Hungary: Investigative media Átlátszó targeted in latest smear campaign

IPI analysis: Few remaining independent media face increasing hostility over funding sources.

In January 2023, Hungarian investigative media outlet Átlátszó and its editor-in-chief, Tamás Bodoky, became the target of the latest smear campaign in pro-government news outlets aimed at discrediting what remains of the country’s independent media.

In the latest escalation of this pressure, Átlátszó and its journalists faced accusations in pro-government media of “betraying” the nation, attacking Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries, working for foreign interests and being a national security risk, due to their collaboration in a cross-border investigative project.

The unsubstantiated attacks were made in a series of articles published over consecutive weeks in media owned by allies of the Fidesz government, including the Magyar Nemzet daily, which is part of the pro-government KESMA conglomerate.

These texts about Átlátszó’s non-profit funding model included allegations that Átlátszó was receiving “Judas money” and being a “criminal association” involved in treason and anti-national activities. In a second defamatory article in Magyar Nemzet, Bodoky was directly referred to as a liar and a “national traitor”.

In a common pattern, these initial media smears were echoed by a pro-government foundation and then amplified in what appear to be a coordinated manner by the national news agency MTI, public broadcaster Magyar Televízió and dozens of regional media outlets which are part of KESMA, spreading them to a wider audience.

“It reminds us of the methods of Putin’s Russia and hints at a coordinated campaign, when first the government newspaper attacks us, mentioning a foreign agency and national treason, and then the government’s favourite pseudo-civilian organization urges intelligence intervention”, Bodoky said in response to the attacks.

Átlátszó and Bodoky were targeted over the media outlet’s role in a cross-border investigative project called “Hungarian Money” (hungarianmoney.eu), which was conducted in 2020 and led by Átlátszó Erdély, a Hungarian-language investigative outlet based in Romania. Five editorial teams from five European countries, including Átlátszó, investigated how the Orbán government spent at least €670 million in Hungarian minority organizations in neighbouring Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Croatia over the past decade, and how it uses this “soft power” to exert influence abroad.

The project received funding from Investigative Journalism for Europe (IJ4EU), which is coordinated by the International Press Institute (IPI). IJ4EU supports cross-border investigations of public interest in the EU. It is financially backed by the European Commission and other donors but operates independently.

🇭🇺 #Hungary: Investigative media outlet @Atlatszo & its editor-in-chief @bodoky were the target of a smear campaign in pro-government media & accused of betraying the nation & being a 'national security risk'. @erdely_atlatszo. @MediaFreedomEU alert🔽https://t.co/I4LOY0BgKo pic.twitter.com/CrU5xofLoR
— IPI - The Global Network for Independent Media (@globalfreemedia) January 23, 2023

Wider pattern of discreditation

While the smear campaign was denounced by Átlátszó’s investigative partners in a joint statement and multiple journalists expressed solidarity with its team, concerns remain that these kinds of articles continue to act as an incitement of hostility and distrust towards Átlátszó and its journalists.

Far from being an isolated incident, in the past year Átlátszó and other of the country’s remaining independent media, including most recently Telex, have continued to face persistent attacks in government-aligned news outlets smearing them for receiving funding from abroad.

In recent months, the new buzzword in this strategy has been “dollar media”, accompanied by accusations that media are in the pocket of U.S or other unspecified foreign interests or of Hungarian-born billionaire businessman and philanthropist George Soros.

This follows a wider pattern in Hungary, outlined in a 2022 IPI report, that media critical of the government are smeared in an intertwined network of pro-government media as organs of misinformation spreading “fake news” in service of political opposition or foreign governments. These attacks often act as a signpost for online abuse and harassment of journalists. However, so far this harassment normally takes the form of insults from trolls rather than serious intimidation or death threats.

Economic asphyxiation of independent media

The focus on the recent ire on foreign funding sources also points to another phenomenon in the Hungarian media ecosystem: that under successive Fidesz governments, critical and independent media outlets have been systematically drained of state advertising funding, forcing some to seek project grants financed from abroad to stay afloat while also retaining their editorial independence.

This economic isolation is part of a wider campaign of media capture undertaken by the Fidesz government over the past decade, which has involved the coordinated exploitation of legal, regulatory and economic power to gain control over public media, concentrate private media in the hands of allies, and distort the market to the detriment of independent journalism.

In this captured media ecosystem, Fidesz has calibrated the market in its favour by rewarding alignment with its narrative while starving critical media of lucrative advertising funding from ministries and other state institutions. This carrot-and-stick approach has seen independent media excluded from advertising and other subsidies altogether, with public money channelled to finance Fidesz’s media empire. Many of these media in turn serve political interests by acting as the attack dogs of the government against its critics at home and abroad.

In the face of this economic climate, grants from foreign donors and the European Union have proven to be a lifeline for what remains of Hungary’s shattered independent media market. Set against the backdrop of the coordinated erosion of media pluralising recent years, is little surprise then that this financial support has been firmly placed in the crosshairs of the Fidesz media machine.

This article was originally published by IPI as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

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MFRR Summit 2023 | Press Freedom on the Line

The MFRR Summit is back, and this year we’re holding our conference under the title of “Press Freedom on the Line” from 29 – 31 March 2023.

Reflecting the MFRR’s core campaign areas, the online conference will host in-depth discussions on journalist safety, media capture, the rule of law, and SLAPPs.

Hosted on Zoom for interactive participation, and simultaneously livestreamed on the MFRR YouTube channel, the conference will play host to a range of panel discussions, live interviews, and keynote speeches with journalists, media freedom experts, policy-makers, and other stakeholders all working to defend press freedom. The Summit will also feature the award ceremony for the 2023 IJ4EU Impact Award for cross-border investigative journalism.

You can find the full Summit programme below, including information on how to register for each day.

Summit programme

MFRR Summit 2023 | Day 1

From online attacks to physical violence, Day 1 of the Summit will highlight threats to journalists in EU Member States and candidate countries.

MFRR Summit 2023 | Day 2

Day 2 of the Summit will shine a spotlight on the rule of law and SLAPPs as experts discuss initiatives to counter abusive litigation, impunity for crimes against journalists, and disinformation laws.

10 Cross-Border Investigative Projects Shortlisted for IJ4EU Award

Ten cross-border investigations have been shortlisted for the third annual IJ4EU Impact Award, celebrating excellence in cross-border watchdog journalism in Europe.

IJ4EU Impact Award Ceremony

The final day of the Summit will close with the 2023 IJ4EU Impact Award Ceremony. Celebrating excellence in cross-border investigative journalism in Europe, the IJ4EU Impact Award is given annually to three teams of European cross-border investigative journalists. Read more about the IJ4EU funds and Impact Award here. The ceremony will take place on the evening of 31 March in Leipzig, Germany, and also streamed online.

In the coming weeks we will be sharing more information about the conference but for now we encourage you to save the date. Keep an eye on the MFRR newsletter, Twitter, and our website for all the latest updates!

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Greece: MFRR alarmed by latest revelations of spying on…

Greece: MFRR alarmed by latest revelations of spying on journalists

The partners in the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) are alarmed by the continued lack of transparency of the Greek authorities about the surveillance of journalists.

As reported last week, an audit by the Authority for Communication Security and Privacy (ADAE) at telecom company Cosmote confirmed that the state security services wiretapped investigative journalist Tasos Telloglou for unspecified national security reasons. The ADAE conducted the audit on 15 December, following requests by Telloglou and MEP Giorgos Kyrtsos, who was expelled from the ruling New Democracy party earlier this year.

Cosmote unsuccessfully attempted to interfere with the inspection, as its legal adviser questioned the ADAE’s competence and contacted Supreme Court prosecutor Isidoros Dogiakos. The latter allegedly tried to intervene and stop the audit by stating that there should be an immediate opinion of the Supreme Court Prosecutor’s Office on whether ADAE or interested citizens are allowed to be informed of possible surveillance by the National Intelligence Service (EYP). The ADAE, however, invoked its constitutional authority and insisted on the audit. Dogiakos has meanwhile said that he simply expressed a non-binding view, even though he believes the audit was not legal. He also lashed out against media that have criticised the Greek judicial authorities for their handling of the ongoing investigation into “Greek Watergate”, and called for an extensive tax audit of the outlets.

Telloglou, who works for investigative platform Inside Story, leading daily Kathimerini and the ANT1 television news programme “Special Report, had written in October that he believed he was put under surveillance in connection with his reporting on a spyware scandal. In the article, he said his colleague at Inside Story, Eliza Triantafillou and journalist Thodoris Chondrogiannos of Reporters United had also been monitored. Both outlets repeatedly published breaking news about the use of spyware and alleged connections between companies that market the technology and Greek government figures.

Last week’s revelations are the latest chapter in a sprawling scandal in Greece which has implicated the EYP and the government in the surveillance of journalists. This involves the confirmed hacking of the phone of freelance financial journalist Thanasis Koukakis through the use of Predator spyware by an unknown party and allegations that investigative reporter Stavros Malichudis was secretly monitored by the EYP. In November, newspaper Documento published an article alleging that numerous journalists, editors, media owners and others connected to the industry were targeted with Predator spyware.

These cases are major violations of the affected journalists’ privacy, journalistic source protection, and press freedom in general. Although an investigation into Koukakis’ case has been launched, overall accountability remains wanting, and the Greek authorities have provided no real transparency. Quite the opposite: soon after New Democracy came to power in 2019, it moved to bring the intelligence service under the direct purview of the office of the Prime Minister and amended the requirements for the position of Director of Intelligence so the Prime Minister’s favourite could be appointed. In March 2021, the governing party rushed through a legislative amendment that changed the legal provisions that allowed citizens to be informed by the ADAE about whether they had been under surveillance if it had taken place for national security reasons. The cases at hand, pertaining to journalists who report in the public interest, serve to underscore the problematic nature of this exemption, showcasing the potential for abuse of this clause.

Accordingly, the MFRR reiterates its calls on the Greek authorities to provide transparency and accountability for these severe attacks on press freedom and privacy, and to put an immediate halt to the practice. We also renew our calls for action at the EU level, including through the inclusion in the European Media Freedom Act of provisions that effectively protect journalists and media workers against illegal surveillance.

Signed by:

ARTICLE 19 Europe
European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
International Press Institute (IPI)
OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States, Candidate Countries and Ukraine.

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How the European Media Freedom Act could affect Hungary…

How the European Media Freedom Act could affect Hungary and Poland

Meanwhile, the EU has existing tools to defend media pluralism and freedom

By IPI contributor Anna Wójcik

The European Union’s institutions are well aware of the concerted, structural attacks on media freedom and pluralism in Hungary and Poland plus several other member states, and the European Commission’s flagship annual rule of law reports are proof of that.

However, the EU’s treatment of the media freedom crises in Poland and Hungary, which are part of a broader backsliding of the rule of law, has been fragmented and differs qualitatively from the EU’s response to the assaults on judicial independence, academic freedom, or migrants’ rights by the Fidesz and PiS governments.

Other than monitoring the violations of media freedom and pluralism in the two Visegrad states the EU’s response has been limited to some action in the scope of the Article 7 Rule of Law procedure against Hungary, and a single EU law infringement action against the Hungarian government contesting the media regulator’s independence and accusing it of discriminatory action following its decision not to renew the license of independent radio broadcaster Klubrádió.

Frustrated by the lack of legal tools available to it, the European Commission is seeking new EU-wide legislation in the form of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), presented in September, that would harmonize some aspects of regulation over public and private media in member states.

Until now, public and private media regulation has been mainly the responsibility of member states. With no legal mandate to act on media freedom issues, the Commission has based the EMFA on rules protecting the single market.

Meanwhile, the Council of Europe has developed extensive standards for public media and media pluralism and the EMFA is a welcome opportunity to turn some of these standards into binding law in EU member states.

While the EMFA has not been devised solely to address the challenges that the current governments in Budapest and Warsaw have posed to media freedom and pluralism, the draft regulation holds specific promises in this regard.

New rules, new regulations

The first concern in Hungary and Poland is the media regulators’ lack of independence. The Media Council in Hungary, and, in Poland, the National Broadcasting Council (Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji, KRRiT) and the PiS-established National Media Council (Rada Mediów Narodowych) are part of the respective governments’ informal power grab. Loyalists with links to the governing parties dominate these media regulators, which have contributed to limiting media freedom.

In 2020, the Hungarian Media Council did not renew Klubrádió’s license, forcing the station to move online with a limited audience. After Fidesz secured a fourth term in power in April 2022, the regulator refused to renew the license of non-profit Tilos Rádió, citing violations of rules on the use of inappropriate language on air. Tilos won back the licence in the subsequent application process.

In Poland, in 2020/2021, KRRiT delayed the renewal of the broadcasting licenses of the television broadcasters TVN24 and TVN7, which are owned by the U.S. company Warner Bros. Discovery. In 2017, KRRiT fined TVN for reporting about a protest; the fine was rescinded in 2022.

The EMFA seeks to nurture greater independence through the enhanced European Board of Media Services that promotes cooperation between the national regulators. It doesn’t enhance any standards, but it does endorse the requirements of independence of national regulatory set out in Article 30 of the 2018-revised Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD), which Hungary and Poland already transposed.

This means that the media regulators are required to be independent of political and business influence and exercise their powers impartially and transparently, in keeping with principles of media pluralism, cultural and linguistic diversity, consumer protection, accessibility, non-discrimination, the proper functioning of the internal market, and the promotion of fair competition. It also prohibits media regulators from seeking or taking instructions from any other bodies regarding the assigned tasks.

If it so wished, the European Commission could already have started infringement proceedings against the biased decisions of media regulators in Hungary and Poland that are detrimental to media freedom and pluralism, based on Article 30 AVMSD. The time to do so is of the essence, especially as the European Parliament elections and local elections in Poland and Hungary are approaching in 2024.

EU law protects European voters’ rights to participate in the EP and elections that are free and fair. The OSCE/ODIHR found in election observation mission reports on general elections in Hungary in 2018 and 2022 and in general elections in 2019 and presidential elections in 2020 in Poland that the elections were tarnished by the apparent bias of public media towards the governing majority or incumbent president and that public broadcasters failed in their duty to provide impartial coverage.

Moreover, the EMFA envisages the creation of the European Board for Media Services, which would succeed the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) and include national media regulators’ representatives. The Board would advise the Commission on regulation and EU law application issues. It is yet unclear how the Board could insulate itself from internal disruption by rogue member states that are systematically assaulting media freedom and pluralism and quite successfully playing catch-me-if-you-can with Brussels.

Unwinding media capture

Another significant problem is the media capture process, particularly advanced in Hungary and mimicked in Poland. Fidesz has captured media through a network loyal oligarchs, who in 2018 “donated” media to the Central European Press and Media Foundation (Közép-Európai Sajtó és Média Alapítvány, KESMA). Outside of KESMA, the process of forcing journalists to resign or closing some captured media outlets continues.

The PiS party in Poland used the state-controlled oil and gas company PKN Orlen in 2021 to acquire the country’s the most prominent regional daily newspaper group, Polska Press, from the German publisher Verlagsgruppe Passau. The transaction raised major concerns about editorial independence and media concentration. The EMFA would require member states to carry out a “media pluralism and independence” test when taking any new regulatory measures that impact the media market. It would apply, for instance, to decisions impacting media concentration or on private media licensing.

Governments in Hungary and Poland also boost friendly private media with state funds through advertising and partnerships. The EMFA would include rules enhancing transparency and fairness in the allocation of state advertising to media outlets. It would require member states to distribute state advertising to media in a non-discriminatory way.

Article 24 would further require member states’ central and local governments to publish a list of the media supported with public funds and the amounts allocated to them. The national media regulators would be responsible for verifying government-provided information. Without independent regulators however, this provision is unlikely to be effective.

Strengthening the existing toolbox

It is uncertain what shape the EMFA will eventually take in the long EU legislative process. Several objections have been posed to it from interest groups, notably European association of press publishers. Moreover, member states governments may raise objections to specific elements of the act.

Negative developments regarding media freedom impact also other member states than Hungary and Poland, where such problems further entrench democratic backsliding. Greece scores the lowest among member states on RSF’s Press Freedom Index. In the countries ranking high in media freedom, threats of media concentration in the hands of businesspeople with solid political agendas risk destabilizing the electoral process. The opposition to various solutions included in the EMFA may come from a variety of interest groups.

It must also be emphasized that although the EMFA brings some opportunities, focusing on developing new legislation should not be an excuse for not taking action, as the EU already has avenues for legal actions to protect media freedom and pluralism in member states and could apply more political pressure, for example, at the Article 7 hearings against Hungary. The Council should also consider expanding the Article 7 procedure against the Polish government to include specific issues negatively affecting media freedom and pluralism. For now, the EU is not acting as strongly as it could.

Anna Wójcik, PhD, is an assistant professor at the Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences. She was Re:Constitution fellow at the CEU Democracy Institute in 2022. She specializes in the rule of law and freedom of expression. As RethinkCEE program fellow, has recently published with the German Marshall Fund of the United States a policy report on the EU’s response to the media freedom and pluralism backsliding in Hungary and Poland.

This article is part of IPI’s series “Media freedom in Europe in shadow of Covid”, which comprises news and analysis from IPI’s network of correspondets throughout the EU. Articles do not necessarily reflect the views of IPI. The reporting series is supported by funding from the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for FReedom and by the European Commission (DG Connect) as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response coalition.

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France: Three journalists summoned by security agency over suspected…

France: Three journalists summoned by security agency over suspected violation of national defence secrecy

The partner organisations of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) today express concern over the latest summons issued by France’s top security agency to journalists from investigative platform Disclose and public broadcaster Radio France over the suspected violation of national secrecy in connection with their reporting on the armed forces.

Our organisations raise the alarm that the three journalists summoned for voluntary questioning could face potential prison sentences of up to five years and a fine of €75,000 if charged and ultimately found guilty. We therefore urge the General Directorate of Internal Security (DGSI) to seriously consider the implications of this case for press freedom.

The trio – Geoffrey Livolsi, co-founder of investigative media outlet Disclose, Jacques Monin, head of investigations at Radio France and Benoît Collombat, an investigative journalist at Radio France – have been summoned to the DGSI for questioning on 14 December as part of an ongoing judicial investigation into alleged violation of national defence secrecy.

The summons is linked to a March 2018 investigation authored by Collombat and Livolsi, entitled “Air transport: suspicions of influence peddling in the army”, which reported that the National Financial Prosecutor’s Office (PNF) was probing allegations of financial misconduct in the military. The article revealed that high-ranking officers including a named official of the Special Operations Command (COS) were being investigated over alleged air transport subcontracting fraud.

The trio are due to be questioned on the suspicion that they “committed or attempted to commit the offense of revealing or disclosing information allowing the identification of a member of a special forces unit”. According to reports, the summons comes after an unnamed former member of the French special forces filed a complaint. Livolsi from Disclose has stressed that all the officers named in the investigation work in the logistics services of the army, rather than on a mission or in a conflict area and were not in any danger. Both Disclose and Radio France stand by the accuracy and public interest nature of the publication.

Our organisations note that this summons is part of a wider pattern of criminal investigations against media by DGSI in recent years. Journalists from Disclose and Radio France were the subject of a separate investigation in 2019. That summons was based on a complaint by the Ministry of the Armed Forces about publication of classified information about French complicity in supplying weapons to Saudi Arabia which were used to commit war crimes in Yemen. In that case, the DGSI questioned the two co-founders of Disclose and Collombat about a potential violation of national secrecy and attempted to identify their sources.

A second investigation into Disclose was then initiated in November 2021 in connection with its revelations about the alleged complicity of French military intelligence in the arbitrary executions of civilians in Egypt. That time, the Ministry of the Armed Forces filed a complaint alleging the non-profit platform had violated national defence secrecy. Both of these previous probes targeted legitimate and public interest journalism which had led to serious questions and criticism about the operations of the French military and intelligence services.

As in those cases, this summons has serious implications for media freedom. Firstly, serious questions arise as to why this complaint was made now, nearly five years after the journalists’ investigation was published. Moreover, as this probe is being conducted within the scope of national security, the DGSI has the full range of investigatory powers at its disposal, including the use of surveillance tools. This not only creates a stressful climate for the media outlets but could also discourage sources and potential whisteblowers from speaking out.

Our organisations recognise the challenges which come with striking the right balance between safeguarding press freedom and protecting national security. However, it is vital for democracy that journalists and media outlets carrying out investigative reporting on matters of public interest, including about the armed forces and even the special forces, must be able to work free from all forms of pressure or retaliation.

Ahead of the summons on Wednesday December 14, our organisations emphasise that we will closely monitor developments and will respond strongly to further escalations which negatively affect the freedom of the press. If required, we also stand ready to provide assistance to the affected journalists through our MFRR legal support fund.

Signed by:

ARTICLE 19 Europe
European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
International Press Institute (IPI)
OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)

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Italy: Lawsuits against Saviano and Domani highlight wider SLAPP…

Italy: Lawsuits against Saviano and Domani highlight wider SLAPP problem

Ongoing litigation against media by new PM and Defence Minister raise media freedom concerns

By IPI contibutor Christian Elia

In recent weeks there has been much talk in Italy about a recently opened legal case against the journalist and writer Roberto Saviano, who is accused of defamation in a lawsuit filed in 2020 by Giorgia Meloni, the new prime minister. Saviano had called Meloni and Lega leader Matteo Salvini ‘bastards’ during a La7 television programme for their policy on rescuing migrants at sea.

There have been multiple stances in defence of Saviano in newspapers and by associations for freedom of the press and freedom of expression. They have been critical of Meloni and of Salvini, who is a plaintiff in the trial, and say that Meloni’s lawsuit is intimidatory and aimed at discouraging criticism of Saviano and her.

This is not an isolated incident, however. At the end of November 2021, Prime Minister Meloni also filed a defamation case against the daily newspaper Domani. The court decided to indict journalist Emiliano Fittipaldi and the newspaper’s editor-in-chief, Stefano Feltri, over a year-old article about Meloni, who was not prime minister at the time.

The article dates back to October 2021 and reported on Domenico Arcuri, former extraordinary commissioner for the Covid emergency. Arcuri mentioned, talking to magistrates, the names of some MPs who, according to him, had contacted him to promote individuals or companies able to supply masks on “far less advantageous” terms. The MPs included Meloni, Domani reported.

In response, Meloni has demanded €25,000 in damages from the newspaper. The requested financial compensation is part of civil proceedings that can be claimed in addition to criminal proceedings, which is the legal framework for “aggravated defamation” lawsuits.

“Until a law on reckless litigation is passed, lawsuits and civil lawsuits remain the sword of Damocles over freedom of information in the country”, Feltri said in an article.

Domani’s journalists have also pointed out that while is possible for Meloni to sue the newspaper, the PM – herself under investigation for aggravated defamation for a tweet against one of her former candidates – is sheltering behind parliamentary protections from prosecution.

“Meloni as a ‘citizen, journalist and politician’, as she had her lawyer write, decided to take this newspaper to trial but her personal position has changed. As prime minister she is called upon to protect among the constitutional values also freedom of expression of all, also because as a ‘politician she can already protect her own,’” the journalists of Domani wrote.

The new Italian government had already come out against Domani. Last month, Defence Minister Guido Crosetto had announced his intention to sue the newspaper for defamation over an investigation by journalists Emiliano Fittipaldi and Giovanni Tizian into the current minister’s potential conflict of interest with companies in the sector he now oversees. For now, Minister Crosetto has not followed up on the announcement.

Italy’s SLAPP problem

The president of the Federazione Nazionale della Stampa Italiana (FNSI), Giuseppe Giulietti, recalled how ”the law to oppose gagging complaints and punish reckless actions has been at a standstill since 2002 and will remain so due to increasingly clear transversal intentions”.

The law Giulietti is referring to is the law against SLAPPs, as lawsuits are called in which there is a gross disproportion of power between the person or organization suing and the accused. The goal of accusers or plaintiffs in SLAPP cases is not necessarily to win the case, but to intimidate the defendant – even if only through the many burdens and effects of a trial – and discourage his or her work, taking away time, money and initiative. Plaintiffs also take advantage of the public bias against the presumption of innocence, placing the defendant in a position of weakness and risk.

Most of the time the accusation in SLAPP cases is defamation, and these cases are almost always directed at journalists, bloggers or activists who have written or said something in public that someone claims is defamatory against them. The consequences can be both criminal and civil.In Italy, both civil and criminal lawsuits are often referred to as “querele temerarie” (reckless lawsuits), with some confusion: “querela”, however, in legal language refers only to criminal cases. They are referred to as “reckless” because they are brought despite the uncertainty of the final outcome, but precisely for the purpose of responding or threatening the defendant.

A 2016 dossier edited by the association Ossigeno per l’informazione, based on data provided by the Ministry of Justice, estimated that around 70 per cent of defamation lawsuits are dropped by the public prosecutor and therefore do not go to trial.

There is no more recent data, but lawyer Andrea Di Pietro, who has been dealing with the issue for many years, said in an interview that in 2019 the ministry confirmed to Ossigeno that that percentage was still valid. According to him and several other experts in the field, it probably still is today.Until recently, Article 13 of Law 47 of 1948 on the press, which set forth a mandatory term of imprisonment from one to six years “in the event of conviction for libel in the press committed by attributing a specific fact”, was also taken into account for defamation in the press.

This article was declared illegitimate in June last year by the Constitutional Court. By contrast, the court deemed Article 595 of the Criminal Code, which deals with defamation, compatible with the Constitution, since that provision allows the judge to apply a prison sentence only in cases of exceptional gravity and in all other cases to limit it to a fine.

Article 595 of the Criminal Code concerns anyone who”’by communicating with several persons, offends the reputation of others”. It is punishable by imprisonment of up to two years or a fine of up to EUR 2,065, but both can be increased if the offence is against “a political, administrative or judicial body”.

In the case of defamation “in the press” – a definition that today includes both newspapers and other media, e.g. social networks, and therefore potentially concerns almost everyone – the penalty can be up to three years and the fine is at least EUR 516.

EU anti-SLAPP directive on the way

After years of calls for action, last April the European Commission presented two measures that are still awaiting approval. The first is a legislative proposal for a directive that would intervene precisely on the problems of civil lawsuits, which also exist in Italy: the most important measure is the introduction of a mechanism that would allow civil lawsuits that are manifestly unfounded to be dismissed quickly.

This mechanism, should the directive be approved, will, however, only be valid for cases of European relevance: i.e. cases relating to articles or public speeches involving, for example, more than one EU member country.

The directive also envisages protection for journalists working in the EU who receive convictions from courts in non-EU states, and penalties to discourage the frequent use of SLAPPs, including the possibility for an accused party who proves his or her innocence to claim damages from the plaintiff.

The other measure proposed by the European Commission is a recommendation to member states to implement measures to encourage this kind of practice in their national legislation. The recommendation, however, is not binding, and much will depend on whether and how it is implemented in each country.

The next hearing in Saviano’s trial has been set for December 12, 2022. Many journalists and members of the cultural world will be present at the hearing in support of the defendant. In the courtroom will also be the president of the FNSI, Giuseppe Giulietti, and the spokesperson of Articolo 21, an association that fights for press freedom, Elisa Marincola, as well as a delegation of CASE Italia observers who are following the case with a view to write a repor.

“It is necessary to say ‘enough to reckless lawsuits’ with a law that at this point can only be induced by the European Directive given that the Italian Parliament has failed to produce even a minimal amendment that could act as a deterrent against gag lawsuits,” Giulietti commented.

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Latvia: Media regulator urged not to revoke Dozhd license…

Latvia: Media regulator urged not to revoke Dozhd license pending court review

Decision revoking broadcast license is clear violation of media freedom.

The undersigned partners of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) today express serious concern over the decision by Latvia’s National Electronic Mass Media Council (NEPLP) to revoke the broadcast license of exiled independent Russian TV station Dozhd, which is based in Riga. Given the clear implications for media freedom, our organisations urge the regulator to refrain from enforcing the revocation until a court has reviewed the decision.

On 6 December, the NEPLP’s chairperson said that Dozhd’s license had been withdrawn “in connection with the threat to national security and the public order” and citing three serious violations of the country’s broadcast law since it began broadcasting last summer. Dozhd’s broadcasting ban enters into force on December 8, but it has the right to appeal. The NEPLP also announced its intent to block Dozhd’s YouTube channel within the country.

Our organisations acknowledge and welcome the steps taken by Latvian authorities since the war began to provide visas for more than 470 Russian journalists and their families, including those from Dozhd, who were forced to flee the country. This allowed Dozhd and others to re-establish operations and continue working. Latvia has provided a welcome example for Europe to follow and deserves praise for its overall support for free and independent media.

While our organisations recognise the sensitivity of this issue in Latvia, our shared view is that the decision to revoke their broadcast license is disproportionate and ultimately counterproductive.

In our assessment, appropriate steps were taken by Dozhd to address the three violations of Latvia’s broadcast law cited by the regulator. The presenter who misspoke about ‘support’ to Russian troops has apologised and been dismissed; the use of a map downloaded from the internet showing Crimea as part of Russia’s territory was a clear mistake for which the editor has since apologised; and the single reference to Russia’s military as “our army” was dealt with and the media outlet was fined. While Dozhd must respect Latvian law, in our view these three editorial errors were mistakes and do not meet the threshold for the outright revocation of a media outlet’s broadcast licence.

Arguments raised about Dozhd’s journalists posing a potential national security or intelligence threat are very serious accusations that need to be addressed by independent courts rather than a broadcast regulator. There is clear guidance on restricting freedom of expression on the basis of national security that needs to be followed by the authorities.

The wider implications of this decision for the Russian anti-war movement are significant. As the most influential exiled Russian broadcast media outlet, Dozhd’s resolutely anti-war coverage of issues such as mobilisation, Russian atrocities and the realities from the front lines have provided a crucial alternative to government propaganda.

Moving forward, we urge the NEPLP to refrain from enforcing the decision on revocation of Dozhd’s licence. We also urge the Administrative Court to reverse the NEPLP decision until a court has reviewed the decision on appeal. The Court must is should consider both the violations committed and the alleged national security or intelligence allegations, as well as the broader implications the decision will have for Dozhd, its editors and journalists, and other exiled Russian media.

Until then, our message is clear: independent Russian journalism should be provided a safe refuge in Europe. Dozhd’s mission of providing independent news to Russian-speaking audiences is a crucial one and we hope this matter can be resolved.

Signed by:

ARTICLE 19 Europe
European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
International Press Institute (IPI)
OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)

Allgemein

Portugal: Press freedom remains robust even as media face…

Portugal: Press freedom remains robust even as media face resource strains

Strong legal framework and lack of political interference in media create open climate for independent journalism

By IPI contributor Cláudia Marques Santos

Press freedom remains strong in Portugal. The country is democratically stable and the risks of government interference in the media are low. Both the constitution and the national Press Law safeguard journalists in their daily reporting.

But there are some areas of concern: journalists’ deteriorating work conditions and precarity, as well as significant concentration of media groups. The number of cases from Portugal that end up in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) regarding press freedom violations is also high. The ECtHR has convicted Portugal in three major cases this year alone.

Portugal consistently ranks well in international press freedom rankings. In addition, according to the 2022 Digital News Report, 61 percent of Portuguese people have trust in news overall as well as in news they read or listen to. The European University Institute’s 2022 Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM) finds that Portugal presents a stable situation.

“Portugal is not a problematic country”, says Carla Baptista, academic and one of the authors of the 2022 MPM entry on Portugal. “In the case of political independence, the question is whether there are media outlets that are directly controlled by political forces, by parties or others. [In Portugal] Political parties cannot own television or radio stations, they can only own newspapers. There is no direct use of the media [by political parties] as there is in many European countries.”

Besides this low risk concerning political independence, the country has a strong legal framework regarding the practice of journalism and the right to inform, as well as guaranteeing the fundamental right not to reveal sources.

Plus, according to the Media for Democracy Monitor, Portugal scores maximum points concerning pluralism in newsrooms’ rules and practices. “There’s no tradition for news media to endorse publicly a political party or a presidential candidate”, it said in its 2022 report. “All of the main media insist on independence as their supreme value, promising to offer their audience all the relevant perspectives on any issue under debate.”

Some challenges remain, however. In early 2021, controversy erupted when it became known that two Portuguese journalists were subject to a two-month long police surveillance operation, in 2018 April and May, ordered by the Public Prosecutor’s Office, with the purpose of revealing their confidential sources, because of investigations they were doing about corruption and a major football club.

As a result, the European Commission severely criticized Portugal, considering it “unacceptable” that, in a state governed by the rule of law, journalists are subject to police surveillance and harassment when it comes to accessing sources. Just last April, the Lisbon Court of Appeal reverted the investigating judge’s decision not to order a trial of the two journalists for crimes of breach of secrecy of justice.

Legal landscape for press freedom

Though the rights of Portuguese journalists are secured by the Press Law (nr. 2/99, whose Article 1 says “freedom of the press includes the right to inform, to be informed and to be informed without hindrance or discrimination”), the practice of Portuguese courts explains why many cases end up in ECtHR.

Since 2005, the European Court of Human Rights (EctHR) has ruled in more than 20 cases that Portugal violated Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights regarding freedom of expression. These have included cases involving the television broadcaster SIC, daily newspaper Público and newsmagazine Visão.

In December 2003 SIC reported that the then Azores’ secretary of Agriculture and Fisheries was implicated in a pedophile case in the islands, which was being investigated. Last year the ECtHR found in favour of SIC.

In 2017 the ECtHR found in favour of José Manuel Fernandes, Público’s former director, who had been convicted in court over a 2006 editorial article he wrote about the then newly elected president of the Supreme Court, criticizing his inauguration speech.

In 2016 the ECtHR also found in favour of Visão. Six years earlier, the news magazine had been convicted over an opinion article saying that the then prime minister would have to be on drugs to start a war with a political commentator (who is today the president of Portugal).

And only this year the ECtHR found against Portugal in the case of a satirical newspaper based in Madeira. In 2007, this newspaper had written that “unloading a ship at Caniças is the same thing as unloading a pallet of money at the orange foundation”, referring to the orange-coloured PSD party that ruled the island for decades.

“It’s cultural”, says Ricardo Correia Afonso, a Portuguese lawyer whose career has been built on defending journalists in court. “Until very recently, Portugal was a country where you’d put freedom of expression and the right to inform on one side and the right to honour and good name on the other.” Afonso said that, traditionally, the latter principle prevailed.

Another concern is the horizontal concentration of media companies, with several big media groups controlling the market, as noted in the 2022 Media Pluralism Monitor. In 2015, a new Transparency Law obliged media companies to report every year their financial outcomes and ownership details to Portugal’s media regulator, Entidade Reguladora para a Comunicação Social (ERC). While this has increased transparency in media ownership, concerns remain about some large media companies not sending all the required data. Another concern this study points out is the lack of funding of this institution, which has an ex-judge as president.

Working conditions

Job security is another major concern in Portuguese journalism. According to the Media for Democracy Monitor, Portugal scores poorly on this metric. “In the last 10 years, all of the most important Portuguese news media downsized their newsrooms, dismissing dozens of journalists”. Between 2009 and 2020 the number of professional journalists decreased 23 percent, from 6,673 to 5,124.

Resources for Investigative journalism have also dropped, which isn’t a good indicator for democracy. News media are clearly underfunded. Most journalists in newsrooms aren’t given time to investigate- Freelancers cannot afford going to court if someone presses charges against them. All of this raises the risk that important stories may not come to light.

Another matter in discussion in Portugal is the fact that the Press Law, which dates from 1999, hasn’t been updated since. Digital media, for instance, remain unregulated. In Portugal, media matters are under the umbrella of the Ministry of Culture. The last government had a secretary of state for cinema, television and media affairs. This specific position no longer exists, although media still remain under the culture ministry.

Disinformation also stands out as a great risk for democracy and news reporting in Portugal. In May 2021 a law (no. 27/2021) was published approving the Portuguese Charter on Human Rights in the Digital Era. “Alongside ensuring basic rights, freedoms, and guarantees for citizens in the online environment, the legislation establishes that the state must protect citizens from people who produce, reproduce, and disseminate misinformation, in line with the European Action Plan against Disinformation”, writes the Digital News Report. On the other hand, according to Media Democracy Monitor, there’s no significant online harassment of Portuguese journalists. There are exceptions, however.

In December 2020 and January 2021, journalists who made an investigation on the broadcaster SIC about the far-right populist party Chega were subjected to a torrent of insults, harassment, and threats online. The same happened earlier this month, with the release in several media of an investigation made by a new consortium of Portuguese investigative journalists about online hate speech made by police forces in private social media groups, powered by movements linked to Chega.

Another concerning phenomenon is the increasing bias displayed in online news platforms. “There is a proliferation of digital news media that are a one person company”, says Carla Baptista. “The law only demands an editorial project and a director which means ERC approves news media almost automatically.” Fake news is a big problem, and Portugal is no exception.

Library

Multiple journalists threatened and harassed in Serbia, authorities must…

Multiple journalists threatened and harassed in Serbia, authorities must take urgent action

In the past month in Serbia, several journalists have been targeted by serious threats raising fears for their physical safety. Partners of the Media Freedom Rapid Response and the Safe Journalists Network in condemning in the strongest terms the intimidation and often orchestrated campaigns by pro-government media outlets and members of the public to silence journalists.

The undersigned organisations urge the authorities to take the necessary measures to ensure their protection and prevent further threats.

The latest shocking threat reported on 1 December 2022 targeted Nova S TV’s journalist Jelena Obucina. Obucina received messages via Twitter, threatening her with “impalement” and stating she “would be burned”. The chilling text is composed of repeated and meticulously described death threats and threats of sexual violence. The messages were sent after a statement published in the tabloid Alo wrongly accusing Obucina of threatening Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić on television and of making anti-state propaganda.

A few days ago, the home address of Serbian journalist Nenad Kulačin was published on posters pasted in downtown Belgrade. His colleague at the daily newspaper Danas, Marko Vidojković, received more than 20 death threats via social media following a guest appearance on TV Nova S, during which he commented on the FIFA World Cup match between Serbia and Brazil. Several tabloid newspapers published an identical article that targeted and insulted him over his views expressed regarding that match.

On 6 November 2022, Danas’ daily received a threatening email via an unknown Switzerland-based Protonmail email address directed at the newsroom, which listed specific journalists and columnists. The email read that “salvos of bullets” could be fired at them, and that it could “end up” like what happened to journalists of the French satirical paper Charlie Hebdo, who were killed in their offices by terrorists in 2015. The email called the journalists “enemy of the Serbian people”, “traitors” and mentioned the newspaper’s coverage of Kosovo, Montenegro, and the Republika Srpska. Since then, permanent police security has been positioned in front of the editorial offices in Belgrade.

The Safe Journalists Network said that, while the number of cases did not increase above the standard figures recently, the severity of those threats are of great concern: “It is again clear that narrative and negative campaigns that start with statements from high-ranking government officials, usually continued by tabloids, lead to terrible threats from unknown people, especially on social media. We are concerned because such cases and incidents create confusion among citizens, who receive a completely wrong message from government officials and tabloids, that says that journalists are working against their country, that they are targeting the president and senior officials, and that they are actually enemies of Serbia.”

The undersigned organisations urge the Serbian authorities to publicly condemn the threats against the media, thoroughly investigate these cases as well as all reports filed by journalists, and ensure prevention of further attacks by promoting an environment that respects pluralistic opinions and diverging editorial policies.

Signed by:

ARTICLE 19 Europe
European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
International Press Institute (IPI)
OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)

Library

Italy: Prime Minister sues Domani newspaper for defamation

Italian defamation laws are once again being misused by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni to silence and threaten independent journalism in Italy. The undersigned organisations call for the lawsuit against the newspaper Domani to be dropped and for the Italian Parliament to adopt a comprehensive reform of defamation laws in Italy.

In October 2021, the current Prime Minister, at the time member of the Italian Parliament and leader of the far-right party Fratelli d’Italia, initiated legal action for aggravated criminal defamation against Emiliano Fittipaldi and Stefano Feltri, respectively correspondent and editor of the daily national newspaper Domani. The lawsuit originated from an article that raised questions over an obscure procurement process of face masks during the first waves of the Covid-19 pandemic. In particular, the article was investigating the alleged role Meloni played in influencing Domenico Arcuri, then Covid Commissioner, by recommending certain suppliers for medical equipment intended for the Italian healthcare system. According to the authors of the article, her interference in the process consisted of endorsing Fabio Pietrella, a businessperson and newly elected Fratelli d’Italia member of the Parliament, for the procured services.

Prime Minister Meloni is requesting damages with an interim compensation of 25,000 euros from the newspaper. After a preliminary hearing, which took place on 15 November, the public prosecutor decided to open a criminal defamation trial, which is due to begin on 10 July, 2024.

Our organisations have consistently advocated for a reform of both civil and criminal defamation laws in Italy to bring legislation in line with international freedom of expression standards and the recent Constitutional Court rulings. In its 2020 and 2021 decisions, the court urged the Parliament to enact a comprehensive reform of defamation laws in Italy. As of today, the Parliament has failed to respond to such calls.

In April 2022, the European Commission put forward a Directive proposal that would prompt EU member states to take action to counter Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) in civil law cases for matters with trans-border application. The proposal on SLAPPs is expected to be adopted in 2023 after discussion and a vote by the Council of the EU and the European Parliament. Alongside the directive proposal, the European Commission has formulated a set of Recommendations identifying a number of measures meant to counter both vexatious criminal and civil lawsuits. Furthermore, according to international and European human rights law, top public officials should tolerate a higher degree of scrutiny and criticism than others, in light of the public position they hold.

Our organisations acknowledge with growing concern the rising number of SLAPP cases against journalists brought by public officials in Italy against those who express dissent or inform the public on contentious issues, question their work or, as in the present case, expose alleged wrongdoing.

We call on Prime Minister Meloni to withdraw the defamation lawsuit against Italian newspaper Domani and to initiate a reform process of defamation laws in the country to avoid the abuse of vexatious lawsuits against the public interest. We also call on the Italian Parliament to begin comprehensive reform of defamation laws in line with international freedom of expression standards as soon as possible. Such reform should centre on the decriminalisation of defamation and set limits within civil law on the amount in damages that can be sought to avoid creating undue obstacles to the journalistic profession.

Furthermore, this reform should address specific challenges posed by SLAPPs against journalists within the Italian framework. While the Italian Civil Procedural Code includes some provisions aimed at countering SLAPPs – article 96 provides that those plaintiffs who filed a lawsuit in ‘bad faith’ must compensate the defendant – judges rarely recur to this provision in practice. Within this context, we also urge the Parliament to start a discussion to follow up on the Recommendations included in the EU Anti-SLAPPs initiative and to support the adoption of an advanced text of the EU Anti-SLAPPs Directive.

An Anti-SLAPPs Working Group in Italy, part of the Coalition Against SLAPPs in Europe (CASE), brings together representatives of the world of journalism and civil society in Italy to raise awareness about SLAPPs and sustain advocacy towards a set of measures that would effectively counter them.