France: MFRR condemns new resurgence of police violence against…

France: MFRR condemn new resurgence of police violence against journalists

At least six journalists have been injured since early September while covering the protests against the 2026 national budget plan. The Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) partners condemn the deliberate violence by law enforcement officers and call once again on the French authorities to protect and recognise the work of journalists as essential during protests.

25.09.2025

On 18 September 2025, a journalist from the public television channel France 2 was hospitalised in Lyon after being injured while covering the second day of the “Bloquons tout” (Block Everything) protests against the French government. The journalist suffered burns and tinnitus after a projectile – believed to have been fired by a police officer – hit him in the back and tore his shirt. 

 

 

This incident is part of a broader pattern documented by Mapping Media Freedom (MapMF), with at least five other assaults on journalists by law enforcement reported earlier this month. On 10 September, on the first day of the national strike in Montpellier, the reporter Samuel Clauzier was strangled and had his camera destroyed. In Paris, four more journalists were assaulted, with two injured while covering the protests: they were subjected to tear gas, beatings and shoving. 

 

 

The situation is particularly alarming considering the country’s history of police violence targeting journalists and demonstrators during previous social movements. In anticipation of the upcoming protests, the Ministry of Interior quietly published a new document in July 2025, the National Urban Violence Scheme (SNVU), presented as a practical guide for law enforcement. Unlike the National Law Enforcement Plan (SNMO) of 2020, which legally guaranteed protection for journalists covering nationwide demonstrations, the SNVU initially ignored the role of journalists in the specific context of “urban violence”. It stated that “the consideration of journalists’ status as enshrined in the national law enforcement plan does not apply”. Following strong criticism from journalists’ organisations, the Interior Ministry eventually withdrew this wording. 

 

 

The MFRR partners call for an independent and swift investigation into the registered attacks, and reiterate that journalists who document social movements and police actions do so in the public interest. With a new day of mobilisation now planned for 2 October, we demand an end to police violence, and call for unambiguous protection for journalists, including during clashes, in order to safeguard the fundamental right to information.

 

Our organisations will continue to closely monitor the situation and provide support to journalists in need.

Signed by:

  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)
  • ARTICLE 19 Europe

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Bulgaria: Mission to examine media freedom and independent journalism

Bulgaria: Mission to examine media freedom and independent journalism

Between 24-25 September, the International Press Institute (IPI) will join a coalition of international media freedom and journalist organisations travelling to Bulgaria to conduct a press freedom mission on behalf of the Council of Europe’s Safety of Journalists Platform and the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR).

24.09.2025

The delegation will conduct a series of meetings over two days in the capital Sofia with stakeholders including the Bulgarian President; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Interior; Council of Electronic Media (CEM); Office of General Prosecutor; Commission for Personal Data Protection; Central Election Commission and representatives from embassies.

 

Representatives of the participating organisations will also meet with leading journalists and editors from a range of different media organisations in Bulgaria, as well as media associations and unions, media experts, members of civil society organisations and academics. Separate meetings are planned with the Bulgarian National Radio and the Bulgarian National Television.

 

The aim is to take the pulse of media freedom in the country, examining issues including the safety of journalists, media regulation, public broadcasting, media pluralism, defamation and SLAPPs, media ownership and the reform process required under the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA).

 

A press briefing to share the initial findings of the mission and present recommendations to safeguard media freedom in Bulgaria will be held from 09.30-11.00 on 26 September at National Press Club of the Bulgarian Press Agency (49 “Tsarigradsko shose” blvd). The event is open to all media and translation services will be provided.

 

Participants include ARTICLE 19, Association of European Journalists (AEJ), European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF), European Broadcasting Union (EBU), European Federation of Journalists (EFJ), Index on Censorship, International Press Institute (IPI), Reporters Without Borders (RSF) and the Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT).

 

This mission is being organised with support of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Open Letter on Improving Journalists’ Access to the Albanian…

Open Letter on Improving Journalists’ Access to the Albanian Parliament

Thirty media freedom and civil society organisations – including the SafeJournalists Network, MFRR partners, RSF and leading Albanian groups – have urged the Albanian Parliament to drop proposals that would severely restrict journalists’ access. The letter warns that limiting independent filming and confining interactions with MPs would undermine transparency, accountability, and Albania’s EU commitments.

19.09.2025

To: 

Mr. Niko Peleshi, Speaker of the Parliament of Albania

Cc:

Head of the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights and Means of Public Information 

Mr. Taulant Balla, Head of the Parliamentary Group of the Socialist Party
Mr. Gazment Bardhi, Head of the Parliamentary Group of the Democratic Party 

Mr. Tedi Blushi, Head of the Parliamentary Group of the Freedom Party 

 

Subject: Concerns over proposals to restrict journalists’ access to Parliament

 

Dear Mr. Peleshi, 

 

We, the SafeJournalists Network, the partners of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), Reporters Without Borders (RSF), and media freedom organisations in Albania, express our deep concern regarding recent proposals by the parliamentary majority to significantly restrict journalists’ access to the Parliament of Albania. These proposals, as reported by journalists, foresee abolishing independent filming in the plenary chamber and replacing it entirely with a single official feed, as well as confining all interactions between MPs and the media to a single designated “doorstep” space. If implemented, this would effectively eliminate direct and spontaneous contact between journalists and elected representatives and make accountability voluntary.

 

Such restrictions would deprive the public of one of the few remaining avenues for holding MPs and ministers accountable. While the protection of MPs’ private communications is a legitimate concern, it cannot serve as a pretext for removing independent cameras from the plenary chamber or for barring journalists from approaching MPs in parliamentary spaces. We have previously raised concerns about the media accreditation rules introduced by the Parliament in 2021, which already curtailed journalists’ freedom of movement inside Parliament and increased reliance on official feeds. Since then we have documented repeated cases of obstruction and a broader pattern of limited access.

 

In Albania, the broader media environment makes these proposed restrictions even more concerning. Government representatives and majority MPs rarely hold press conferences or appear on independent debate shows, relying instead on curated communication through social media or pre-prepared audiovisual materials produced and distributed by the Media and Information Agency. Delays, refusals, and centralisation already hinder access to public information. Parliament has therefore been the last institutional space where journalists could directly and spontaneously question political representatives. To remove this space would amount to a serious setback for media freedom and democratic accountability.

 

We therefore urge you, Mr. Speaker, to take the following steps:

  • Convene an open dialogue with journalists, media freedom organisations, and stakeholders to revise the parliamentary accreditation system so that it balances privacy with transparency and ensures meaningful access.
  • Align accreditation with existing commitments, including the Parliament’s Strategic Plan 2025–2030 pledges on transparency, accountability, and constructive relations with the media.
  • Ensure clear protocols for the Guard of the Republic to prevent arbitrary obstruction of journalists, as observed in 2024, particularly during moments of political tension.
  • Preserve multiple points of access. A doorstep can complement, but must not replace, corridors, lobbies, and courtyard interactions that enable spontaneous questioning.
  • Guarantee institutional openness by maintaining independent filming in addition to official feeds, publishing schedules and all relevant parliamentary information in a timely and accessible manner, strengthening the Parliament’s press service, and committing to future consultation with journalists and media freedom organisations before any further changes are made.
  • Strengthen transparency in public communication by instituting regular, journalist-driven media conferences with Parliament, MPs, and ministers, held several times per month.
  • Introduce an independent appeals mechanism so that accreditation or access decisions can be challenged quickly and fairly, ensuring equal treatment of all accredited outlets, including smaller, regional, and online media and new formats of journalistic profession. 
  • Reaffirm Albania’s EU commitments. Parliamentary openness and media freedom are core elements of Cluster 1 in the EU accession negotiations. Upholding these standards will demonstrate Parliament’s commitment to transparency and accountability, while restrictive measures would undermine democratic credibility at home and abroad.

 

We reiterate our commitment to supporting Albanian institutions in improving media freedom and freedom of expression, emphasizing that robust protections for journalism and free speech are fundamental to Albania’s democratic development and EU integration path.

Signed by:

SafeJournalists Network 

  • Association of Journalists of Kosovo
  • Association of Journalists of Macedonia
  • BH Journalists Association
  • Croatian Journalists’ Association
  • Independent Journalists Association of Serbia
  • Trade Union of Media of Montenegro

Media Freedom Rapid Response 

  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • ARTICLE 19 Europe
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT)
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)

Reporters Without Borders (RSF)

 

Civil society organisations in Albania 

  • Center Science and Innovation for Development (SCiDEV)
  • Association of Journalists of Albania (AJA)
  • Albanian Helsinki Committee (AHC)
    Albanian Media Council (KSHM)
  • Albanian Woman in Audiovisual (AWA)
  • Union of Journalists and Media Workers (SGMP)
  • Res Publica
  • Association of Professional Journalists of Albania (APJA)
  • Amfora
  • Faktoje
  • Union of Albanian Journalists (UGSH)
  • Albanian Center for Quality Journalism (ACQJ)
  • Civil Rights Defender, Albania
  • Citizens.al 

Reporting Diversity Network 

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Letër e Hapur mbi Përmirësimin e Qasjes së Gazetarëve në Kuvendin e Shqipërisë

 

Drejtuar:
Z. Niko Peleshi, Kryetar i Kuvendit të Shqipërisë

 

Për dijeni:
Kryetari i Komisionit Parlamentar për të Drejtat e Njeriut dhe Mjetet e Informimit Publik
Z. Taulant Balla, Kryetar i Grupit Parlamentar të Partisë Socialiste
Z. Gazment Bardhi, Kryetar i Grupit Parlamentar të Partisë Demokratike
Z. Tedi Blushi, Kryetar i Grupit Parlamentar të Partisë së Lirisë

 

Lënda: Shqetësime mbi propozimet për kufizimin e qasjes së gazetarëve në Kuvend

 

I nderuar z. Peleshi,

 

Ne, Rrjeti SafeJournalists, partnerët e Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), Reporterët pa Kufij (RSF), dhe organizatat e lirisë së medias në Shqipëri, shprehim shqetësimin tonë të thellë lidhur me propozimet e fundit nga shumica parlamentare për të kufizuar ndjeshëm qasjen e gazetarëve në Kuvendin e Shqipërisë. Këto propozime, sipas raportimeve të gazetarëve, parashikojnë heqjen e filmimeve të pavarura në sallën plenare dhe zëvendësimin e tyre plotësisht me një transmetim zyrtar të vetëm, si dhe kufizimin e të gjitha ndërveprimeve midis deputetëve dhe medias në një hapësirë të vetme të përcaktuar si “doorstep”. Nëse zbatohen, një gjë e tillë do të eliminonte praktikisht kontaktin e drejtpërdrejtë dhe spontan mes gazetarëve dhe përfaqësuesve të zgjedhur dhe do ta bënte llogaridhënien vullnetare.

 

Kufizime të tilla do t’ia hiqnin publikut një nga hapësirat e fundit për të mbajtur përgjegjës deputetët dhe ministrat. Ndërkohë që mbrojtja e komunikimeve private të deputetëve është një shqetësim legjitim, ajo nuk mund të shërbejë si pretekst për heqjen e kamerave të pavarura nga salla plenare apo për ndalimin e gazetarëve që t’u afrohen deputetëve në hapësirat e Kuvendit. Ne kemi ngritur më parë shqetësime për rregullat e reja të akreditimit mediatik të miratuara nga Kuvendi në vitin 2021, të cilat tashmë kufizuan lirinë e lëvizjes së gazetarëve brenda Kuvendit dhe rritën varësinë nga transmetimet zyrtare. Që prej asaj kohe kemi dokumentuar raste të përsëritura pengesash dhe një model më të gjerë të kufizimit të aksesit.

 

Në Shqipëri, konteksti i përgjithshëm mediatik e bën edhe më shqetësues këtë propozim. Përfaqësuesit e qeverisë dhe deputetët e shumicës rrallë mbajnë konferenca për shtyp apo marrin pjesë në debate televizive të pavarura, duke u mbështetur më shumë te komunikimi i kuruar përmes rrjeteve sociale apo materialeve audiovizive të parapërgatitura nga Agjencia për Media dhe Informim. Vonesat, refuzimet dhe centralizimi tashmë pengojnë qasjen në informacionin publik. Kuvendi ka qenë për këtë arsye hapësira e fundit institucionale ku gazetarët mund të pyesnin drejtpërdrejt dhe spontanisht përfaqësuesit politikë. Heqja e kësaj hapësire do të ishte një hap i rëndë mbrapa për lirinë e medias dhe llogaridhënien demokratike.

 

Ne ju bëjmë thirrje, z. Kryetar, të ndërmerrni këto hapa:

  • Të zhvilloni një dialog të hapur me gazetarët, organizatat e lirisë së medias dhe palët e tjera të interesuara për të rishikuar sistemin e akreditimit parlamentar në mënyrë që të balancojë privatësinë me transparencën dhe të garantojë akses domethënës.
  • Të përafroni akreditimin me angazhimet ekzistuese, përfshirë Strategjinë e Kuvendit 2025–2030 dhe zotimet e Nismës “Parlamenti i Hapur” mbi transparencën, llogaridhënien dhe marrëdhëniet konstruktive me median.
  • Të vendosni protokolle të qarta për Gardën e Republikës për të parandaluar pengesat arbitrare ndaj gazetarëve, siç është vënë re në vitin 2024, veçanërisht gjatë momenteve të tensionit politik.
  • Të ruani pika të shumta aksesi. “Doorstep”-i mund ta plotësojë qasjen, por nuk duhet të zëvendësojë korridoret, lobet dhe oborret që mundësojnë pyetje spontane.
  • Të garantoni hapjen institucionale duke lejuar filmimet e pavarura krahas transmetimeve zyrtare, duke publikuar në kohë oraret dhe gjithë informacionin parlamentar përkatës, duke forcuar shërbimin e shtypit të Kuvendit, dhe duke u angazhuar për konsultime të ardhshme me gazetarët dhe organizatat e lirisë së medias përpara çdo ndryshimi tjetër.
  • Të forconi transparencën e komunikimit publik duke vendosur konferenca të rregullta për shtyp, të udhëhequra nga gazetarët, me pjesëmarrjen e Kuvendit, deputetëve dhe ministrave, të mbajtura disa herë në muaj.
  • Të krijoni një mekanizëm të pavarur apelimi në mënyrë që vendimet për akreditim ose qasje të mund të kundërshtohen shpejt dhe në mënyrë të drejtë, duke garantuar trajtim të barabartë për të gjitha mediat e akredituara, përfshirë ato lokale, rajonale, online dhe formatet e reja të gazetarisë.
  • Të riafirmoni angazhimet e Shqipërisë ndaj BE-së. Hapja parlamentare dhe liria e medias janë elemente themelore të Klasterit 1 në negociatat e anëtarësimit. Zbatimi i këtyre standardeve do të tregojë angazhimin e Kuvendit ndaj transparencës dhe llogaridhënies, ndërsa masat kufizuese do të dëmtonin besueshmërinë demokratike brenda dhe jashtë vendit.

 

Ne ritheksojmë angazhimin tonë për të mbështetur institucionet shqiptare në përmirësimin e lirisë së medias dhe të shprehjes, duke theksuar se mbrojtja e fortë e gazetarisë dhe e fjalës së lirë janë themelore për zhvillimin demokratik të Shqipërisë dhe rrugën e saj drejt integrimit në BE.

Nënshkrues:

Rrjeti SafeJournalists

  • Asociacioni i Gazetarëve të Kosovës
  • Shoqata e Gazetarëve të Maqedonisë
  • Shoqata e Gazetarëve të Bosnjë-Hercegovinës
  • Shoqata e Gazetarëve Kroatë
  • Shoqata e Pavarur e Gazetarëve të Serbisë
  • Sindikata e Mediave e Malit të Zi

Reagimi i Shpejtë për Lirinë e Medias (Media Freedom Rapid Response)

  • Federata Evropiane e Gazetarëve (EFJ)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • ARTICLE 19 Europe
  • Instituti Ndërkombëtar i Shtypit (IPI)
  • Osservatorio Ballkani Kaukazi Transeuropa (OBCT)
  • Qendra Evropiane për Lirinë e Shtypit dhe Medias (ECPMF)

Reporterët pa Kufij (RSF)

Organizatat e shoqërisë civile në Shqipëri

  • Qendra për Shkencë dhe Inovacion për Zhvillim (SCiDEV)
  • Asociacioni i Gazetarëve të Shqipërisë (AJA)
  • Komiteti Shqiptar i Helsinkit (KSHH)
  • Këshilli Shqiptar i Medias (KSHM)
  • Gratë Shqiptare në Audiovizual (AWA)
  • Sindikata e Gazetarëve dhe Punonjësve të Medias (SGMP)
  • Res Publica
  • Shoqata e Gazetarëve Profesionistë të Shqipërisë (APJA)
  • Amfora
  • Faktoje
  • Unioni i Gazetarëve Shqiptarë (UGSH)
  • Qendra Shqiptare për Gazetari Cilësore (ACQJ)
  • Civil Rights Defender, Shqipëri
  • Citizens.al

Rrjeti i Raportimit të Diversitetit

Kjo deklaratë u koordinua nga Reagimi i Shpejtë për Lirinë e Medias (MFRR), një mekanizëm mbarëevropian që gjurmon, monitoron dhe reagon ndaj shkeljeve të lirisë së shtypit dhe medias në shtetet anëtare të BE-së dhe vendet kandidate.

Ukraine: Demand for justice from Russia one year after…

Ukraine: Demand for justice from Russia one year after death of Victoria Roshchyna

September 19 marks one year since the death of Victoria Roshchyna, a Ukrainian journalist who had been held for over a year in Russian captivity. On this day, MFRR partners remember Victoria and demand justice for her death from Russian authorities.

19.09.2025

Roshchyna’s body was repatriated to Ukraine and buried in Kyiv only on 8 August 2025, almost one year after the official date of her death recorded by Russian authorities.

 

According to Ukrainian forensic investigators, Roshchyna’s body showed numerous signs of torture, including burn marks from electric shocks, cuts on the body, neck injuries, and a broken rib. Ukrainian authorities and independent investigations indicated that she had been subjected to regular beatings, threats, humiliation and deprivation of medical care, water and food.

 

Later reporting by Forbidden Stories also indicated that multiple organs had been removed from her body before it was returned to Ukraine, in a potential effort to conceal evidence of torture. While the precise circumstances of her death remain unknown, it is certain that Victoria lost her life while under the supervision of Russian prison authorities.

 

Roshchyna departed for her last reporting trip in July 2023 to investigate rumours of torture in Russian prisons in the occupied Zaporizhia region. The 26-year-old freelance journalist had previously worked for major Ukrainian news outlets such as Ukrainska Pravda and Hromadske. She attempted to reach territories of eastern Ukraine occupied by Russia after its full-scale invasion but went missing soon after crossing the border into Russia.

 

Her family and journalists who had been in contact with Roshchyna soon sounded the alarm on her disappearance. Over the next year, Russian authorities provided no information on her whereabouts. Security forces finally confirmed in May 2024 that she had been arrested on undisclosed charges and allowed only a single phone call with her father.

 

Russian authorities never confirmed where Roshchyna was arrested or where she was being held. Her last confirmed location was the infamous Taganrog prison in Russia, according to investigations.

 

Subjected to regular torture, Roshchyna died while in Russian captivity, possibly while being transported from Taganrog prison in southwestern Russia to Moscow in preparation for an upcoming exchange. Her family was informed by Russian authorities only a month later.

 

Following the announcement of her death, Russian captives have consistently refused to explain the circumstances in which she lost her life, or comment on allegations that Victoria was subjected to torture.

 

One year after Victoria’s tragic death, MFRR partners reiterate our demand for full justice for her family. Russian authorities must be held accountable for the death of the journalist who was posthumously granted the Order of Freedom award by Ukraine.

 

Our organisations welcome the Ukrainian criminal investigation into Roshchyna’s death. We call on the Russian authorities to cooperate with the investigation and come clean over the full circumstances of her imprisonment, torture and death. Only when all those responsible have been held accountable for their crimes will justice have been served. We offer our solidarity with her family and colleagues and support to all those fighting for justice.

Signed by:

  • ARTICLE 19 Europe
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Moldova: fears for press freedom in case of pro-Russian…

Moldova: fears for press freedom in case of pro-Russian victory

Journalists warn significant backsliding possible after elections on September 28.

On June 23 to 27, the International Press Institute (IPI), representing the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) consortium, conducted a press freedom mission to the Republic of Moldova, to assess the situation of press freedom in the country ahead of crucial parliamentary elections scheduled for September 28.

17.09.2025

Multiple interviews with journalists, press freedom activists and self-regulatory bodies painted a picture of a media sector concerned about the future of independent journalism in the country ahead of the closely watched election.

 

While the overall climate for free and independent journalism remains relatively healthy compared to other EU candidate countries in the region, local divergences remain acute and all media face intense challenges to their financial viability.

 

Moldova – still a safe haven for independent journalism?

IPI’s interviews with stakeholders in Moldova overall confirmed data documented on the MFRR’s Mapping Media Freedom (MapMF) platform. These alerts have shown that since regular monitoring started in June 2022, when Moldova became a candidate for entry into the European Union, the country enjoys a relatively healthy media freedom climate.

 

As of September 2025, the MapMF platform has recorded 81 press freedom violations in Moldova. The majority of these incidents were insults or harassment of journalists by politicians, either in person or online, as well as intimidation of journalists at protests.

 

Serious cases of physical violence against media workers were not recorded and the overall legal framework of Moldova ensures appropriate conditions for the exercise of independent journalism.

 

This includes media access to publicly available information, the right to freely report from protests and other events of public interest, as well as, overall, open media access to politicians and government officials.

 

Large-scale cyber attacks against media, which have become increasingly frequent in Europe, and especially in neighbouring Ukraine, have not been identified as a major risk in Moldova.

 

However, in a landscape characterised by the division between pro-Western and pro-Russian politics, journalists face challenges in navigating polarised news environments and disinformation. The fragility of the media and public interest journalism due to the small advertising market is particularly concerning.

 

These issues are deepened by acute regional differences within Moldova. While the media environment is overall healthy in most of the country, in Transnistria, a region occupied by pro-Russian military forces, no media are allowed to freely function. Issues also persist in the largely Russian-speaking regions of Gagauzia and Taraclia, where independent journalists report being regularly intimidated by local authorities and the population.

 

Attacks on the rise as geopolitical situation becomes more tense

The number of media freedom violations in Moldova has gradually increased since monitoring began in June 2022: 10 cases were recorded by the MapMF platform between April and December 2022, in comparison to 19 in 2023, 24 in 2024, and 25 in just the first eight months of 2025.

 

Journalists and press freedom organizations expressed particular concern about waves of attacks which have, over the past year, coincided with periods of high political tensions. The first months of 2025, for instance, saw a heavy backlash against journalists and media following the decision by the Trump administration to significantly cut U.S. foreign aid, including programmes which supported independent media.

 

In response, a number of actors, including pro-Russian politicians and private individuals, the latter especially in the online space, engaged in discrediting and intimidating behavior targeting media who previously received grant support from the United States.

 

While the drastic drop in U.S. funding greatly impacted Moldovan media, newsrooms have been able to adapt, with media representatives reporting that mass closures of media outlets have not been observed over the past year. Some journalists, however, expressed the fear that should the current level of support from European sources not continue, the risks of closure would become especially high for regional media.

 

Government approach to media freedom

While both MapMF data and interviews with Moldovan journalists have pointed to a relatively healthy level of media freedom in the country, concerns remain with regards to recent legal and regulatory decisions targeting media houses owned by pro-Russian oligarchs.

 

Central here is the mandate of Moldova’s strategic investment council (Council for the Examination of Investments of Importance to State Security). The government body was set up to help protect national security in the context of Russia’s invasion of neighbouring Ukraine and has over the past year made decisions on suspending the broadcasting of TV channels accused of distributing Russian propaganda.

 

While interviewees did not question in principle the legitimacy of the suspension of media outlets for the dissemination of pro-Russian propaganda, worries were expressed about a lack of sufficient due process in the adoption of these decisions, and the lack of transparency in the official justification for broadcast license suspensions. In fact, it was unclear whether there was any procedure in place at all for such situations, or what criteria were used to issue decisions on broadcast suspension.

 

Certain media representatives also expressed worries about the level of self-censorship in outlets which closely align editorially with the current government’s policies on pursuing European integration and denouncing Russia’s war in Ukraine. Some interviewees said that “a sort of symbiosis” exists between some pro-European media and the current government, which has led to negative perceptions about the editorial independence of these media which, in turn, leads to lower levels of public trust.

 

As a result, Moldovans have increasingly turned to social media in search of alternative voices or watchdog reporting. However, this has also increased exposure to pro-Russian disinformation and other forms of biased or unreliable news sources.

 

Efforts by the current government to counter these tendencies by building a national strategic communications (stratcom) office aiming to combat Russian disinformation, were assessed by many media stakeholders as largely ineffective.

 

Efforts to counter falling levels of trust in media, as well as Russian disinformation operations particularly during elections, are also undermined by low levels of media literacy in Moldova, leaving Moldova’s citizens particularly exposed.

 

All media stakeholders interviewed highlighted the serious risks created by Russian disinformation, arguing that Russian sources which attempt to discredit democratic, human rights and pro-EU values are able to mobilise significant financial resources, making the task of reaching local populations even more difficult for independent media.

 

Worries surrounding the outcome of the parliamentary election

The campaign preceding Moldova’s upcoming parliamentary elections in September 2025 included numerous instances in which journalists were dragged into the political contest between pro-European and pro-Russian forces, with politicians and protesters especially intimidating journalists who were carrying out reporting work.

 

Civil society organizations, self-regulatory bodies and journalists interviewed by IPI in Moldova also stressed the potential risks linked to the possible emergence of a pro-Russian government following the elections.

 

A proposal to introduce a “foreign agent” law in Moldova, similar to the one adopted in Russia, and more recently in Georgia, was even filed in parliament in April 2025, with the support of the Block of Communists and Socialists (BCS).

 

While this political group currently does not have a parliamentary majority, many journalists fear that pro-Russian parties could eventually approve such legislation and threaten the future of media which receive foreign funding.

 

Some journalists even discussed plans to relocate outside the country in the event of the victory of pro-Russian parties, noting that plans to work in exile were already explored following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

 

Other interlocutors, however, expressed doubts that a pro-Russian government would introduce restrictive “foreign agent” legislation. They pointed out that a foreign agent law would also affect many pro-Russian media, who rely on funding from Russia or other foreign sources.

 

Other fears of journalists surrounding a possible victory of pro-Russian groups include restricted access to information of public interest, limited access to press conferences for critical and independent media, as well as the possible misuse of spyware and other surveillance tools against journalists.

 

Transnistria and Gagauzia

While the media freedom situation in Moldova remains stable overall, this situation is very different in the region of Transnistria, which remains outside the control of the government in Chișinău. Inside Transnistria, independent reporting critical of the pro-Russian authorities does not exist. Journalists from other parts of Moldova cannot freely travel to the region to report. The arrest of TV8 correspondent Viorica Tataru, as well as more recent cases, testify to the risks of exercising independent journalism in Transnistria.

 

As reported by journalists who cover Transnistria and the bordering regions, reporting trips to the territory are complex operations conducted undercover, which at times leads to detention by the authorities. While to date all journalists detained in such circumstances were promptly released following the intervention of the Moldovan government or foreign embassies in Chișinău, this situation still creates high-risk conditions for journalists seeking to report from Transnistria.

 

Issues also persist in Moldova’s southern region of Gagauzia, which is under the control of the central government but enjoys a wide degree of autonomy. In Gagauzia, according to data published on the MapMF platform, journalists are regularly intimidated and harassed for their work, to a greater degree than in other regions of the country. While Gagauzia only comprises approximately five percent of Moldova’s population of around two million, close to one-third of all MapMF alerts registered in Moldova are directly linked to Gagauzia.

 

Equally important, independent journalists carry out their duties in a climate of hostility from a majority of the local population, which has traditionally elected pro-Russian parties.

 

Similar issues also persist in Taraclia, a region populated mainly by representatives of Moldova’s Bulgarian ethnic minority. In Taraclia, journalists face a situation similar to Gagauzia. Moreover, local journalists, reporting on their communities, can be exposed to greater risks of threats and intimidation as they are easier to identify and locate.

 

Conclusion

Overall, IPI’s mission to Moldova confirmed the situation depicted in data collected by the MFRR consortium since 2022, which showed a relatively healthy level of press freedom in the country despite its numerous challenges. While the situation remains overall positive, fears over the upcoming election have revealed the fragility of media freedoms in Moldova.

 

Serious issues remain with regards to Moldova’s vulnerability in the face of Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns. The fear expressed by some interviewees regarding the possible need to relocate independent media outside of Moldova, if pro-Russian parties obtain a majority in parliament in upcoming elections, is worrying in the context of the overall satisfactory situation of press freedom in the country today.

 

While the risk of Russian interference in Moldova was the greatest concern of interviewees, other long-present issues remain, such as the continued lack of even basic media freedom in Transnistria, and the continued intimidation of journalists in regions such as Gagauzia and Taraclia.

 

All in all, Moldova’s vulnerable position shows the need for additional support for the country’s vital independent media sector, the situation of which has become particularly unstable as a result of the Trump administration’s decision to terminate development aid programmes worldwide.

 

While the climate for media freedom in Moldova is positive overall, the situation remains fragile and the future of journalism could hinge dramatically on the outcome of the upcoming elections.

This statement was coordinated by IPI as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Monitoring Report January-June 2025

Monitoring Report January-June 2025

This Monitoring Report takes stock of the press freedom situation in 36 EU Member States and candidate countries during the first six months of 2025. Between January and June, the Mapping Media Freedom database documented 709 press freedom violations, affecting 1249 media workers or entities. 

16.09.2025

The report documents a vast variety of attacks, indicating that media workers in Europe operate in an increasingly hostile environment. The types of attacks documented included verbal attacks – such as death threats and smear campaigns – physical attacks, attacks to property, legal incidents, and interference with reporting work. 

 

Media workers faced threats in different contexts – including private and professional environments. Attacks online were the most common, a trend that continues from previous reports. The second most dangerous workplace for journalists were protests, followed by incidents at court and public places. 

Though private individuals remained the main perpetrators accounting for 22% of the recorded incidents, they are closely followed by government and public officials, who were responsible for 21% attacks. Police and state security were the perpetrators of 12% of the incidents. 

 

A particular focus is put on the phenomenon of foreign agent laws and disinformation narratives about foreign media funding that have become a significant threat to independent media in Europe. Media outlets and workers in Georgia, Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, and Slovakia faced accusations of foreign funding, or were targeted by laws compromising media freedom. 

 

Serbia is also highlighted as a country of concern with a total of 96 press freedom violations. Amidst ongoing anti-government protests and a violent state response, journalists faced an unprecedented number of attacks, including smear campaigns by the government, attacks during protest reporting, editorial pressure and unjust dismissals.

 

The 2025 Monitoring Report is structured in four parts:

  • A general overview highlighting major issues and trends of the press freedom situation in EU Member States and candidate countries, including quantitative analysis and charts with statistics.
  • Two thematic chapters on prominent topics within press freedom in Europe: Foreign agent laws and disinformation narratives, and the emergency situation in Serbia. 
  • An analysis of the press freedom situation in two EU Member States: Hungary and Romania.
  • An analysis of the press freedom situation in four EU candidate countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Turkey, and Ukraine. 

This report was compiled by the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF), the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ), and the International Press Institute (IPI) as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Backroom deals to silence independent media in Serbia?

Backroom deals to silence independent media in Serbia?

As the political situation in Serbia remains explosive, the publication of a controversial private conversation highlights an attempt to muzzle the few media outlets in the country that continue to take a critical line towards the government.

12.09.2025

By Massimo Moratti

Original publication on OBCT, also available in Italian.

In Serbia’s media landscape, characterized by a rapidly and progressive deterioration in freedom information    , N1 and Nova S are the only major media outlets looking critically at the actions of the Serbian government and authorities.

 

Over the last summer, marked by frequent protests and violence in many Serbian cities, the two broadcasters regularly reported live from protest sites. Journalists from both stations, often wearing protective helmets, were frequently exposed to scenes of urban warfare and occasionally harassed, insulted, and beaten     by government supporters and sometimes even by law enforcement    . No other media outlet in Serbia has been covering the protests live.

The recording

For these reasons, the publication of a recording of a conversation between Telekom Serbia’s executive director, Vladimir Lučić, and United Group’s general manager, Stan Miller, has caused a huge stir.

 

Telekom Serbia is largely state-owned, while United Group holds a majority stake in United Media, the company that owns N1. The recording was released by OCCRP     (Organized Crime Corruption Reporting Project) and KRIK     (Crime and Corruption Investigation Network), two organizations at the forefront of reporting crime and corruption in the region.

 

The recording is from a meeting between the two CEOs of their respective organizations, which took place in early August. At the beginning of the conversation, Miller commented on the situation, saying that “Serbia is exploding under our asses.” The conversation then focused on Aleksandra Subotić, executive director of United Media.

 

During the recording, Miller tells Lučić that he can’t immediately fire Subotić, as agreed, and that he must first downsize the company and divide it into several parts. Miller says he understands the president is very angry.

 

Lučić responds that President Vučić has already discussed the matter with Nikos Stathopoulos, the president of the British group that holds a majority stake in United Group. Lučić says that President Vučić only asked for the removal of Subotić, not the directors of N1 and Nova S, because he knows it’s difficult to remove the director at the moment. Miller himself says he’s very annoyed by Subotić.

Reactions

The publication of the recordings immediately sparked protests from the independent press, which gave wide coverage to the story and denounced what appeared to be an attempt to silence     N1 and Nova S.

 

President Vučić’s office, contacted for comment by the two portals, reiterated that “[President] Vučić does not interfere in the editorial policy of the media, nor does he have any interest in it.” Telekom Serbia initially declined to respond, but immediately after the recording was published, it announced it would file lawsuits against all those involved, not because the content was inauthentic, but because the two portals had not sent the recording to Telekom for verification. Lučić categorically denied     President Vučić’s involvement.

 

However, United Group’s position confirmed the conversation and its contents. United Group, which had previously reiterated that “in all the countries in which it operates, it has never been influenced, and will never be influenced, by political pressure,” confirmed that the conversation took place and reiterated its content, but firmly rejected any insinuation that the company was attempting to undermine the independence of its media outlets. However, it emphasized that recording private conversations is illegal.

 

While N1, Nova S, and other independent portals     gave the incident considerable coverage, closely following the developments, government-affiliated media outlets and press reported it only indirectly two days later, when Lučić explained      the content of the conversation to RTS and announced     he would file a lawsuit for publishing the recording.

 

The tabloid Informer    , one of the government’s most ardent supporters, followed the same line and focused on Lučić’s comments, openly criticizing Subotić for mismanaging United Media and for causing damage to both United Group and Telekom, thus deserving to be replaced.

 

While the reactions in Serbia reflect the polarization of Serbian society, outside Serbia condemnation of the attempts to limit the independence of N1 and Nova S was unanimous. The organizations participating in the Media Freedom Rapid Response project issued a press release on the matter, condemning attempts to limit media independence and calling for     intervention by European institutions to curb such attempts.

 

A few days later, this intervention arrived: when asked about the matter, European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos explicitly stated     that pressure on the media, whether political or economic, does not benefit democracy.

Concerning signs

The concerns of industry insiders and those closely following media freedom in Serbia do not appear to be unfounded. Already in February, United Group had sold     SBB, the cable television provider (including N1 and Nova S), to Telekom Serbia. The news had raised considerable concern regarding the negative impact on media freedom.

 

These concerns were heightened a few weeks later when United Group sold its satellite component to Total TV, and shortly thereafter, Total TV sold it to Telekom Srbija    . Shortly after this sale, N1 and Nova S were excluded from Telekom Srbija’s satellite programs.

 

These transactions further alarmed industry experts, who saw a coordinated effort to reduce the visibility of independent television stations. Moreover, President Vučić’s discontent with N1 and Nova S is a fact: already in June, he had described the activities of these two television stations as “pure terrorism    ,” expecting prosecutors to take action against them. This expectation was reiterated after the recent incidents     in Novi Sad.

 

More recently, the weekly Vreme     reported that Vučić’s goal is to shut down the two television stations by November 2025. The timing of this closure would be strategic given that many are speculating that new elections     will be held by December 2025.

This article was published by OBCT as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Türkiye: Stop Throttling Social Media Platforms and Messaging Services

Türkiye: Stop Throttling Social Media Platforms and Messaging Services

Türkiye is increasingly throttling social media platforms and messaging apps to silence online communication at moments of profound political or social importance. The undersigned human rights and press freedom organisations condemn Türkiye’s actions, which isolate people from vital information, and stifle democratic participation. Türkiye must correct course and uphold its international human rights obligations.

11.09.2025

On 7 September at 23:45, major social media platforms and messaging services X, Instagram, YouTube, TikTok, Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram, and Signal became inaccessible in Istanbul for approximately 21 hours

 

The bandwidth throttling coincided with a police blockade of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) Istanbul headquarters. The blockade triggered a call from CHP’s Istanbul Youth Branch to gather in front of the building at 23.00 on 7 September, in protest against a temporary injunction by an Istanbul court suspending the Party’s provincial leadership and replacing it with ‘trustees’, a decision some legal experts say was beyond the court’s jurisdiction. On September 11, a court in Ankara rejected the case for the annulment of the Party’s İstanbul provincial congress on substantive grounds.

 

The throttling of platforms was accompanied by attacks on peaceful assembly and growing pressure on media reporting on the tense situation. On 8 September, the police forcibly entered the CHP headquarters together with the court-appointed trustee, deploying tear gas against demonstrators, journalists, party members and staff both outside and inside the building. At least 10 people were reportedly detained and handcuffed. The Istanbul Governor’s Office had already issued a ban on public gatherings in six districts starting at 20:00 on 7 September and lasting until 11 September. In addition, the president of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) warned on X that outlets ‘undermining social peace and public safety’ would face administrative fines, broadcasting suspensions and, ultimately, license revocations. This comes after major independent broadcasters TELE1, Halk TV, and SZC TV were hit with broadcast bans in recent months.  

 

No official explanation has been provided for the throttling as of 11 September. Under Article 60/10 of the Electronic Communications Law (Law No. 5809), the Presidency may order the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK) to restrict communications without a court order where there is peril in delay, citing national security, public order, or other grounds listed under Article 22 of the Constitution. These administrative restrictions are temporary and have to be brought to the judiciary within 24 hours. The competent court is required to render a decision within 48 hours thereafter. This means that communication can be cut for up to 72 hours without judicial approval. Article 60/10 was added to the Electronic Communications Law in August 2016 with a State of Emergency Decree, and codified into law in November of the same year. 

 

Türkiye has a documented pattern of throttling social media platforms and messaging apps during critical events, including the February 2023 earthquakes when Twitter was throttled for about 12 hours despite urgent rescue efforts relying on it. Another example is the throttling of Instagram, YouTube, Facebook and Twitter after a bombing in November 2022.

 

The latest shutdown marks the second one in recent months. When CHP’s 2028 presidential candidate and then-Istanbul Mayor was detained in March 2025, X, TikTok, YouTube, Instagram, and Telegram were throttled in Istanbul for 42 hours. This time around, the government escalated its repression by including Signal, and Whatsapp, the most widely used mobile application in the country. Accessing throttled platforms and messaging services through VPNs is not a reliable alternative in Türkiye, as most major providers have already been blocked for several years.

 

These restrictions are often imposed with little to no explanation. Platforms and messaging services are throttled and then quietly restored, leaving the public in a state of uncertainty. They limit the ability of journalists to report developing events of intense public interest, restrict access to vital information and stifle political dissent during moments when the public most needs open and free communication. 

 

Türkiye’s actions are in clear violation of international human rights law. As emphasised by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘given their indiscriminate and disproportionate impacts on human rights, States should refrain from the full range of internet shutdowns’. Any restriction on freedom of expression, including the blocking of certain platforms, must be based on a clear legal basis, necessary to achieve a legitimate aim, and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. According to the OHCHR, any internet shutdown, including targeted ones, must further be subject to prior authorisation by a court or other independent adjudicatory body and communicated in advance to the service providers with a clear legal explanation and details regarding scope and duration. In addition, governments must provide redress mechanisms, including through judicial proceedings, to those whose rights have been affected. Türkiye repeatedly violates these requirements. It instead uses throttling measures as convenient tools in its arsenal to block people’s access to information in politically sensitive times and to limit scrutiny of its actions.    

 

The undersigned human rights and press freedom organisations urge Türkiye to refrain from throttling social media platforms and messaging services. Türkiye must stop its consistent crackdown on dissenting voices and the media, and uphold its international human rights obligations.

Signed by:

  • ARTICLE 19
  • ARTICOLO 21 
  • Civic Space Studies Association 
  • EuroMed Rights Network
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • Human Rights Watch  
  • International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), in the framework of the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders 
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • Media and Law Studies Association (MLSA)
  • PEN Denmark
  • PEN International
  • P24 Platform for Independent Journalism
  • South East Europe Media Organisation (SEEMO)
  • World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), in the framework of the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Türkiye Sosyal Medya Mecraları ve Mesajlaşma Hizmetlerinde Bant Daraltma Uygulamasına Son Vermelidir

 

​​Türkiye, özellikle siyasi ve toplumsal açıdan kritik dönemlerde sosyal medya mecraları ile çevrim içi mesajlaşma hizmetlerine yönelik bant daraltma uygulamalarına  başvurmaktadır. Aşağıda imzası bulunan insan hakları ve medya özgürlüğü kuruluşları kamuoyunun bilgiye erişimini engelleyen ve demokratik katılımı zedeleyen bu uygulamaları kınamakta; Türkiye’yi uluslararası insan hakları hukuku kapsamındaki yükümlülüklerini yerine getirmeye davet etmektedir.

 

7 Eylül günü saat 23:45 itibarıyla İstanbul’da, X, Instagram, YouTube, TikTok, Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram ve Signal’e yaklaşık 21 saat süreyle bant daraltma uygulandı. 

 

Bant daraltma uygulaması emniyet güçlerinin ana muhalefet partisi Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi’nin (CHP) İstanbul İl Başkanlığı binasını ablukaya aldığı ve bunun üzerine CHP İstanbul Gençlik Kolları’nın 7 Eylül saat 23.00’te parti binası önünde toplanma çağrısı yaptığı sırada başladı. Bu çağrı, partinin il yönetiminin bir ara kararla tedbiren askıya alınıp yerine kayyum atanmasını protesto niteliğindeydi. Kimi hukukçular bu kararın, kararı veren mahkemenin yetkisini aştığı kanısındadır. 11 Eylül’de Ankara’daki bir mahkeme, partinin İstanbul il kongresinin iptaline ilişkin davayı esastan reddetti.

 

Bant daraltma uygulaması, barışçıl toplanma hakkına müdahaleler ve gelişmeleri kamuoyuna aktaran medya kuruluşlarına yönelik artan baskılarla eş zamanlı olarak gerçekleştirilmiştir. 8 Eylül tarihinde emniyet güçleri, mahkemece atanan kayyum ile birlikte CHP İstanbul İl Başkanlığı binasına zorla girmiş; polis, bina içinde ve çevresinde bulunan göstericilere, gazetecilere, parti üyelerine ve çalışanlara karşı biber gazı kullanmıştır. Olaylar sırasında en az on kişinin kelepçelenerek gözaltına alındığı belirtilmektedir. İstanbul Valiliği 7 Eylül saat 20:00’den 11 Eylül’e dek altı ilçede tüm toplu etkinlikleri yasaklamış; Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu (RTÜK) Başkanı, X mecrası üzerinden yaptığı açıklamada ‘toplumsal barışa ve kamu güvenliğine zarar verecek’ şekilde yayın yapan kuruluşların idari para cezası, yayın durdurma ve nihayetinde lisans iptali yaptırımlarıyla karşı karşıya kalacağını sert bir dille belirtmiştir. Son aylarda TELE1, Halk TV ve SZC TV gibi bağımsız yayın kuruluşlarının yayın yasaklarına maruz kalmış olması bu tehditlerin yarattığı baskıyı artırmaktadır. 

 

11 Eylül itibarıyla, henüz bant daraltma uygulamasına ilişkin resmi bir açıklama yapılmamıştır. 5809 Sayılı Elektronik Haberleşme Kanunu’nun 60/10. maddesi uyarınca Cumhurbaşkanlığı, gecikmesinde sakınca bulunan hallerde ulusal güvenlik, kamu düzeni veya Anayasa’nın 22. maddesinde sayılan diğer gerekçelere dayanarak mahkeme kararı olmaksızın Bilgi ve İletişim Teknolojileri Kurumu’na (BTK) iletişimi kısıtlama talimatı verebilmektedir. Yasaya göre bu idari kararlar 24 saat içinde ilgili Sulh Ceza Hakimi’nin onayına sunulur, hakim kararını 48 saat içinde açıklar. Bu, mahkeme kararı olmadan iletişimin 72 saate kadar kesilebileceği anlamına gelmektedir. 60/10. madde, Ağustos 2016’da Olağanüstü Hal Kararnamesi ile Elektronik Haberleşme Kanunu’na eklenmiş ve aynı yılın Kasım ayında aynen kabul edilerek kanunlaşmıştır. 

 

Türkiye, kamusal önem taşıyan olaylar sırasında sosyal medya mecraları ve mesajlaşma hizmetlerine erişimi engellemede alenen bilinen bir kısıtlama geçmişine sahiptir. Örneğin, Şubat 2023’teki depremlerde arama kurtarma faaliyetleri kapsamında kullanılması nedeniyle hayati öneme sahip olan Twitter’a erişim yaklaşık 12 saat süreyle engellenmiştir. Yine Kasım 2022’de gerçekleşen bir bombalı saldırının ardından Instagram, YouTube, Facebook ve Twitter’a bant daraltması uygulanmıştır

 

7-8 Eylül tarihlerinde gerçekleşen bant daraltma uygulaması, son aylarda gerçekleşen ikinci benzer uygulamadır. CHP’nin 2028 Cumhurbaşkanı adayı ve tutuklanarak yerine kayyum atanan İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediye Başkanı Ekrem İmamoğlu Mart 2025’te gözaltına alındığında İstanbul’da X, TikTok, YouTube, Instagram ve Telegram’a erişim 42 saat boyunca kısıtlanmıştı. Eylül’de bu listeye Signal ve ülkede en yaygın kullanılan mobil uygulama olan WhatsApp da dahil edildi. VPN’ler aracılığıyla bant daraltmasına maruz kalan mecra ve mesajlaşma hizmetlerine erişmek ise Türkiye’de güvenilir bir alternatif teşkil etmemektedir; zira pek çok VPN hizmeti sunan uygulama da ülkede erişime engellidir

 

Elektronik Haberleşme Kanunu kapsamındaki bant daraltma uygulamaları genellikle hiçbir resmi açıklama yapılmadan başlayıp sona ermektedir. Bu uygulamalar toplumu belirsizlik içinde bırakmakta, gazetecilerin toplumsal ve siyasi açıdan önemli gelişmeleri haberleştirme kabiliyetini sınırlamakta, ve açık ve özgür iletişimin en gerekli olduğu dönemlerde siyasi muhalefetin sesini kısmaktadır.

 

Türkiye’nin bant daraltma uygulamaları uluslararası insan hakları hukukunu açıkça ihlal etmektedir. Birleşmiş Milletler İnsan Hakları Yüksek Komiserliği (OHCHR) tarafından vurgulandığı üzere, ‘insan hakları üzerinde ayrım gözetmeyen ve orantısız etkileri nedeniyle, devletler internetin tamamen kapatılmasından kaçınmalıdır’. Belirli mecralara erişimin engellenmesi de dahil olmak üzere ifade özgürlüğüne getirilen her türlü kısıtlama açık bir yasa hükmüne dayanmalı, meşru bir amaca ulaşmak için gerekli olmalı ve bu meşru amaç ile orantılı olarak uygulanmalıdır. OHCHR’ye göre, hedefli kapatmalar da dahil olmak üzere her türlü internet erişimi kısıtlaması, uygulamanın başlamasından önce mahkeme veya diğer bir bağımsız yargı organının iznine tabi olmalı; hizmet sağlayıcılara kapsam ve süreyi içeren bir yasal açıklama ile önceden bildirilmelidir. Bunun yanı sıra, kısıtlamalardan hakları etkilenen kişilere etkili telafi mekanizmaları sağlanmalıdır. Türkiye bu yükümlülükleri tekrarlayan bir biçimde ihlal etmekte, siyasi açıdan hassas dönemlerde toplumun bilgiye erişimini engelleyecek ve kendi eylemlerinin denetlenmesini sınırlayacak şekilde davranmaktadır. 

 

Aşağıda imzası bulunan kuruluşlar, Türkiye’yi sosyal medya mecraları ve çevrim içi mesajlaşma hizmetlerini kısıtlamaktan kaçınmaya çağırmaktadır. Türkiye, muhalif seslere ve medyaya yönelik baskılarını durdurmalı ve uluslararası insan hakları yükümlülüklerini yerine getirmelidir. 

İmzalayanlar

  • ARTICOLO 21
  • Avrupa Basın ve Medya Özgürlüğü Merkezi (ECPMF)
  • Avrupa Gazeteciler Federasyonu (EFJ)
  • Danimarka PEN
  • EuroMed Rights Network
  • ​​Güney Doğu Avrupa Medya Örgütü (SEEMO)
  • İnsan Hakları İzleme Örgütü (Human Rights Watch)
  • İşkence Karşıtı Dünya Koalisyonu (OMCT), İnsan Hakları Savunucularının Korunması için Gözlemevi çerçevesinde
  • Medya ve Hukuk Çalışmaları Derneği (MLSA)
  • Punto24 Bağımsız Gazetecilik Derneği (P24)
  • Sivil Alan Araştırmaları Derneği
  • Uluslararası Basın Enstitüsü (IPI)
  • Uluslararası İnsan Hakları Federasyonu (FIDH), İnsan Hakları savunucularının Korunması için Gözlemevi çerçevesinde
  • Uluslararası PEN

Bu açıklama, AB üye ülkeleri ve aday ülkelerde basın ve medya özgürlüğünün ihlallerini takip eden, izleyen ve bunlara müdahale eden Avrupa çapında bir mekanizma olan Medya Özgürlüğü Acil Müdahale (MFRR) tarafından koordine edildi.

Georgia: Media Freedom groups condemn latest attacks on journalists…

Georgia: Media Freedom groups condemn latest attacks on journalists by ruling party activists and police 

The undersigned media freedom, journalists’, and freedom of expression organizations strongly condemn the recent physical and verbal attacks on independent media by activists of the Georgian Dream ruling party and a police officer.

11.09.2025

These latest serious physical attacks are the result of long-standing impunity for crimes against journalists in Georgia. We demand an independent and thorough investigation into these incidents and that all those responsible be fully held accountable.

 

On the evening of September 8, tensions near Tbilisi Mayor Kakha Kaladze’s campaign office escalated between peaceful protesters and Georgian Dream activists. Reports and footage show GD supporters and activists attacking protesters, including journalists who were there to cover the demonstration.

 

The confrontation began when demonstrators marching from the Public Broadcaster arrived at Kaladze’s office, encountering GD supporters allegedly waiting in parked cars. GD supporters and militants used bottles and batons to attack protesters and journalists, many of whom were clearly identifiable as members of the press.

 

Several journalists were beaten by the group, including Publika.ge’s Aleksandre Keshelashvili and Keto Mikadze, whose phones were also stolen. Other journalists documented GD activists throwing objects, shouting insults, and harassing both press and protesters.

 

Hungarian journalist László Mézes, covering the demonstration for independent Hungarian publisher Magyar Hang, was beaten unconscious, had his finger broken, and his phone stolen.

 

Ketevan Khutsishvili of independent media outlet Netgazeti was verbally abused, physically pushed, and obstructed by the deputy director of the Tbilisi Police Department. In another incident, police reportedly did not react after OC Media co-founder Mariam Nikuradze was doused with water by a GD supporter.

 

All of these journalists were wearing press vests and badges and were clearly identifiable as members of the press.

 

Following the incidents, the Interior Ministry published a statement saying it has “launched an investigation into group violence.” The statement said the police officers “took all relevant measures from the start of the confrontation to cool down the tensions and prevent the further intensification of the conflict.”

 

However, according to footage and reports of independent journalists demonstrate that police either refrained from intervening or directly participated in attacks against journalists.

 

The attacks on journalists on September 8 are not isolated incidents but part of a broader, ongoing pattern of violence against reporters, police inaction, and impunity for crimes against the press in Georgia. The GD authorities have not only failed to condemn these violent acts but have systematically encouraged and promoted them, sharing responsibility for the attacks.

 

The scale of media freedom decline and systematic attacks on journalists in Georgia must not be ignored. We reiterate our call on the international community to exert stronger pressure on the increasingly authoritarian Georgian Dream regime to end its ongoing assault on independent press.

Signed by:

  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

MFRR Webinar: Taking stock: 709 attacks on media freedom…

Taking stock:  

709 attacks on media freedom in the first six months of 2025

18 September, 13:00 CET.

Between January and June 2025, the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) documented 709 press freedom violations against 1249 media workers in 36 European countries. In this webinar, we will take a look at what types of attacks media workers faced, who attacked them, and in what context. We will zoom in on developments in four focus countries – Georgia, Serbia, Romania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina – where media workers operated under severe pressure these first six months. Foreign agent laws and narratives are also highlighted as a worrying trend that threatens independent journalists and media outlets in Europe. 

Join us on September 18 to discuss an overview of the report with a special focus on Georgia, Serbia, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and foreign agent narratives. 

Speakers

Cara Räker

Monitoring Officer, European Centre for Press and Media Freedom

Camille Magnissalis

Press Freedom Monitoring and Communications Officer, the European Federation of Journalists

Ronja Koskinen

Press Freedom Officer, International Press Institute

Teona Sekhniashvili

Europe Network and Advocacy Officer, International Press Institute

Moderator

Gürkan Özturan

Media Freedom Monitoring Officer, European Centre for Press and Media Freedom