Blog

EU flags outside the European Commission Library

Joint Statement on the Proposal for the European Media…

Joint Statement on the Proposal for the European Media Freedom Act

The undersigned journalists’, media freedom, and human rights organisations welcome the European Commission’s initiative to strengthen the free and pluralistic media system and the commitment to protect journalists and editorial independence within the European Union.

These values directly link to fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression, the right to access to information, the formation of opinion, and making informed choices in elections, as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

 

Matters relating to the media have traditionally been the competence of member states, however such is the threat posed to media freedom that an EU wide action has become necessary to protect Europe’s democratic values.

 

Therefore we support the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) which breaks significant new ground in our efforts to protect media freedom in Europe. The EMFA has identified many of the key issues where the EU and member states must urgently act in order to protect media freedoms. This statement of intent, alone, is very welcome.

 

However, if the EMFA is to become effective in the struggle to guarantee media pluralism, to protect journalists’ rights and ensure editorial independence from the impact of vested commercial and political interests, it should strengthen efforts to increase the transparency in media ownership; introduce rules governing all financial relations between the state and media (in addition to advertising); guarantee the independence of national regulators as well as the independence of the European Board for Media Services; and fully protect journalists from all forms of surveillance (in addition to spyware).

 

The undersigned organisations look forward to continuing to engage with the institutions of the European Union to ensure that the text of the European Media Freedom Act is as robust and effective as possible and helps provide a foundation for generations of journalists to come.

Signed by:

  • Association of European Journalists (AEJ) 
  • Civil Liberties Union for Europe (Liberties) 
  • Coalition for Creativity (C4C) 
  • Committee to Protect Journalists 
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF) 
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ) 
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU) 
  • Global Forum for Media Development (GFMD) 
  • Index on Censorship 
  • International Press Institute (IPI) 
  • Media Diversity Institute, Belgium (MDI) 
  • OBC Transeuropa (OBCT) 
  • Ossigeno.info 
  • Reporters WIthout Borders (RSF) 
  • Society of Journalists, Warsaw 
  • South East Europe Media Organisation (SEEMO) 
  • The Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation 
  • Transparency International EU 
  • World Association Community Radio Broadcasters (AMARC Europe)
MFRR 3 consortium logos
Library

MFRR Monitoring Report: 311 European media freedom violations recorded…

MFRR Monitoring Report: 311 European media freedom violations recorded in first half of 2022

The Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) has published the latest edition of the MFRR Monitoring Report, outlining the state of media freedom throughout all European Union Member States and candidate countries from January to June 2022.

The Monitoring Report includes an analysis of the data compiled for Mapping Media Freedom, which collects and visualises all press freedom violations in the European Union and candidate countries. Although Moldova and Ukraine received candidate country status on 23 June 2022, alerts from these countries are not included in the 6 month analysis. However, given the severe impact Russia’s invasion has had on journalist safety and media freedom, the report includes a dedicated chapter focusing on Ukraine.

 

Read below for an overview of the report’s general findings. Specific thematic and country analyses can be accessed in the full report using the button below.

In the first six months of the year, 311 media freedom violations were recorded in 29 countries. These involve 552 persons or entities related to media, including journalists, media companies, family members, journalists’ sources, and NGOs fighting for press freedom.

Verbal attacks, including harassment and threats, were the most common types of violations, making up 39.2% of the total number of attacks. This was followed by legal incidents (30.9%) and physical attacks (19.3%). Attacks to property made up 14.2% of alerts and 12.9% of alerts were linked to censorship, such as blocked access to information.

 

Among these attacks was the murder of Güngör Arslan, Managing Editor of the Turkish newspaper Ses Kocaeli.

As for perpetrators, private individuals remained the main source of attacks to journalists and media workers (36.3%), followed by police and state security (17.7%) and government and public officials (11.6%).

In terms of contexts in which violations took places, online and digital attacks increased significantly and became the most frequent context (22.8%) closely followed by attacks during protests (22.2%), violations in courts (15.1%), and in public places or on the street (11.3%).

Contexts Monitoring Report

After providing a general overview of the alerts, the report continues with thematic analyses focusing on the war in Ukraine, compliance with some topics raised in the European Commission Recommendation on the protection, safety, and empowerment of journalists, and the surveillance of journalists and media workers. These analyses are followed by country reports summarising the state of media freedom in Turkey, Greece, Spain, Poland, Malta, France, Germany, Serbia, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States, Candidate Countries and Ukraine.

MFRR 3 consortium logos
Library

Albania: Press freedom groups call for a fair trial…

Albania: Press freedom groups call for a fair trial in defamation lawsuit by former top prosecutor against Isa Myzyraj

The undersigned media freedom and freedom of expression organisations and journalist unions and associations are highly concerned by the defamation lawsuit filed against journalist Isa Myzyraj, who works for Ora News, by Elizabeta Imeraj.

Formerly Tirana’s top prosecutor, Imeraj was fired in April 2022 as part of the justice reform process for causing a loss of trust in the justice system and inability to justify or explain her assets. Following yesterday’s postponement of the case and ahead of the hearing now scheduled for 16 October, we call for a fair trial with full respect for all due process rights and in which the importance of free speech, press and public interest reporting is appropriately considered.

 

Imeraj is suing Myzyraj after he reported threats and intimidation he received for writing about Imeraj’s vetting process to international networks. In late March and early April 2022, Myzyraj commented on the developments around Imeraj’s vetting process carried out by the constitutionally-mandated International Monitoring Operation (IMO). The journalist had noticed that colleagues from other media outlets began self-censoring, while many mainstream media did not report the developments. At the same time, anonymously owned media outlets in Albania began publishing defamatory pieces attacking members of the IMO in what the EU’s Directorate-General for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement characterised as an “orchestrated smear campaign”. Myzyraj said his investigations found that at least three of these online outlets had links to Imeraj and published these allegations on Facebook and Twitter. Imeraj contests this statement and filed a lawsuit before the Elbasan District Court.

 

The defamation case is set against serious concerns about media freedom and threats to independent watchdog journalism in Albania, which plummeted to 103rd rank in RSF’s 2022 World Press Freedom Index, last in the Balkans.

 

We will continue to monitor the case closely and stand in solidarity with Myzyraj.

Signed by:

  • ARTICLE 19 Europe
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)
  • Reporters Without Borders (RSF)
  • SafeJournalists Network

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States, Candidate Countries and Ukraine.

MFRR 3 consortium logos
Event

The EC Recommendation on journalists’ safety: A view from…

The EC Recommendation on journalists’ safety:

A view from the field one year on

21 September, 14:00 CEST.

On 16 September 2021, the European Commission published their Recommendation on the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists. The Recommendation illustrated the European Commission’s commitment to the safety of journalists and set out a range of measures that – if implemented – would see a marked improvement to journalist safety in EU member states.

 

One year on, journalists in Europe still face major threats to their safety and security. In this webinar, we will hear from a range of journalists about their experiences with the aim of creating a view from the media field, one year after the publication of the Recommendation.

Moderator

Guusje Somer

Policy & Advocacy Officer, Free Press Unlimited

Speakers

Emilia Sercan

Romanian investigative journalist, author and senior lecturer at the Faculty of Journalism and Communication Science within the University of Bucharest

Maja Sever

Journalist and President of the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)

Turkish journalist blacklist Library

Turkey: Solidarity with twenty journalists including TGS leadership blacklisted…

Turkey: Solidarity with twenty journalists including TGS leadership blacklisted by police

The partner organisations of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) expressed solidarity with the twenty journalists blacklisted by the Turkish General Directorate of Security (EGM) for their writing and joined Turkey’s Journalists Union (TGS) in denouncing an apparent attempt to intimidate independent journalists and trade unionists.

On 5 September, the Mezopotamya News Agency (MA) revealed that the General Directorate of Security (EGM) had blacklisted 20 journalists in relation to their writings for the online magazine Journalist Post, a periodical run by journalists living in exile. No legal proceedings have yet been initiated against them.

 

The confidential document, containing the blacklist, was disclosed during the trial of MA editor-in-chief Dicle Müftüoğlu, on trial under terrorism charges. According to media reports, the list was prepared based on intelligence information collected against the Fethullah Gülen movement for anti-terrorism police departments. Based on this intelligence information, the EGM Foreign Relations Department of the Turkish Police classified Journalist Post as being run by a Fethullah Gülen-linked network.

 

Since 2020, four magazine issues have been published as part of a solidarity campaign for freedom of expression and press freedom worldwide. It featured 74 articles, interviews, news and analysis written by journalists and academics from 32 different countries, available in Turkish, English and German.

 

The list includes the name of the journalists who have been involved in running the magazine or contributing to it, their ID numbers, their positions, and whether they have an entry with their ID numbers on the National Judiciary Network (UYAP).

 

The listed journalists are: Engin Sağ, Şemsi Açıkgöz, Mustafa Kılıç, Yüksek Durgut, Ramiz Kılıçarslan, Necdet Çelik, Hasan Cücük,  İsmail Muhammet Sağıroğlu, Enes Cansever,  Basri Doğan, Türkmen Terzi, Vedat Demir, Rabia Yavuz Türe, Yunus Erdoğdu, Naciye Nur Kılıç, Erkan Pehlivan, Erkin Emet, Dicle Müftüoğlu, Dicle Fırat (Journalists Association DFG Co-chairperson), Mustafa Kuleli (General Secretary of Journalists Union of Turkey and EFJ Vice-President) and Gökhan Durmuş (President of Journalists Union of Turkey).

 

Listed among the 20 journalists, EFJ Vice-President Mustafa Kuleli reacted: “Erdogan’s regime is trying to criminalise journalism and advocacy by juxtaposing them with terrorism. They are trying to intimidate us. We will continue to defend journalists, journalism and democracy.  As I wrote in my article that got me blacklisted: Turkey is bigger than Erdogan. The people of Turkey will eventually defeat tyranny and despotism.”

 

Our organisations urge the Turkish authorities to end the repression of media freedom advocates and to not start legal proceedings against the listed journalists. Thirty-eight journalists and media workers are still behind bars in Turkish prisons for doing their job in the public interest.

Signed by:

  • ARTICLE 19 Europe
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • OBC Transeuropa

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States, Candidate Countries and Ukraine.

MFRR 3 consortium logos
OK Radio Library

Serbia: Support for OK Radio as it faces intimidation…

Serbia: Support for OK Radio as it faces intimidation by powerful businessperson

The partner organisations of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) today express support and solidarity with embattled broadcaster OK Radio and urge Serbian law enforcement authorities to put an end to the dangerous campaign of harassment and pressure exerted on the media outlet by a powerful local businessperson.

Over the last few months, OK Radio, a leading independent radio station which covers local news in the southern city of Vranje, has faced an increasingly violent wave of attacks and intimidation from Dejan Nikolic Kantar, a powerful gambling businessperson. Pressure on the media outlet and its staff began in March 2022 after they filed a complaint to an inspector about plans by a company connected to Kantar to illegally build a new gambling business on the site next to the radio station.

 

Around this time, the radio station’s owner Olivera Vladković told police that she received threats over the phone from Kantar, who demanded she give consent for the construction or face “problems”. After OK Radio refused to back down, in April masked individuals smashed windows at the “No Comment” cafe, a business attached to the station which is also owned by Vladković and provides OK Radio with a large part of its income.

 

In early June, construction of the betting shop continued without permits and walled up one of the windows of the radio station overnight. OK Radio reported the news and shared pictures. Soon after, the café was vandalised again when a man was filmed spray painting the building. An individual then entered the café holding a mobile phone with the speaker turned on, through which Kantar screamed threats at OK Radio staff and journalists.

 

As the plight of the radio station gained national attention, representatives of Serbia’s Permanent Working Group for Safety of Journalists visited Vranje in mid-June to support OK Radio. Posters were put up overnight in the streets of Vranje which depicted a fake arrest warrant for Veran Matić, a leading member of the Working Group. Four men were recently tried but found not guilty of threatening the safety of Matić.

 

On June 16, Kantar was arrested for violent behaviour after he went to the café to allegedly threaten OK Radio journalists. Two other individuals who are alleged to have carried out attacks on his behalf have also been detained. All three are facing criminal charges brought by prosecutors and have denied the allegations. Kantar, a leading figure in the local gambling and construction industry, is currently serving separate sentences for violent behaviour and illegal betting, according to reports. Although a planning inspector has ordered the illegal building to be demolished, local companies have refused to carry out the demolition for fear of reprisals.

 

Most recently, during the trial of the businessperson on August 16, Kantar explicitly threatened the radio station’s owners in the courthouse telling them: “The fact that you said in court that you are afraid, you are right, you have reasons to be afraid, and I will not stop…”. According to reports, he also made a veiled death threat in a reference to murders at the Jasenovac concentration camp in 1941, at which point he made the sound of gunfire. In recent months, two employees have left their jobs at OK Radio over fears for their safety.

 

Our organisations view these actions as a brazen attempt by a local strongman to threaten the media outlet into silence, put its staff in danger, and intimidate other journalists from critical reporting on Kantar and his business interests. These tactics are used all too often by powerful business interests in Serbia who feel that they can threaten the media with impunity.

 

We urge Serbian authorities to ensure the safety of the journalists and staff at OK Radio and demonstrate that such attacks on journalists will not go unpunished. We also welcome the vocal support given to OK Radio by media representatives of the Permanent Working Group for Safety of Journalists and the wider journalistic community in Serbia. Our organisations will continue to monitor the situation closely and will be watching for the next hearing in the trial on the violent attacks against OK Radio scheduled for September 30.

Signed by:

  • ARTICLE 19 Europe
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • OBC Transeuropa

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States, Candidate Countries and Ukraine.

MFRR 3 consortium logos
Library

Analysis: Strengthening Moldova’s independent press in the shadow of…

Analysis: Strengthening Moldova’s independent press in the shadow of polarisation and propaganda

By IPI Contributor Daniel Salaru

Following the election of a pro-EU president in 2020, Moldova’s independent press has grown in strength and significance. However, challenges remain as a result of the country’s political and social instability, its vast levels of corruption, and the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine. Among growing regional tensions, Moldova’s independent press is preparing for an uncertain future.

Moldova, historically a frontier between empires, continues to suffer as a result of its past. Despite gaining independence from the USSR in 1991, its society has been continuously divided between aligning with the west or the former Soviet sphere.

 

The conflict between these opposing viewpoints led to the tumultuous early years of independence, with the tiny nation being divided between one central government, an autonomous territorial unit, Gagauzia, and a separatist region occupied by Russian forces, Transnistria.

 

The coming to power of President Maia Sandu’s pro-western government in 2020 brought new hopes for an independent press. However, against the backdrop of the nearby war in Ukraine, growing political and economic uncertainty continues to impede press freedom and pluralism to this day.

 

Between jingoists, oligarchs, and politicians 

Moldova’s press environment, though diverse, remains highly polarized. While the news conglomerates of oligarch and former Democratic Party of Moldova leader Vlad Plahotniuc collapsed after he fled the country in 2019, a new threat soon emerged. Another media empire rose to prominence under the control of the pro-Russian Socialist party (PSRM). Seven notable TV channels, several dozen news portals and Telegram channels, alongside dozens of political commentators, came under the direct or indirect control of the PSRM and its leader, Igor Dodon. Their rhetoric was continuously bolstered by Russian propaganda, exploiting the popularity of the Russian language in Moldova.

 

Despite an often-hostile environment, independent outlets continued to reveal the corruption of leading officials and fight disinformation. RISE, a leading independent Moldovan investigative outlet, released a notable series of reports discussing the ties between Kremlin and Dodon. Other investigative outlets often used their platforms to expose the opulence and schemes of oligarchs, public officials, and members of the judiciary. The free press has had successes in exposing the root causes of disinformation.

 

However, the combined efforts of the pro-Kremlin and pro-PSRM media networks continued to undermine popular confidence in state institutions and the very concept of Moldovan independence, making it difficult for independent outlets to gain the trust of the public. Despite domestic and international efforts, low levels of media literacy often rendered many in Moldova susceptible to disinformation campaigns.

 

“Propaganda is like radiation, it is very hard to contain,” said Vladimir Thorik, the Russian-language editor of RISE, in an interview with IPI. “No matter what you do, you can’t succeed. Propaganda appeals to the ideas of the good old Soviet times and that the West is foreign to Moldovan society. It uses corrupted methods and ideas.”

 

After 2020, the increasingly hostile rhetoric of the pro-Russian media, both external and internal, continued to sow instability. A 2021 poll by the Institute of Public Politics, a Moldovan civil society organization, found that 90 percent of the inhabitants of Gagauzia got their news from Russian-language media outlets. A total of 62 percent of the respondents expressed their extreme confidence in Russian-language news. These channels were controlled either by the Kremlin or the PSRM.

 

Russia’s influence remained strong in all territories of the Republic, as Moldova’s governmental institutions were simply not strong enough to counter the barrage of disinformation.

 

However, the war in Ukraine brought the battle against disinformation into the spotlight.

 

A new fight 

After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, in an effort to counter the increasingly damaging effects of Kremlin propaganda, the Moldovan parliament effectively banned the broadcast of news, military, political and analytical Russian programmes on June 22. However, even this radical ban was not able to counter the effects of years of disinformation.

“In Gagauzia and Transnistria they air Russian news channels and the Chisinau authorities cannot do anything about it,” said Thorik.

Disinformation continued to spread through the internet. The Socialist-controlled TV channels, while supposedly airing Moldovan news, ignored the war in Ukraine at best and disseminated Kremlin talking points at worst.

“Some media chose to not talk about the war, but talked a lot about refugees, failing to discuss who started the war and how the war was going. It was bizarre,” said Nadine Gogu, the executive director of the leading Moldovan press freedom NGO Center for Independent Journalism (CJI), in an interview with IPI. “A lot of Russian content replaced this, like shows and movies. Once Russian talk shows were banned, even the shows not discussing politics still discussed politics, as the Russians adapted and tried to reach outside Russia.”

Facing a weakened, yet persistent network of disinformation, Moldovan outlets continue to look for new ways to counter disinformation and strengthen their presence. However, the ever-present military threat from Russia via Transnistria and Gagauzia has created a permanent level of uncertainty for all outlets in Moldova.

 

Adapting to the new reality 

The full-scale conflict in Ukraine, at its start, presented an unprecedented challenge to Moldovan outlets. Amidst a drastic increase in work intensity, advertising revenues collapsed, while staffing shortages became more acute.

 

“The first months were very difficult,” said Gogu. “Advertising revenues fell drastically… a lot of mass media institutions were left without the few revenues that were coming from advertising. Some said that this withdrawal was even selective, advertising was taken from the outlets that were actually reporting about the war, while others who chose to ignore the war or be silent on it continued to receive revenues.”

 

“The volume of work has grown massively, editors are few and continue to remain in small numbers,” Gogu added. “People continue to be exhausted, working seven days a week as things are changing hour to hour, minute to minute. They do not have the resources to hire people, due to the fall in advertising revenues.”

 

Despite these hardships, the free press has attempted to adapt to the new reality. Through new international partnerships and methods of financing, as well as long-term education campaigns, many hope to break the media bubble that some Moldovans have found themselves in.

 

“We started talking more intensively with Ukrainians and Russians,” said Thorik. “We have the Transnistrian problem and many other threats that we did not talk about much before.” Indeed, in cooperation with the independent Ukrainian outlet Slidstvo, RISE published an investigation into the use of Ukrainian passports by leading Transnistrian leaders in order to travel freely through Europe. “On the one hand, they organized a mini North Korea and on the other hand they used the passports to go abroad,” said Thorik.

 

Many in the independent press have also increasingly looked to outside grants to compensate the loss of advertising revenues. As advertising contracts are often politically motivated, grants act as a guarantor of editorial independence for many outlets. “Today many Moldovan outlets have accessed international grants,” said Gogu. “They wish to continue their work.”

 

However, problems with grants persist.

 

“There was some international aid,” stated Thorik. “There were some grants for improving safety. However, they were not structural or institutional grants, they were one-time, purchasing equipment piece-by-piece for the time being. As we see from the example of Ukrainian journalists, once war starts, we have to be prepared. We are in a period of uncertainty, we do not know the threats that are facing us.” Like Ukrainian journalists themselves, members of the Moldovan free press have expressed their concern over the short-term nature of many of the grants.

 

Leading outlets and press freedom NGOs have also made efforts to increase levels of media literacy and critical analysis skills to improve the population’s ability to detect disinformation. Thanks to CJI support and leadership, in the 2021-2022 school year, the optional school subject of media education was taught by 128 teachers to 4,208 schoolkids across the entire country. The center supported numerous other projects promoting critical analysis skill and media literacy. “We work on media education and hope to integrate this concept in other institutions,” said Gogu.

 

Uncertainty on the horizon 

“It is calm now, but we do not know what will happen in the fall,” says Gogu. Independent journalism in Moldova, while currently showing remarkable progress, is ultimately under grave threat.

 

With the continuously evolving situation in Ukraine, as well as growing domestic hardships, it is likely that the challenges that the Moldovan press will face in its near future will be immense. With the growing potential for Moldova’s domestic situation to be exploited by external forces, it is imperative that the work of a free and independent press is continuously supported, both domestically and internationally.

This article is part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States, Candidate Countries, and Ukraine. The project is co-funded by the European Commission.

MFRR 3 consortium logos
Library

Turkey: International groups call to restore Evrensel’s right to…

Turkey: International groups call to restore Evrensel’s right to receive public ads

18 press freedom, freedom of expression and human rights organisations call on the Turkish Press Advertising Agency (BİK) to withdraw without delay its alarming decision to revoke the right of the independent Evrensel newspaper to receive public ads, a vital source of financial income for the publication. BİK has a regulatory duty to act as an independent and fair distributor of public ads, and not to facilitate censorship through suppressing critical news outlets.

 

Turkish translation available here.

On 22 August 2022, Evrensel newspaper received BİK’s decision backdated to July 17, 2022, revoking its right to receive public ads. This move was prompted by an audit into alleged bulk buying that distorted Evrensel’s distribution figures against which measure the advertising levels are set. The right of Evrensel to receive public advertisements has been suspended since September 2019. With the latest decision, this suspended right was completely cancelled.

 

In its decision, the BİK stated that “the public ad ban on Evrensel was observed to be suspended for a full six months without break, excluding the period when such administrative monitoring was suspended due to the pandemic, therefore its right to receive public ads was revoked”. Evrensel has the right to appeal to the decision at court. Should Evrensel be removed from BİK’s system to receive any public advertising, a new, swiftly launched application process for re-gaining the right to public ads would take at least three years. This drawn-out process would be detrimental to the newspaper’s financial stability.

 

In the last three years, IPI and undersigned press freedom organisations have repeatedly called on BİK to withdraw the initial public ad ban that was initiated in September 2019 on Evrensel. Ten members of the European Parliament had also joined the call with a letter to then-General Director of BİK Rıdvan Duran requesting the ban be lifted. Despite an in person meeting with Duran in February 2020, the ad ban remained in force until this latest decision.

 

MFRR Coordinator, Gürkan Özturan, said:

 

“The long time pressure and regulatory restrictions imposed on independent media has been impacting media freedom and society’s right to access information negatively in Turkey. The latest BİK decision to revoke advertisement revenues for Evrensel is yet another example of this ongoing and increasing trend and must be revoked immediately.”

 

In a judgment issued on 10 August 2022, the Turkish Constitutional Court ruled that BİK’s arbitrary and consecutive public ad bans on newspapers including Sözcü, Cumhuriyet, Evrensel and BirGün, violated freedom of expression and press freedom as well as constituted and evidence of BİK acting as a tool for systematic censorship and criminalization of news coverage in the country. The Constitutional Court’s verdict thus confirmed that BİK lacks impartiality towards media outlets.

 

Media freedom in recent years has been deteriorating in Turkey in light of the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in 2023, we are concerned about the state of remaining independent media outlets, the repercussions it will have on the right to access information for the residents of Turkey who will need to rely on the existing media outlets to make informed decisions in the election calendar, and how this will contribute to an already-shrinking civic space in the country. Hereby we once again call upon the Press Advertising Agency (BİK) in Turkey to withdraw the decision to revoke ad revenues for Evrensel.

Signed by:

  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • ARTICLE 19
  • Articolo 21
  • Danish PEN
  • English PEN
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • IFEX
  • IPS Communication Foundation/bianet
  • Media and Law Studies Association (MLSA)
  • OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)
  • P24 (Platform for Independent Journalism)
  • PEN America
  • PEN Norway
  • PEN Turkey
  • Reporters Without Borders (RSF)
  • South East Europe Media Organisation (SEEMO)
  • Swedish PEN
  • The Coalition For Women In Journalism (CFWIJ)

Uluslararası hak grupları, Evrensel’in kamu ilanı yayımlama hakkının geri verilmesi için çağrı yaptı 

Basın İlan Kurumu, Evrensel gazetesinin kamu ilanı alma hakkını iptal etti

 

Uluslararası Basın Enstitüsü (IPI) ve 17 uluslararası basın ve ifade özgürlüğü ve insan hakları grubu, Basın İlan Kurumu’na (BİK) bağımsız Evrensel gazetesinin kamu ilanı alma hakkına yönelik iptal kararını derhal geri çekme çağrısı yaptı. BİK, gazetelerin yayın hayatı için hayati önem taşıyan kamu ilanlarının bağımsız ve adil bir biçimde dağıtılmasında düzenleyici bir rol oynamalıdır, eleştirel haber kurumlarını baskılayarak sansür mekanizmasını yaygınlaştırmada değil.

 

Evrensel gazetesine 22 Ağustos 2022’de tebliğ edilen 17 Temmuz tarihli BİK kararında gazetenin kamu ilanı alma hakkının tümüyle iptal edildiği bildirildi. Bu karar, Evrensel gazetesinin tirajını “çoklu alım” ile arttırdığı iddialarını takiben başlatılan denetimlerin gerçekleştirilmesinin ardından geldi. Evrensel için gazetelerin tirajlarına göre belirlenen kamu ilanı gelirleri Eylül 2019’da denetim kararına kadar BİK tarafından durdurulmuştu. Bu son karar ile Evrensel gazetesi, kamu ilanı yayımlama hakkını tümüyle kaldırdı.

 

BİK kararında, “23 Mart 2020 ile 30 Nisan 2022 tarihleri arasında Kurumca mevzuat şartlarının aranmadığı salgın süreci hariç bırakılmak suretiyle altı ay içinde yayınlama hakkı yeniden devam etmediği anlaşıldığından, Günlük Evrensel gazetesinin, resmi ilan ve reklam yayınlama hakkının sona ermesine karar verilmiştir,” ifadelerini kullandı. Evrensel’in kararı önce BİK’e itiraz etmek olmak üzere mahkemede temyiz hakkı bulunuyor. Evrensel gazetesinin BİK sisteminden çıkarılması halinde, ilan yayımlama hakkının geri kazanımı için bugün başlatılacak bir başvuru sürecinin dahi en az üç yıl süreceği öngörülüyor. Bu süreç, gazetenin finansal sürdürülebilirliği açısından son derece yıkıcı etkiler doğuracaktır.

 

Son üç yıl içinde, IPI ve aşağıda imzası bulunan basın özgürlüğü kurumları, Eylül 2019’da verilen Evrensel’e yönelik ilan durdurma cezasının kaldırılması için BİK’e pek çok kez çağrıda bulundu. 10 Avrupa Parlamentosu üyesi, dönemin BİK Başkanı Rıdvan Duran’a ortak mektup göndererek bu çağrıya destek vermişti. Şubat 2020’de Duran ile IPI öncülüğünde yüz yüze düzenlenen bir toplantıda bu talep ve endişeler dile getirilmiş olmasına rağmen, ilan durdurma cezası kaldırılmamıştı.

 

Sözcü, Cumhuriyet, Evrensel ve BirGün gazetelerinin toplu başvurusuna yönelik Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin 10 Ağustos 2022 tarihli kararında, bu gazetelere verilen arka arkaya ve keyfi ilan kesme cezalarının basın ve ifade özgürlüklerini ihlal ettiğini belirtti. Ayrıca bu durumun yapısal sorunlardan kaynaklandığını belirten karar ile BİK’in ülkedeki sistematik sansür mekanizmasının bir aracı olarak hareket ettiği adeta teyit etmiş oldu. Böylelikle, AYM kararı BİK’in medya kurumlarına yönelik bağımsız yaklaşımının kaybedildiğini tasdik etti.

 

Son yıllarda Türkiye’deki medya özgürlüğü alanı gün geçtikçe daralıyordu. 2023 genel ve başkanlık seçimleri takvimi devam ederken, bağımsız haber yapmaya çalışan medya kuruluşlarının durumu, bilgiye dayalı karar verebilmek için var olan basın kuruluşlarına bağımlı kalan Türkiye vatandaşlarının habere erişimi üzerindeki olumsuz etkileri ve tüm bunların halihazırda daralmakta olan sivil alana olumsuz katkısı hakkında büyük endişe içerisindeyiz. O nedenle, bir kez daha Basın İlan Kurumu’na Evrensel gazetesinin ilan yayımlama hakkının iptalinin geri çekilmesi için çağrı yapıyoruz.

İmzacı kurumlar:

  • Uluslararası Basın Enstitüsü (IPI)
  • ARTICLE 19
  • Articolo 21
  • Avrupa Basın ve Medya Özgürlüğü Merkezi (ECPMF)
  • Danish PEN
  • English PEN
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • IFEX
  • International Federation of Journalists (IFJ)
  • IPS Communication Foundation/bianet
  • Media and Law Studies Association (MLSA)
  • OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)
  • P24 (Platform for Independent Journalism)
  • PEN America
  • PEN Norway
  • PEN Turkey
  • Reporters Without Borders (RSF)
  • South East Europe Media Organisation (SEEMO)
  • Swedish PEN
  • The Coalition For Women In Journalism (CFWIJ)

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States, Candidate Countries and Ukraine.

MFRR 3 consortium logos
Library

Greece: The government must not cover up “Greek Watergate”

Greece: The government must not cover up “Greek Watergate”

By The Manifold, an investigative media outlet covering Greece

Despite mounting pressure, the Greek government is still refusing to provide substantive answers regarding the revelations that two journalists and an MEP and leader of an opposition party have been targeted for surveillance by EYP (the Greek Intelligence Service), as well as by yet unknown operators using the spyware “Predator”.

The affair concerns two distinct operations. The first is EYP’s spying on two journalists, Stavros Malichoudis, a reporter with independent outlet Solomon, and Thanasis Koukakis, a freelance journalist investigating banking and business stories; and also Nikos Androulakis, an MEP and leader of opposition party PASOK. These surveillance operations were carried out through EYP’s “normal” procedure for listening in on a target’s communications, following approval by a prosecutor. The second was the hacking of Koukakis’s and Androulakis’s mobile phones with Predator, a spyware tool that is able to access even encrypted services.

 

Although the surveillance of journalists and political opponents by state services hardly seems like the hallmark of democratic governance, the first procedure can be legal, not only for “national security” reasons, but also in cases of serious crime like drug smuggling or human trafficking. The legal framework in Greece, however, lacks any provision for technically supervising the use of spyware, which in practice makes it illegal.

 

No conclusive link between the two operations has been proven — yet. The fact, though, that they took place one right after the other (in the case of Koukakis) or simultaneously (in the case of Androulakis) raises reasonable suspicions that they are related. Further suspicions about both the use of spyware and the ostensibly legal procedure used against two journalists and a politician are raised not only by the Greek government’s handling of the affair, but also a number of key decisions it has made in the last three years.

 

Legislating against transparency

Soon after being elected in July 2019, the New Democracy government implemented new legislation in two crucial areas regarding the intelligence service: first, it brought it under the direct purview of the office of the prime minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis; second, it amended the required qualifications for the position of director of intelligence, so it could appoint the prime minister’s favourite, Panayiotis Kontoleon, who fell short of the previous criteria.

 

Less than two years later, in March 2021, it made another controversial move: it introduced a rushed legislative amendment, piggybacked on unrelated legislation, that changed the provisions which allowed citizens to be informed whether they had been under surveillance (provided such surveillance had been terminated), if their surveillance had taken place for reasons of “national security”. In other words, up to that point, ADAE (the Hellenic Authority for Communication Security and Privacy) could, following permission from a prosecutor, inform a citizen who requested it that they had been under surveillance in the past, which meant that there was at least a theoretical possibility to seek redress in the courts, if one believed they had been targeted unfairly. Since the law changed, it is sufficient for EYP to claim reasons of “national security” and ADAE cannot divulge anything. What is more, the law applies retroactively, so all past surveillance is now effectively beyond scrutiny.

 

Members of the ADAE board, albeit in a non-official capacity, had protested at the time and had pointed out that such legislation contravenes the European Convention of Human Rights, as it practically deprives victims of illegal surveillance of access to due process. There is no indication that the government even considered their protests.

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States, Candidate Countries and Ukraine.

From migrants’ rights to Predator

In November 2021, Efimerida ton Syntakton, a prominent left-wing daily, published a report which revealed that EYP had targeted numerous individuals for surveillance, apparently without legitimate reason. Among them, there were participants in anti-vaccination rallies, but also a civil servant who supported migrant workers’ rights, a lawyer who defended an immigrant in court, and a journalist who was trying to locate an unaccompanied minor in a refugee camp.

 

When Stavros Malichoudis, the journalist in question, recognised himself in the report, Solomon, the independent website where he works, published a scathing article, asking: “In which system of government does the state record the movements of journalists?” No justification for the surveillance was ever made public.

 

In December 2021, in a seemingly unrelated development, two reports, one by Citizen Lab of the University of Toronto and one by Meta (Facebook’s parent company), pointed out the threat of Predator, a new spyware developed by so-called “cyber-mercenaries” of the global surveillance-for-hire industry. Predator closely resembles Pegasus, a similar spyware tool implicated in illegal hackings across the world since 2016.

 

The reports did not exactly rock the Greek mainstream media’s news cycle. However, one independent, investigative website, Inside Story, picked up on the fact that the reports mentioned the possibility of Predator “customers” in Greece. It followed up on the reports and published a story showing that a corporate structure had been established in Greece to market Predator, and also most disquietingly that dozens of fake urls had been created to resemble existent Greek webpages, in an apparent phishing set-up for potential Predator targets. Despite the obvious implications for the security of communications, there was no official response from competent authorities.

 

A private citizens’ affair

Inside Story’s next feature, however, in April 2022,  launched the torrent of revelations that have been termed the “Greek Watergate” — a title repeated by no less an authority on the matter than The Washington Post. It showed that investigative journalist Thanasis Koukakis’s phone, analysed by Citizen Lab, had been hacked with Predator, the first such confirmed case in Europe. It also showed that Koukakis, alerted by a source that his communications might have been monitored, had submitted a request to ADAE to be informed if he had been a surveillance target in the past. ADAE replied that “no event that contravenes relevant legislation has been noted”. Inside Story pointed out that the “relevant legislation”, which could have compelled ADAE to inform Koukakis of his surveillance, had been hastily amended.

 

The publication provoked the first reaction from the government, which amounted to no more than a dismissal: the government spokesman Yiannis Oikonomou simply said there should be an investigation if “one private citizen had another private citizen under surveillance”.

 

The “private citizen” argument, though, was immediately questioned when, a few days after Inside Story, another independent investigative website, Reporters United, published a report that proved that EYP had Koukakis under surveillance, citing “national security”, under its “normal” procedure, for three months in 2020. EYP broke off the surveillance on the very day that Koukakis filed his request with ADAE. His phone was hacked with Predator immediately after that.

 

The government neither confirmed nor denied the “normal” surveillance of Koukakis by EYP, following the same pattern it had established a year earlier with Malichoudis, but it continued to deny any involvement with Predator. Moreover, EAD (the National Transparency Authority, created by the New Democracy government), which had been tasked with investigating Koukakis’s phone hacking, issued a report absolving the government of any wrongdoing, although it failed to even consider important evidence. This is not the only time that EAD has been criticised for incomplete and pro-government investigations. Its report on illegal pushbacks of refugees had met with international ridicule when it found no wrongdoing by the Greek authorities, based solely on the testimony of the police and coastguard.

 

Denials and resignations

Barely a few days after EAD had cleared the government, Nikos Androulakis revealed that according to the EU Parliament’s security experts, there had been an attempt to hack his phone with Predator. Under pressure for answers, EYP revealed in July that it had been spying on him under its “normal” procedure, for reasons of “national security”, during the time he was a candidate for PASOK’s leadership. This surveillance had taken place simultaneously with the attempted Predator attack.

 

Meanwhile, the two independent outlets, Inside Story and Reporters United, had persisted with their investigations, and through a series of stories had established that EYP and the Greek police services had been in the market for spyware in the past, and that Intellexa, the company that markets Predator, was active in Greece and was indirectly connected, through a web of corporate entities, with government contracts. The more recent of these reports, by Reporters United, also published in Efimerida ton Syntakton, indirectly tied some of these corporate entities to Grigoris Dimitriadis, the general secretary of the Prime Minister’s office.

 

Initially, Dimitriadis had defended his business activities as legal, and had denied any involvement with Predator or related corporate entities. After a few days, though, under the weight of the revelations, both Grigoris Dimitriadis and Panayiotis Kontoleon, the director of EYP, submitted their resignations. Dimitriadis, however, followed his resignation with lawsuits against Reporters United, Efimerida ton Syntakton and Thanasis Koukakis, demanding exorbitant sums for alleged defamation.

 

It is worth noting that during the four months since Inside Story’s revelation that Koukakis’s phone had been hacked with Predator, there has barely been a mention of the affair in Greek mainstream media, whose overwhelming pro-government bias we have analysed in a previous article. It has only been since Androulakis made the attempted Predator attack on his phone public that most mainstream media saw fit to cover the scandal to a limited degree — presumably because he is a centrist politician rather than an independent journalist.

Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. Image via Shutterstock/Alexandros Michailidis Library

Greece: The government must not cover up “Greek Watergate”

Greece: The government must not cover up “Greek Watergate”

Revelations about wiretapping and spyware surveillance of journalists underscore press freedom concerns.

 

By The Manifold, an investigative media outlet covering Greece

Despite mounting pressure, the Greek government is still refusing to provide substantive answers regarding the revelations that two journalists and an MEP and leader of an opposition party have been targeted for surveillance by EYP (the Greek Intelligence Service), as well as by yet unknown operators using the spyware “Predator”.

The affair concerns two distinct operations. The first is EYP’s spying on two journalists, Stavros Malichoudis, a reporter with independent outlet Solomon, and Thanasis Koukakis, a freelance journalist investigating banking and business stories; and also Nikos Androulakis, an MEP and leader of opposition party PASOK. These surveillance operations were carried out through EYP’s “normal” procedure for listening in on a target’s communications, following approval by a prosecutor. The second was the hacking of Koukakis’s and Androulakis’s mobile phones with Predator, a spyware tool that is able to access even encrypted services.

Although the surveillance of journalists and political opponents by state services hardly seems like the hallmark of democratic governance, the first procedure can be legal, not only for “national security” reasons, but also in cases of serious crime like drug smuggling or human trafficking. The legal framework in Greece, however, lacks any provision for technically supervising the use of spyware, which in practice makes it illegal.

No conclusive link between the two operations has been proven — yet. The fact, though, that they took place one right after the other (in the case of Koukakis) or simultaneously (in the case of Androulakis) raises reasonable suspicions that they are related. Further suspicions about both the use of spyware and the ostensibly legal procedure used against two journalists and a politician are raised not only by the Greek government’s handling of the affair, but also a number of key decisions it has made in the last three years.

Legislating against transparency

Soon after being elected in July 2019, the New Democracy government implemented new legislation in two crucial areas regarding the intelligence service: first, it brought it under the direct purview of the office of the prime minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis; second, it amended the required qualifications for the position of director of intelligence, so it could appoint the prime minister’s favourite, Panayiotis Kontoleon, who fell short of the previous criteria.

Less than two years later, in March 2021, it made another controversial move: it introduced a rushed legislative amendment, piggybacked on unrelated legislation, that changed the provisions which allowed citizens to be informed whether they had been under surveillance (provided such surveillance had been terminated), if their surveillance had taken place for reasons of “national security”. In other words, up to that point, ADAE (the Hellenic Authority for Communication Security and Privacy) could, following permission from a prosecutor, inform a citizen who requested it that they had been under surveillance in the past, which meant that there was at least a theoretical possibility to seek redress in the courts, if one believed they had been targeted unfairly. Since the law changed, it is sufficient for EYP to claim reasons of “national security” and ADAE cannot divulge anything. What is more, the law applies retroactively, so all past surveillance is now effectively beyond scrutiny.

Members of the ADAE board, albeit in a non-official capacity, had protested at the time and had pointed out that such legislation contravenes the European Convention of Human Rights, as it practically deprives victims of illegal surveillance of access to due process. There is no indication that the government even considered their protests.

From migrants’ rights to Predator

In November 2021, Efimerida ton Syntakton, a prominent left-wing daily, published a report which revealed that EYP had targeted numerous individuals for surveillance, apparently without legitimate reason. Among them, there were participants in anti-vaccination rallies, but also a civil servant who supported migrant workers’ rights, a lawyer who defended an immigrant in court, and a journalist who was trying to locate an unaccompanied minor in a refugee camp.

When Stavros Malichoudis, the journalist in question, recognised himself in the report, Solomon, the independent website where he works, published a scathing article, asking: “In which system of government does the state record the movements of journalists?” No justification for the surveillance was ever made public.

In December 2021, in a seemingly unrelated development, two reports, one by Citizen Lab of the University of Toronto and one by Meta (Facebook’s parent company), pointed out the threat of Predator, a new spyware developed by so-called “cyber-mercenaries” of the global surveillance-for-hire industry. Predator closely resembles Pegasus, a similar spyware tool implicated in illegal hackings across the world since 2016.

The reports did not exactly rock the Greek mainstream media’s news cycle. However, one independent, investigative website, Inside Story, picked up on the fact that the reports mentioned the possibility of Predator “customers” in Greece. It followed up on the reports and published a story showing that a corporate structure had been established in Greece to market Predator, and also most disquietingly that dozens of fake urls had been created to resemble existent Greek webpages, in an apparent phishing set-up for potential Predator targets. Despite the obvious implications for the security of communications, there was no official response from competent authorities.

A private citizens’ affair

Inside Story’s next feature, however, in April 2022,  launched the torrent of revelations that have been termed the “Greek Watergate” — a title repeated by no less an authority on the matter than The Washington Post. It showed that investigative journalist Thanasis Koukakis’s phone, analysed by Citizen Lab, had been hacked with Predator, the first such confirmed case in Europe. It also showed that Koukakis, alerted by a source that his communications might have been monitored, had submitted a request to ADAE to be informed if he had been a surveillance target in the past. ADAE replied that “no event that contravenes relevant legislation has been noted”. Inside Story pointed out that the “relevant legislation”, which could have compelled ADAE to inform Koukakis of his surveillance, had been hastily amended.

The publication provoked the first reaction from the government, which amounted to no more than a dismissal: the government spokesman Yiannis Oikonomou simply said there should be an investigation if “one private citizen had another private citizen under surveillance”.

The “private citizen” argument, though, was immediately questioned when, a few days after Inside Story, another independent investigative website, Reporters United, published a report that proved that EYP had Koukakis under surveillance, citing “national security”, under its “normal” procedure, for three months in 2020. EYP broke off the surveillance on the very day that Koukakis filed his request with ADAE. His phone was hacked with Predator immediately after that.

The government neither confirmed nor denied the “normal” surveillance of Koukakis by EYP, following the same pattern it had established a year earlier with Malichoudis, but it continued to deny any involvement with Predator. Moreover, EAD (the National Transparency Authority, created by the New Democracy government), which had been tasked with investigating Koukakis’s phone hacking, issued a report absolving the government of any wrongdoing, although it failed to even consider important evidence. This is not the only time that EAD has been criticised for incomplete and pro-government investigations. Its report on illegal pushbacks of refugees had met with international ridicule when it found no wrongdoing by the Greek authorities, based solely on the testimony of the police and coastguard.

Denials and resignations

Barely a few days after EAD had cleared the government, Nikos Androulakis revealed that according to the EU Parliament’s security experts, there had been an attempt to hack his phone with Predator. Under pressure for answers, EYP revealed in July that it had been spying on him under its “normal” procedure, for reasons of “national security”, during the time he was a candidate for PASOK’s leadership. This surveillance had taken place simultaneously with the attempted Predator attack.

Meanwhile, the two independent outlets, Inside Story and Reporters United, had persisted with their investigations, and through a series of stories had established that EYP and the Greek police services had been in the market for spyware in the past, and that Intellexa, the company that markets Predator, was active in Greece and was indirectly connected, through a web of corporate entities, with government contracts. The more recent of these reports, by Reporters United, also published in Efimerida ton Syntakton, indirectly tied some of these corporate entities to Grigoris Dimitriadis, the general secretary of the Prime Minister’s office.

Initially, Dimitriadis had defended his business activities as legal, and had denied any involvement with Predator or related corporate entities. After a few days, though, under the weight of the revelations, both Grigoris Dimitriadis and Panayiotis Kontoleon, the director of EYP, submitted their resignations. Dimitriadis, however, followed his resignation with lawsuits against Reporters United, Efimerida ton Syntakton and Thanasis Koukakis, demanding exorbitant sums for alleged defamation.

It is worth noting that during the four months since Inside Story’s revelation that Koukakis’s phone had been hacked with Predator, there has barely been a mention of the affair in Greek mainstream media, whose overwhelming pro-government bias we have analysed in a previous article. It has only been since Androulakis made the attempted Predator attack on his phone public that most mainstream media saw fit to cover the scandal to a limited degree — presumably because he is a centrist politician rather than an independent journalist.

A televised smokescreen

The prime minister’s attempt to contain the scandal by giving a televised address to the nation failed to provide answers to pressing questions. Kyriakos Mitsotakis spoke only of the surveillance of Androulakis, which he said was legal, but “politically wrong”. Despite the EYP being under his personal purview, he said he did not know about it, and would never have allowed it if he did. Which begs the question: in what sense would the prime minister have prevented a legal action for political reasons?

The prime minister announced vague measures to bolster the transparency of EYP’s activities, “without hindering its mission”. But he said nothing about the legality of the surveillance of journalists — in fact he didn’t mention them at all — or about the free hand that “national security” had lent the intelligence service to monitor his political opponent. Above all, he said nothing about Predator, despite mounting evidence that the spyware hacks are not unrelated to EYP’s ostensibly legal procedures.

The government’s unwillingness to really uphold transparency is exacerbated by the fact that the investigation ordered by the Supreme Court prosecutor, Isidoros Doyiakos, concerns only the circumstances under which EYP’s classified activities became public, and not the legality of the activities themselves.

While the scandal is increasingly unnerving EU authorities and is being covered by media across the world, the government has reluctantly agreed to shorten the Parliament’s summer recess, in order to allow for a thorough parliamentary discussion.

Surveillance for reasons of “national security” in Greece has increased to 15,000 orders last year, according to ADAE’s records. In combination with the knowledge that at least some of these orders concern journalists, lawyers, pro-migrant rights activists and politicians, this staggering rise truly prompts the question if Greece is sliding back to its undemocratic past. Given the current government’s track record of withholding answers, it is no small consolation that independent journalists are still digging.

This article was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and candidate countries. 

MFRR 3 consortium logos