstances that led to her death.

In its 2021 report, the public inquiry found the state had to “shoulder responsibility” for Caruana Galizia’s death because it had created an “atmosphere of impunity”. It had also failed to take reasonable steps to protect her. The report went on to make critical recommendations for legislative reform within the establishment and within the police to fight corruption and improve the safety of journalists.

Two years after receiving the final report of the public inquiry into the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, Malta has yet to address the systemic failures that led to the journalist’s death.

Malta’s government has still only fully implemented one of the 28 key recommendations, which it proceeded to mishandle.

The Caruana Galizia inquiry report recommended setting up a Committee of Media Experts that was meant to examine the state of journalism and the fundamental right of freedom of expression. The committee was to produce specific recommendations that parliament would consider in a brief timeframe.

Instead, the government set up a Committee of Media Experts to advise on legislation already drafted rather than to advise the government during the drafting process. And ever since the Committee was set up, the entire two-year consultative process has been characterised by opacity and controversy, leaving journalists no better protected than before.

As journalists and civil society await the publication of the white paper and the details included within, there is some concern that this major opportunity for meaningful reform which better protects journalists could be lost, and that one element of the legacy many hoped to secure after the tragic murder of Daphne Caruana Galizia could be undermined.

A fraught and opaque process

Work to reform the laws governing Maltese media began in January 2022 after the government rejected legislative proposals presented in parliament by the opposition that were based on the public inquiry’s recommendations.

Instead, the government announced that it had appointed an eight-person committee to assess local laws and advise on improving them. The committee was given three months to submit their comments and suggestions on the draft legislation already prepared by the government.

The committee was never consulted during the drafting of the bills. It was also instructed to keep their discussions confidential, which led to criticism of the journalists who formed part of the Committee representing Malta’s Press Association.

The Committee of Media Experts submitted its first recommendations and proposals in June 2022. But the report was not made public until late September when Justice Minister Jonathan Attard presented the government’s proposals at a press conference.

Legal experts immediately identified several deficiencies in the Maltese government’s legislative proposals.

For example, a proposed amendment that seeks to protect the heirs of a deceased author or editor in defamation cases still raises concerns about the ability of publishers to defend against such allegations should a plaintiff decide to pursue their case against a publisher.

In addition, the proposed amendments address Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP) by empowering Maltese courts to dismiss baseless cases. Damages in SLAPP suits from foreign courts can be capped locally, and local courts can disregard foreign judgments in such suits. However, the proposed legislation falls short of international recommendations, leaving journalists in Malta vulnerable to SLAPP threats.

About to miss an opportunity?

After unveiling the draft bills, over a hundred Maltese journalists, academics, and artists wrote to Prime Minister Robert Abela, urging him to hold a public consultation on the proposed legislation.

The prime minister initially resisted but eventually agreed to halt the legislative process to allow the media experts committee to consult the broader media sector.

The same committee, whose main recommendations had already been ignored and which the government blamed for the lack of consultation, was then tasked with consulting the public and returning with a revised set of recommendations.

The committee submitted its second report to the government last July. Malta’s Parliament had closed for the summer recess by then, allowing the government to keep the report under wraps until October 2 when it was tabled in the House of Representatives.

Proposals made by the committee include creating a system of transparent public funding for media houses, binding public authorities to provide information to journalists within a reasonable time, and constitutionally protecting journalists from revealing their sources.

These elements of the proposed reforms have been cautiously welcomed by media freedom groups, who stress that the devil will be in the detail of the proposed amendments, as well as the strictness of their implementation.

The committee also proposed amendments to the law protecting journalists from Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, allowing them to be dismissed early on in the court proceedings and recommended the removal of terms such as journalist, author or editor and extending the protection from SLAPPs to other possible targets, including NGOs and activists.

It also advised the government to empower magistrates who rule against a SLAPP case to order the payment of damages to the person or entity targeted by the SLAPP suit.

In its report, committee members noted that the government had again ignored its central original proposal, namely imposing an explicit obligation upon authorities to provide access to information within a reasonable time via Freedom of Information (FOI) requests..

There were also several recommendations, including those by international press freedom organisations, that the Media Committee should have considered in this second round of recommendations.

The committee did not introduce specific criteria for identifying a SLAPP suit and maintained the process of acknowledging foreign judgments that comply with the third country’s law. Experts, therefore, believe that in their current form, the suggested anti-SLAPP provisions will do little to deter plaintiffs from filing SLAPP suits.

When the report was tabled in parliament on October 2, Prime Minister Abela also announced that he would publish a white paper with the proposed laws for the media in Malta but gave no indication when this would be.

Given how fraught and protracted the entire consultation process has been, the white paper feedback may be the last chance to push for more ambitious legislation to create an enabling environment for public participation in Malta or risk being stuck with sub-optimal laws that will do little to change the status quo.

As the wait for the white paper continues, determination remains firm amongst media, journalists and international organisations to push for the best possible media laws for Malta, and the improvement in press freedom that such reforms would bring.

This article was commissioned by IPI as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and candidate countries. The project is co-funded by the European Commission.

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Media pluralism in a legal limbo in Serbia

The allocation of national broadcasting frequencies in Serbia highlights the lack of transparency and pluralism in the sector. Frequencies are only awarded to government-friendly media. Concerns have been expressed by both the European Commission and the European Parliament.

By Massimo Moratti

Originally published by OBCT, also available in ITA

The issue of the public allocation of national broadcasting frequencies in Serbia seems to have come to a public halt, after a few important developments in the past months that have shown how contentious this issue is and exposed the weaknesses of the institutional framework of Serbia.

The usual suspects receive (again) the national TV frequencies

The whole dispute started on 29 July 2022 when Serbia’s Electronic Media Regulatory Body (REM) awarded the four national broadcasting frequencies for a period of eight years to the same four televisions (Happy, Pink, B92 and Prva) that had previously received them. The allocation occurred in spite of the numerous shortcomings in the performance of these televisions, including at least 12,000 violations of the advertising act in the previous years and of the fact that several reports for hate speech and violence were filed against them. The award decision started a public outcry and attracted severe criticism by local and international stakeholders since these televisions are all known to be supportive of the SNS, the Serbian Progressive Party, currently in power in Serbia. National and international press freedom organisations considered the process of allocation of the frequencies to be in violation of the principle of pluralism of the public broadcasting organisations and of the principles on the allocation of licences. Few days later, the REM announced that a fifth national frequency would be allocated and that the whole process would be over by the end of the autumn.

The EU progress report

The whole issue was extensively covered by the EU in its 2022 progress report which highlighted how the REM had awarded the four national frequencies to the same broadcasters as in the previous eight years in spite of the fact that all of them had received warnings by the REM due to violations of their legal obligations. The EU reiterated the need to respect the principle of media pluralism and transparency in the process of allocating the frequencies. Moreover, in the progress report the EU quoted the ODIHR final report on the April 2022 elections in Serbia. In its final report the ODIHR noticed that the REM remained passive in overseeing the conduct of Serbian media during the recent electoral campaign. ODIHR also remarked that national public broadcasters provided “extensive uncritical news coverage to public officials who were also candidates” while “private TV channels with a national coverage […] allocated some 90% of coverage in news programmes to the president and government officials portraying them generally positively”. In other words, the REM had failed in its role of ensuring the correct application of the rules regulating the electoral campaign on the public broadcasters.

The saga of the fifth frequency begins

The public tender for the fifth national frequency was launched in August 2022 with a deadline set for the 11 October for the submission of bids. Four televisions eventually applied, amongst them TV Nova S which produces a number of successful programmes and is known for its critical stance towards the government.

According to Nova S, the deadline for the REM to decide on the applications was 30 days and it expired on the 26 November, however on 29 November the chairperson of the REM herself denied that there was any deadline for the awarding of frequencies and that the decision would be brought during one of the next sessions, without making any firm commitments.

Darkness in Serbia

The applicants and those following the process were worried that the whole procedure was just an excuse to buy time and eventually avoid awarding the frequencies. This led to a significant protest of the televisions belonging to the operator United Group, N1 and TV Nova S. On 6 December, the two TVs stopped their broadcasting and for the whole day they broadcasted a black screen displaying the text “Darkness in Serbia without free media”. The protest had a large impact and its timing coincided with the summit EU – Western Balkans. President Vucic himself was forced to comment on it during the summit itself criticising the TVs and stating that they were protesting more in their own interest than in that of the public. The protest of the TVs was later followed by another organised within the National Parliament by the members of the opposition who showed their support for the two televisions and displayed the same message as the two TVs did.

REM goes on strike

While the protest of the TVs did not explicitly refer to the issue of the fifth frequency in Serbia, the message was nevertheless clear and the reaction of the REM was immediate. The REM suspended their work on 9 December via an urgent phone session. Later on that month the chairwoman of the REM informed the Parliamentary Committee on Culture and Information that the REM had gone on strike because of the “violent coordinated pressure” that they were receiving from opposition groups and in particular because of the pressure from the United group. Debates followed whether such a strike was legal or not, but the result was that time was passing and once more the decision on the allocation of the fifth frequency was delayed. The strike eventually ended on 21 December 2022 after the REM received the support of the parliamentary committee as well as that of the Minister of Information and Telecommunications.

The saga continues…

The end of the strike was not the end of the saga. Two days after the end of the strike the president of the REM itself announced publicly that the REM will not allocate the fifth national frequency while there is a pending court dispute with one of the applicants. The reference was to TV Nova S, which on 20 December had started a court case for administrative silence against the REM because the deadline to award the frequency had passed and no decision was brought. While the court case had been initiated to urge the REM to complete the procedure, the REM referred to it as a reason to continue postponing the decision on the allocation of the fifth frequency, even if the case can last years. The chairperson of the REM, Ms. Olivera Zekic, in fact stated that the court procedure “will last as long as it lasts. We can’t interfere in the work of judicial bodies. Was anybody forcing them (Nova S) to take us to court? No, I only regret that because of them, also other interested TVs will have to wait”. The paradox is that the lawsuit against the administrative silence is now being used by the REM to continue their silence and has become the main excuse to delay solving the issue. A similar complaint raised with the Ombudsman’s Office did not produce any results.

To date, there is no end in sight to this issue, even if eight months have passed since the call for the fifth frequency was launched and the deadline expired more than 5 months ago. The fact that the issue was raised both by the European Commission in October and most recently, in April 2023, by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament did not unblock the situation. Indeed when commenting on such a report, the chairperson of the REM while rejecting the criticism of the European Parliament clearly stated that the REM has no legal obligation to issue the fifth frequency and that four national frequencies are even too much for the Serbian market. The latest statement seems to confirm what many suspected at the beginning: that the fifth national frequency will never be allocated or that it will be allocated when it is too late and it becomes meaningless.

This article was published as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and candidate countries.

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How the European Media Freedom Act could affect Hungary…

How the European Media Freedom Act could affect Hungary and Poland

Meanwhile, the EU has existing tools to defend media pluralism and freedom

By IPI contributor Anna Wójcik

The European Union’s institutions are well aware of the concerted, structural attacks on media freedom and pluralism in Hungary and Poland plus several other member states, and the European Commission’s flagship annual rule of law reports are proof of that.

However, the EU’s treatment of the media freedom crises in Poland and Hungary, which are part of a broader backsliding of the rule of law, has been fragmented and differs qualitatively from the EU’s response to the assaults on judicial independence, academic freedom, or migrants’ rights by the Fidesz and PiS governments.

Other than monitoring the violations of media freedom and pluralism in the two Visegrad states the EU’s response has been limited to some action in the scope of the Article 7 Rule of Law procedure against Hungary, and a single EU law infringement action against the Hungarian government contesting the media regulator’s independence and accusing it of discriminatory action following its decision not to renew the license of independent radio broadcaster Klubrádió.

Frustrated by the lack of legal tools available to it, the European Commission is seeking new EU-wide legislation in the form of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), presented in September, that would harmonize some aspects of regulation over public and private media in member states.

Until now, public and private media regulation has been mainly the responsibility of member states. With no legal mandate to act on media freedom issues, the Commission has based the EMFA on rules protecting the single market.

Meanwhile, the Council of Europe has developed extensive standards for public media and media pluralism and the EMFA is a welcome opportunity to turn some of these standards into binding law in EU member states.

While the EMFA has not been devised solely to address the challenges that the current governments in Budapest and Warsaw have posed to media freedom and pluralism, the draft regulation holds specific promises in this regard.

New rules, new regulations

The first concern in Hungary and Poland is the media regulators’ lack of independence. The Media Council in Hungary, and, in Poland, the National Broadcasting Council (Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji, KRRiT) and the PiS-established National Media Council (Rada Mediów Narodowych) are part of the respective governments’ informal power grab. Loyalists with links to the governing parties dominate these media regulators, which have contributed to limiting media freedom.

In 2020, the Hungarian Media Council did not renew Klubrádió’s license, forcing the station to move online with a limited audience. After Fidesz secured a fourth term in power in April 2022, the regulator refused to renew the license of non-profit Tilos Rádió, citing violations of rules on the use of inappropriate language on air. Tilos won back the licence in the subsequent application process.

In Poland, in 2020/2021, KRRiT delayed the renewal of the broadcasting licenses of the television broadcasters TVN24 and TVN7, which are owned by the U.S. company Warner Bros. Discovery. In 2017, KRRiT fined TVN for reporting about a protest; the fine was rescinded in 2022.

The EMFA seeks to nurture greater independence through the enhanced European Board of Media Services that promotes cooperation between the national regulators. It doesn’t enhance any standards, but it does endorse the requirements of independence of national regulatory set out in Article 30 of the 2018-revised Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD), which Hungary and Poland already transposed.

This means that the media regulators are required to be independent of political and business influence and exercise their powers impartially and transparently, in keeping with principles of media pluralism, cultural and linguistic diversity, consumer protection, accessibility, non-discrimination, the proper functioning of the internal market, and the promotion of fair competition. It also prohibits media regulators from seeking or taking instructions from any other bodies regarding the assigned tasks.

If it so wished, the European Commission could already have started infringement proceedings against the biased decisions of media regulators in Hungary and Poland that are detrimental to media freedom and pluralism, based on Article 30 AVMSD. The time to do so is of the essence, especially as the European Parliament elections and local elections in Poland and Hungary are approaching in 2024.

EU law protects European voters’ rights to participate in the EP and elections that are free and fair. The OSCE/ODIHR found in election observation mission reports on general elections in Hungary in 2018 and 2022 and in general elections in 2019 and presidential elections in 2020 in Poland that the elections were tarnished by the apparent bias of public media towards the governing majority or incumbent president and that public broadcasters failed in their duty to provide impartial coverage.

Moreover, the EMFA envisages the creation of the European Board for Media Services, which would succeed the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) and include national media regulators’ representatives. The Board would advise the Commission on regulation and EU law application issues. It is yet unclear how the Board could insulate itself from internal disruption by rogue member states that are systematically assaulting media freedom and pluralism and quite successfully playing catch-me-if-you-can with Brussels.

Unwinding media capture

Another significant problem is the media capture process, particularly advanced in Hungary and mimicked in Poland. Fidesz has captured media through a network loyal oligarchs, who in 2018 “donated” media to the Central European Press and Media Foundation (Közép-Európai Sajtó és Média Alapítvány, KESMA). Outside of KESMA, the process of forcing journalists to resign or closing some captured media outlets continues.

The PiS party in Poland used the state-controlled oil and gas company PKN Orlen in 2021 to acquire the country’s the most prominent regional daily newspaper group, Polska Press, from the German publisher Verlagsgruppe Passau. The transaction raised major concerns about editorial independence and media concentration. The EMFA would require member states to carry out a “media pluralism and independence” test when taking any new regulatory measures that impact the media market. It would apply, for instance, to decisions impacting media concentration or on private media licensing.

Governments in Hungary and Poland also boost friendly private media with state funds through advertising and partnerships. The EMFA would include rules enhancing transparency and fairness in the allocation of state advertising to media outlets. It would require member states to distribute state advertising to media in a non-discriminatory way.

Article 24 would further require member states’ central and local governments to publish a list of the media supported with public funds and the amounts allocated to them. The national media regulators would be responsible for verifying government-provided information. Without independent regulators however, this provision is unlikely to be effective.

Strengthening the existing toolbox

It is uncertain what shape the EMFA will eventually take in the long EU legislative process. Several objections have been posed to it from interest groups, notably European association of press publishers. Moreover, member states governments may raise objections to specific elements of the act.

Negative developments regarding media freedom impact also other member states than Hungary and Poland, where such problems further entrench democratic backsliding. Greece scores the lowest among member states on RSF’s Press Freedom Index. In the countries ranking high in media freedom, threats of media concentration in the hands of businesspeople with solid political agendas risk destabilizing the electoral process. The opposition to various solutions included in the EMFA may come from a variety of interest groups.

It must also be emphasized that although the EMFA brings some opportunities, focusing on developing new legislation should not be an excuse for not taking action, as the EU already has avenues for legal actions to protect media freedom and pluralism in member states and could apply more political pressure, for example, at the Article 7 hearings against Hungary. The Council should also consider expanding the Article 7 procedure against the Polish government to include specific issues negatively affecting media freedom and pluralism. For now, the EU is not acting as strongly as it could.

Anna Wójcik, PhD, is an assistant professor at the Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences. She was Re:Constitution fellow at the CEU Democracy Institute in 2022. She specializes in the rule of law and freedom of expression. As RethinkCEE program fellow, has recently published with the German Marshall Fund of the United States a policy report on the EU’s response to the media freedom and pluralism backsliding in Hungary and Poland.

This article is part of IPI’s series “Media freedom in Europe in shadow of Covid”, which comprises news and analysis from IPI’s network of correspondets throughout the EU. Articles do not necessarily reflect the views of IPI. The reporting series is supported by funding from the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for FReedom and by the European Commission (DG Connect) as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response coalition.

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Italy: Journalists brace for impact as Giorgia Meloni’s new…

Italy: Journalists brace for impact as Giorgia Meloni’s new government begins

Questions over how new administration will handle press freedom challenges

By IPI contributor Christian Elia

“On World Press Freedom Day my thanks go to the many journalists who fight for the truth. We will always be at their side against all forms of censorship and imposition of the single thought.”

With these words Giorgia Meloni, leader of the Fratelli d’Italia party, commented on the anniversary of 3 May earlier this year.

Now, after Meloni was sworn in as prime minister of a hard-right government on October 23, international observers are questioning the position of Meloni and the main supporters of her party on freedom of the press and pondering how the administration will address the many challenges facing the country’s journalists.

The coalition government, in addition to Fratelli d’Italia, includes the Lega, led by Matteo Salvini, and Forza Italia, led by Silvio Berlusconi – figures with a problematic track record on media freedom.

With major European Union initiatives to safeguard media independence and pluralism on the horizon, and major reform initiatives within the country stalled, questions also emerge over how the new administration will handle more systemic changes to the legislative and media landscapes.

European inspirations

Meloni’s first international outing after the elections, with a speech at the VOX party meeting in Spain, caused much concern in the media world.

In front of an audience that had heard messages from former U.S. President Donald Trump, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, and Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, Meloni reiterated how Poland and Hungary are models of government for her, glossing over the fact that both governments are currently facing sanctions proceedings under Article 7 of the EU Treaty for breaches of fundamental values.

Meloni has not only defended Hungary and Poland when she was in opposition, but also reiterated this approach as soon as she won the elections. Press freedom in both countries remains under serious pressure. There are major questions about how far she will take inspiration in governing from these ideological allies, and how far she will support them in democratic forums.

In general, looking at Meloni’s rhetoric, it seems clear that she is now trying to present herself as a moderate leader. However, she remains president of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), a pan-European umbrella party that includes the ruling party in Poland as well as increasingly influential far-right parties in countries such as Spain and Sweden.

In the past, Meloni has also spread and supported conspiracy theories on her social media channels, such as ethnic replacement by migrants and disinformation about vaccines. Unlike other far-right leaders in Europe, however, she has not publicly made hostile comments against journalists or the press in general. Under increased scrutiny and critical reporting from the media, this may yet change.

Her government’s approach to EU efforts to strengthen media freedom and pluralism will be another key issue. To date, she has never taken a position on the European Commission’s Media Freedom Act (EMFA) or other press freedom legislation. Only her actions in government will clarify her positions in Italy and Europe on these issues.

Another major issue on the agenda regarding media will be reform of the country’s penal code regarding “defamation through the press”, which can currently be punished with prison sentences from six months to three years. In the past two years, the Constitutional Court has urged lawmakers to initiate a comprehensive reform of defamation provisions and ruled that incarceration in such cases is unconstitutional. Until now, however, parliament has dragged its feet. Observers are concerned the new government appears unlikely to push forward the reform process.

Party problems

Meloni, while always defending her staunchest supporters, has been very careful not to attack freedom of the press directly, taking a cautious stance on the issue of journalists’ work, but not failing to emphasise that in her opinion there is a widespread desire to damage Fratelli d’Italia politically.

What is certain, however, is the attitude of many supporters of her party towards the press. Recent incidents of physical or verbal aggression against journalists can be traced back to extreme right-wing militants, however not directly linked to the Fratelli d’Italia party

The most notorious cases are those of journalist Federico Gervasoni, of the daily newspaper La Stampa, who was threatened with death on social networks for having carried out an investigation into the neo-fascist organisation Avanguardia Nazionale, where some current members of Fratelli d’Italia have operated in the past.

Then there is the case of the journalist Federico Marconi and the photographer Paolo Marchetti, of the weekly magazine L’Espresso, who were physically assaulted for filming during the commemoration by a group of neo-fascists of three right-wing militants murdered in the 1970s. For this attack, exponents of Forza Nuova, an organisation that supported Meloni for a period, were prosecuted by the Italian justice system, but has now distanced itself from her.

The latest episode is the persistent threats against Repubblica journalist Paolo Berizzi, known for his investigations into Italian neo-fascism.

Leading journalist unions and organisations – Ordine dei Giornalisti and the Federazione Nazionale della Stampa Italiana – have called for intervention by the political class in these cases.

Meloni and the party leaders immediately distanced themselves publicly and expressed solidarity with the affected journalists, but never definitively ended relations with the most radical part of her supporters.

Journalists’ safety

In recent years the Italian state has become a model with regard to the protection of journalists threatened by the mafia. Roberto Saviano is the best-known symbol of many journalists who have enjoyed not only physical protection, but also the support of civil society through awareness-raising campaigns.

Another major source of physical attacks and threats over the past 10 years, according to the Italian Order of Journalists, has been politically motivated attacks on the press from groups associated with the far and extreme right.

In order to guarantee the work of journalists and freedom of the press, press freedom groups have stressed that it is necessary for these attacks to not only be punished by the judiciary, but also to be recognised as systematic attacks, so that the Ministry of the Interior and the police, who must protect journalists during these public events and in general, are constantly vigilant.

Whether the new occupants of the Ministry of Interior will continue the important work laid down by previous administrations will be vital for the safety of journalists in Italy moving forward.

Media ownership

With respect to the concentration of media ownership, currently Meloni’s leadership team in Fratelli d’Italia does not represent any particular editorial interests.

However, the former deputy Guido Crosetto, an executive of the company Federazione Aziende Italiane per l’Aerospazio, la Difesa e la Sicurezza (AIAD), linked to Confindustria (the trade representation of Italian industrialists), is the one Meloni will be counting on to obtain the support of industrial groups with interests in the media, which until now have never explicitly supported Meloni in her political rise. Crosetto was appointed Minister of Defence in the Meloni government.

Ever since Silvio Berlusconi entered politics in the 1990s, the problem of media freedom arose because the leader of Forza Italia could count on control of important Italian media. Since then, many things have changed and Berlusconi has reduced his role in media, selling the newspaper Il Giornale and negotiating the sale of the Mediaset TV networks.

Today, in the absence yet of a definitive law on the control of the media by politicians, which even the Democratic Party has never achieved, Guido Crosetto seems to be the mediator between the industrial groups and the media they control.

Until now, Giorgia Meloni, as former leader of the opposition and as party leader, has never expressed any particular indications with respect to a whole series of Italian and international regulations on the subject of freedom of the press. Generally, Meloni has preferred communication linked to social networks over mainstream media.

As the new government takes the reins, many of these questions will become apparent. Until then, journalists are preparing for a bumpy ride.

This article is part of IPI’s reporting series “Media freedom in Europe in the shadow of Covid”, which comprises news and analysis from IPI’s network of correspondents throughout the EU. Articles do not necessarily reflect the views of IPI. This reporting series is supported by funding from the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom and by the European Commisson (DG Connect) as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response coalition.

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Article by Mariam Bogveradze

23 December 2024

Self-defence against SLAPPs in Serbia

By Massimo Moratti

Originally published by OBCT. Also available in ITA.

KRIK and SLAPPs

Distrust in the authorities

The strength of civil society

Greater awareness of SLAPPs

Polish journalism stuck at the crossroads

Malta risks missing the opportunity to safeguard journalists

A fraught and opaque process

About to miss an opportunity?

Media pluralism in a legal limbo in Serbia

The usual suspects receive (again) the national TV frequencies

The EU progress report

The saga of the fifth frequency begins

Darkness in Serbia

REM goes on strike

The saga continues…

How the European Media Freedom Act could affect Hungary and Poland

New rules, new regulations

Unwinding media capture

Strengthening the existing toolbox

Italy: Journalists brace for impact as Giorgia Meloni’s new government begins

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