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Moldova: fears for press freedom in case of pro-Russian…

Moldova: fears for press freedom in case of pro-Russian victory

Journalists warn significant backsliding possible after elections on September 28.

On June 23 to 27, the International Press Institute (IPI), representing the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) consortium, conducted a press freedom mission to the Republic of Moldova, to assess the situation of press freedom in the country ahead of crucial parliamentary elections scheduled for September 28.

17.09.2025

Multiple interviews with journalists, press freedom activists and self-regulatory bodies painted a picture of a media sector concerned about the future of independent journalism in the country ahead of the closely watched election.

 

While the overall climate for free and independent journalism remains relatively healthy compared to other EU candidate countries in the region, local divergences remain acute and all media face intense challenges to their financial viability.

 

Moldova – still a safe haven for independent journalism?

IPI’s interviews with stakeholders in Moldova overall confirmed data documented on the MFRR’s Mapping Media Freedom (MapMF) platform. These alerts have shown that since regular monitoring started in June 2022, when Moldova became a candidate for entry into the European Union, the country enjoys a relatively healthy media freedom climate.

 

As of September 2025, the MapMF platform has recorded 81 press freedom violations in Moldova. The majority of these incidents were insults or harassment of journalists by politicians, either in person or online, as well as intimidation of journalists at protests.

 

Serious cases of physical violence against media workers were not recorded and the overall legal framework of Moldova ensures appropriate conditions for the exercise of independent journalism.

 

This includes media access to publicly available information, the right to freely report from protests and other events of public interest, as well as, overall, open media access to politicians and government officials.

 

Large-scale cyber attacks against media, which have become increasingly frequent in Europe, and especially in neighbouring Ukraine, have not been identified as a major risk in Moldova.

 

However, in a landscape characterised by the division between pro-Western and pro-Russian politics, journalists face challenges in navigating polarised news environments and disinformation. The fragility of the media and public interest journalism due to the small advertising market is particularly concerning.

 

These issues are deepened by acute regional differences within Moldova. While the media environment is overall healthy in most of the country, in Transnistria, a region occupied by pro-Russian military forces, no media are allowed to freely function. Issues also persist in the largely Russian-speaking regions of Gagauzia and Taraclia, where independent journalists report being regularly intimidated by local authorities and the population.

 

Attacks on the rise as geopolitical situation becomes more tense

The number of media freedom violations in Moldova has gradually increased since monitoring began in June 2022: 10 cases were recorded by the MapMF platform between April and December 2022, in comparison to 19 in 2023, 24 in 2024, and 25 in just the first eight months of 2025.

 

Journalists and press freedom organizations expressed particular concern about waves of attacks which have, over the past year, coincided with periods of high political tensions. The first months of 2025, for instance, saw a heavy backlash against journalists and media following the decision by the Trump administration to significantly cut U.S. foreign aid, including programmes which supported independent media.

 

In response, a number of actors, including pro-Russian politicians and private individuals, the latter especially in the online space, engaged in discrediting and intimidating behavior targeting media who previously received grant support from the United States.

 

While the drastic drop in U.S. funding greatly impacted Moldovan media, newsrooms have been able to adapt, with media representatives reporting that mass closures of media outlets have not been observed over the past year. Some journalists, however, expressed the fear that should the current level of support from European sources not continue, the risks of closure would become especially high for regional media.

 

Government approach to media freedom

While both MapMF data and interviews with Moldovan journalists have pointed to a relatively healthy level of media freedom in the country, concerns remain with regards to recent legal and regulatory decisions targeting media houses owned by pro-Russian oligarchs.

 

Central here is the mandate of Moldova’s strategic investment council (Council for the Examination of Investments of Importance to State Security). The government body was set up to help protect national security in the context of Russia’s invasion of neighbouring Ukraine and has over the past year made decisions on suspending the broadcasting of TV channels accused of distributing Russian propaganda.

 

While interviewees did not question in principle the legitimacy of the suspension of media outlets for the dissemination of pro-Russian propaganda, worries were expressed about a lack of sufficient due process in the adoption of these decisions, and the lack of transparency in the official justification for broadcast license suspensions. In fact, it was unclear whether there was any procedure in place at all for such situations, or what criteria were used to issue decisions on broadcast suspension.

 

Certain media representatives also expressed worries about the level of self-censorship in outlets which closely align editorially with the current government’s policies on pursuing European integration and denouncing Russia’s war in Ukraine. Some interviewees said that “a sort of symbiosis” exists between some pro-European media and the current government, which has led to negative perceptions about the editorial independence of these media which, in turn, leads to lower levels of public trust.

 

As a result, Moldovans have increasingly turned to social media in search of alternative voices or watchdog reporting. However, this has also increased exposure to pro-Russian disinformation and other forms of biased or unreliable news sources.

 

Efforts by the current government to counter these tendencies by building a national strategic communications (stratcom) office aiming to combat Russian disinformation, were assessed by many media stakeholders as largely ineffective.

 

Efforts to counter falling levels of trust in media, as well as Russian disinformation operations particularly during elections, are also undermined by low levels of media literacy in Moldova, leaving Moldova’s citizens particularly exposed.

 

All media stakeholders interviewed highlighted the serious risks created by Russian disinformation, arguing that Russian sources which attempt to discredit democratic, human rights and pro-EU values are able to mobilise significant financial resources, making the task of reaching local populations even more difficult for independent media.

 

Worries surrounding the outcome of the parliamentary election

The campaign preceding Moldova’s upcoming parliamentary elections in September 2025 included numerous instances in which journalists were dragged into the political contest between pro-European and pro-Russian forces, with politicians and protesters especially intimidating journalists who were carrying out reporting work.

 

Civil society organizations, self-regulatory bodies and journalists interviewed by IPI in Moldova also stressed the potential risks linked to the possible emergence of a pro-Russian government following the elections.

 

A proposal to introduce a “foreign agent” law in Moldova, similar to the one adopted in Russia, and more recently in Georgia, was even filed in parliament in April 2025, with the support of the Block of Communists and Socialists (BCS).

 

While this political group currently does not have a parliamentary majority, many journalists fear that pro-Russian parties could eventually approve such legislation and threaten the future of media which receive foreign funding.

 

Some journalists even discussed plans to relocate outside the country in the event of the victory of pro-Russian parties, noting that plans to work in exile were already explored following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

 

Other interlocutors, however, expressed doubts that a pro-Russian government would introduce restrictive “foreign agent” legislation. They pointed out that a foreign agent law would also affect many pro-Russian media, who rely on funding from Russia or other foreign sources.

 

Other fears of journalists surrounding a possible victory of pro-Russian groups include restricted access to information of public interest, limited access to press conferences for critical and independent media, as well as the possible misuse of spyware and other surveillance tools against journalists.

 

Transnistria and Gagauzia

While the media freedom situation in Moldova remains stable overall, this situation is very different in the region of Transnistria, which remains outside the control of the government in Chișinău. Inside Transnistria, independent reporting critical of the pro-Russian authorities does not exist. Journalists from other parts of Moldova cannot freely travel to the region to report. The arrest of TV8 correspondent Viorica Tataru, as well as more recent cases, testify to the risks of exercising independent journalism in Transnistria.

 

As reported by journalists who cover Transnistria and the bordering regions, reporting trips to the territory are complex operations conducted undercover, which at times leads to detention by the authorities. While to date all journalists detained in such circumstances were promptly released following the intervention of the Moldovan government or foreign embassies in Chișinău, this situation still creates high-risk conditions for journalists seeking to report from Transnistria.

 

Issues also persist in Moldova’s southern region of Gagauzia, which is under the control of the central government but enjoys a wide degree of autonomy. In Gagauzia, according to data published on the MapMF platform, journalists are regularly intimidated and harassed for their work, to a greater degree than in other regions of the country. While Gagauzia only comprises approximately five percent of Moldova’s population of around two million, close to one-third of all MapMF alerts registered in Moldova are directly linked to Gagauzia.

 

Equally important, independent journalists carry out their duties in a climate of hostility from a majority of the local population, which has traditionally elected pro-Russian parties.

 

Similar issues also persist in Taraclia, a region populated mainly by representatives of Moldova’s Bulgarian ethnic minority. In Taraclia, journalists face a situation similar to Gagauzia. Moreover, local journalists, reporting on their communities, can be exposed to greater risks of threats and intimidation as they are easier to identify and locate.

 

Conclusion

Overall, IPI’s mission to Moldova confirmed the situation depicted in data collected by the MFRR consortium since 2022, which showed a relatively healthy level of press freedom in the country despite its numerous challenges. While the situation remains overall positive, fears over the upcoming election have revealed the fragility of media freedoms in Moldova.

 

Serious issues remain with regards to Moldova’s vulnerability in the face of Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns. The fear expressed by some interviewees regarding the possible need to relocate independent media outside of Moldova, if pro-Russian parties obtain a majority in parliament in upcoming elections, is worrying in the context of the overall satisfactory situation of press freedom in the country today.

 

While the risk of Russian interference in Moldova was the greatest concern of interviewees, other long-present issues remain, such as the continued lack of even basic media freedom in Transnistria, and the continued intimidation of journalists in regions such as Gagauzia and Taraclia.

 

All in all, Moldova’s vulnerable position shows the need for additional support for the country’s vital independent media sector, the situation of which has become particularly unstable as a result of the Trump administration’s decision to terminate development aid programmes worldwide.

 

While the climate for media freedom in Moldova is positive overall, the situation remains fragile and the future of journalism could hinge dramatically on the outcome of the upcoming elections.

This statement was coordinated by IPI as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Allgemein

Monitoring Report January-June 2025

Monitoring Report January-June 2025

This Monitoring Report takes stock of the press freedom situation in 36 EU Member States and candidate countries during the first six months of 2025. Between January and June, the Mapping Media Freedom database documented 709 press freedom violations, affecting 1249 media workers or entities. 

16.09.2025

The report documents a vast variety of attacks, indicating that media workers in Europe operate in an increasingly hostile environment. The types of attacks documented included verbal attacks – such as death threats and smear campaigns – physical attacks, attacks to property, legal incidents, and interference with reporting work. 

 

Media workers faced threats in different contexts – including private and professional environments. Attacks online were the most common, a trend that continues from previous reports. The second most dangerous workplace for journalists were protests, followed by incidents at court and public places. 

Though private individuals remained the main perpetrators accounting for 22% of the recorded incidents, they are closely followed by government and public officials, who were responsible for 21% attacks. Police and state security were the perpetrators of 12% of the incidents. 

 

A particular focus is put on the phenomenon of foreign agent laws and disinformation narratives about foreign media funding that have become a significant threat to independent media in Europe. Media outlets and workers in Georgia, Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, and Slovakia faced accusations of foreign funding, or were targeted by laws compromising media freedom. 

 

Serbia is also highlighted as a country of concern with a total of 96 press freedom violations. Amidst ongoing anti-government protests and a violent state response, journalists faced an unprecedented number of attacks, including smear campaigns by the government, attacks during protest reporting, editorial pressure and unjust dismissals.

 

The 2025 Monitoring Report is structured in four parts:

  • A general overview highlighting major issues and trends of the press freedom situation in EU Member States and candidate countries, including quantitative analysis and charts with statistics.
  • Two thematic chapters on prominent topics within press freedom in Europe: Foreign agent laws and disinformation narratives, and the emergency situation in Serbia. 
  • An analysis of the press freedom situation in two EU Member States: Hungary and Romania.
  • An analysis of the press freedom situation in four EU candidate countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Turkey, and Ukraine. 
Download the Report

This report was compiled by the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF), the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ), and the International Press Institute (IPI) as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Library

Backroom deals to silence independent media in Serbia?

Backroom deals to silence independent media in Serbia?

As the political situation in Serbia remains explosive, the publication of a controversial private conversation highlights an attempt to muzzle the few media outlets in the country that continue to take a critical line towards the government.

12.09.2025

By Massimo Moratti

Original publication on OBCT, also available in Italian.

In Serbia’s media landscape, characterized by a rapidly and progressive deterioration in freedom information    , N1 and Nova S are the only major media outlets looking critically at the actions of the Serbian government and authorities.

 

Over the last summer, marked by frequent protests and violence in many Serbian cities, the two broadcasters regularly reported live from protest sites. Journalists from both stations, often wearing protective helmets, were frequently exposed to scenes of urban warfare and occasionally harassed, insulted, and beaten     by government supporters and sometimes even by law enforcement    . No other media outlet in Serbia has been covering the protests live.

The recording

For these reasons, the publication of a recording of a conversation between Telekom Serbia’s executive director, Vladimir Lučić, and United Group’s general manager, Stan Miller, has caused a huge stir.

 

Telekom Serbia is largely state-owned, while United Group holds a majority stake in United Media, the company that owns N1. The recording was released by OCCRP     (Organized Crime Corruption Reporting Project) and KRIK     (Crime and Corruption Investigation Network), two organizations at the forefront of reporting crime and corruption in the region.

 

The recording is from a meeting between the two CEOs of their respective organizations, which took place in early August. At the beginning of the conversation, Miller commented on the situation, saying that “Serbia is exploding under our asses.” The conversation then focused on Aleksandra Subotić, executive director of United Media.

 

During the recording, Miller tells Lučić that he can’t immediately fire Subotić, as agreed, and that he must first downsize the company and divide it into several parts. Miller says he understands the president is very angry.

 

Lučić responds that President Vučić has already discussed the matter with Nikos Stathopoulos, the president of the British group that holds a majority stake in United Group. Lučić says that President Vučić only asked for the removal of Subotić, not the directors of N1 and Nova S, because he knows it’s difficult to remove the director at the moment. Miller himself says he’s very annoyed by Subotić.

Reactions

The publication of the recordings immediately sparked protests from the independent press, which gave wide coverage to the story and denounced what appeared to be an attempt to silence     N1 and Nova S.

 

President Vučić’s office, contacted for comment by the two portals, reiterated that “[President] Vučić does not interfere in the editorial policy of the media, nor does he have any interest in it.” Telekom Serbia initially declined to respond, but immediately after the recording was published, it announced it would file lawsuits against all those involved, not because the content was inauthentic, but because the two portals had not sent the recording to Telekom for verification. Lučić categorically denied     President Vučić’s involvement.

 

However, United Group’s position confirmed the conversation and its contents. United Group, which had previously reiterated that “in all the countries in which it operates, it has never been influenced, and will never be influenced, by political pressure,” confirmed that the conversation took place and reiterated its content, but firmly rejected any insinuation that the company was attempting to undermine the independence of its media outlets. However, it emphasized that recording private conversations is illegal.

 

While N1, Nova S, and other independent portals     gave the incident considerable coverage, closely following the developments, government-affiliated media outlets and press reported it only indirectly two days later, when Lučić explained      the content of the conversation to RTS and announced     he would file a lawsuit for publishing the recording.

 

The tabloid Informer    , one of the government’s most ardent supporters, followed the same line and focused on Lučić’s comments, openly criticizing Subotić for mismanaging United Media and for causing damage to both United Group and Telekom, thus deserving to be replaced.

 

While the reactions in Serbia reflect the polarization of Serbian society, outside Serbia condemnation of the attempts to limit the independence of N1 and Nova S was unanimous. The organizations participating in the Media Freedom Rapid Response project issued a press release on the matter, condemning attempts to limit media independence and calling for     intervention by European institutions to curb such attempts.

 

A few days later, this intervention arrived: when asked about the matter, European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos explicitly stated     that pressure on the media, whether political or economic, does not benefit democracy.

Concerning signs

The concerns of industry insiders and those closely following media freedom in Serbia do not appear to be unfounded. Already in February, United Group had sold     SBB, the cable television provider (including N1 and Nova S), to Telekom Serbia. The news had raised considerable concern regarding the negative impact on media freedom.

 

These concerns were heightened a few weeks later when United Group sold its satellite component to Total TV, and shortly thereafter, Total TV sold it to Telekom Srbija    . Shortly after this sale, N1 and Nova S were excluded from Telekom Srbija’s satellite programs.

 

These transactions further alarmed industry experts, who saw a coordinated effort to reduce the visibility of independent television stations. Moreover, President Vučić’s discontent with N1 and Nova S is a fact: already in June, he had described the activities of these two television stations as “pure terrorism    ,” expecting prosecutors to take action against them. This expectation was reiterated after the recent incidents     in Novi Sad.

 

More recently, the weekly Vreme     reported that Vučić’s goal is to shut down the two television stations by November 2025. The timing of this closure would be strategic given that many are speculating that new elections     will be held by December 2025.

This article was published by OBCT as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Allgemein

Türkiye: Stop Throttling Social Media Platforms and Messaging Services

Türkiye: Stop Throttling Social Media Platforms and Messaging Services

Türkiye is increasingly throttling social media platforms and messaging apps to silence online communication at moments of profound political or social importance. The undersigned human rights and press freedom organisations condemn Türkiye’s actions, which isolate people from vital information, and stifle democratic participation. Türkiye must correct course and uphold its international human rights obligations.

11.09.2025

Türkçe açıklama aşağıdadır

On 7 September at 23:45, major social media platforms and messaging services X, Instagram, YouTube, TikTok, Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram, and Signal became inaccessible in Istanbul for approximately 21 hours. 

 

The bandwidth throttling coincided with a police blockade of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) Istanbul headquarters. The blockade triggered a call from CHP’s Istanbul Youth Branch to gather in front of the building at 23.00 on 7 September, in protest against a temporary injunction by an Istanbul court suspending the Party’s provincial leadership and replacing it with ‘trustees’, a decision some legal experts say was beyond the court’s jurisdiction. On September 11, a court in Ankara rejected the case for the annulment of the Party’s İstanbul provincial congress on substantive grounds.

 

The throttling of platforms was accompanied by attacks on peaceful assembly and growing pressure on media reporting on the tense situation. On 8 September, the police forcibly entered the CHP headquarters together with the court-appointed trustee, deploying tear gas against demonstrators, journalists, party members and staff both outside and inside the building. At least 10 people were reportedly detained and handcuffed. The Istanbul Governor’s Office had already issued a ban on public gatherings in six districts starting at 20:00 on 7 September and lasting until 11 September. In addition, the president of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) warned on X that outlets ‘undermining social peace and public safety’ would face administrative fines, broadcasting suspensions and, ultimately, license revocations. This comes after major independent broadcasters TELE1, Halk TV, and SZC TV were hit with broadcast bans in recent months.  

 

No official explanation has been provided for the throttling as of 11 September. Under Article 60/10 of the Electronic Communications Law (Law No. 5809), the Presidency may order the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK) to restrict communications without a court order where there is peril in delay, citing national security, public order, or other grounds listed under Article 22 of the Constitution. These administrative restrictions are temporary and have to be brought to the judiciary within 24 hours. The competent court is required to render a decision within 48 hours thereafter. This means that communication can be cut for up to 72 hours without judicial approval. Article 60/10 was added to the Electronic Communications Law in August 2016 with a State of Emergency Decree, and codified into law in November of the same year. 

 

Türkiye has a documented pattern of throttling social media platforms and messaging apps during critical events, including the February 2023 earthquakes when Twitter was throttled for about 12 hours despite urgent rescue efforts relying on it. Another example is the throttling of Instagram, YouTube, Facebook and Twitter after a bombing in November 2022.

 

The latest shutdown marks the second one in recent months. When CHP’s 2028 presidential candidate and then-Istanbul Mayor was detained in March 2025, X, TikTok, YouTube, Instagram, and Telegram were throttled in Istanbul for 42 hours. This time around, the government escalated its repression by including Signal, and Whatsapp, the most widely used mobile application in the country. Accessing throttled platforms and messaging services through VPNs is not a reliable alternative in Türkiye, as most major providers have already been blocked for several years.

 

These restrictions are often imposed with little to no explanation. Platforms and messaging services are throttled and then quietly restored, leaving the public in a state of uncertainty. They limit the ability of journalists to report developing events of intense public interest, restrict access to vital information and stifle political dissent during moments when the public most needs open and free communication. 

 

Türkiye’s actions are in clear violation of international human rights law. As emphasised by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘given their indiscriminate and disproportionate impacts on human rights, States should refrain from the full range of internet shutdowns’. Any restriction on freedom of expression, including the blocking of certain platforms, must be based on a clear legal basis, necessary to achieve a legitimate aim, and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. According to the OHCHR, any internet shutdown, including targeted ones, must further be subject to prior authorisation by a court or other independent adjudicatory body and communicated in advance to the service providers with a clear legal explanation and details regarding scope and duration. In addition, governments must provide redress mechanisms, including through judicial proceedings, to those whose rights have been affected. Türkiye repeatedly violates these requirements. It instead uses throttling measures as convenient tools in its arsenal to block people’s access to information in politically sensitive times and to limit scrutiny of its actions.    

 

The undersigned human rights and press freedom organisations urge Türkiye to refrain from throttling social media platforms and messaging services. Türkiye must stop its consistent crackdown on dissenting voices and the media, and uphold its international human rights obligations.

Signed by:

  • ARTICLE 19
  • ARTICOLO 21 
  • Civic Space Studies Association 
  • EuroMed Rights Network
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • Human Rights Watch  
  • International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), in the framework of the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders 
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • Media and Law Studies Association (MLSA)
  • PEN Denmark
  • PEN International
  • P24 Platform for Independent Journalism
  • South East Europe Media Organisation (SEEMO)
  • World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), in the framework of the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Türkiye Sosyal Medya Mecraları ve Mesajlaşma Hizmetlerinde Bant Daraltma Uygulamasına Son Vermelidir

 

​​Türkiye, özellikle siyasi ve toplumsal açıdan kritik dönemlerde sosyal medya mecraları ile çevrim içi mesajlaşma hizmetlerine yönelik bant daraltma uygulamalarına  başvurmaktadır. Aşağıda imzası bulunan insan hakları ve medya özgürlüğü kuruluşları kamuoyunun bilgiye erişimini engelleyen ve demokratik katılımı zedeleyen bu uygulamaları kınamakta; Türkiye’yi uluslararası insan hakları hukuku kapsamındaki yükümlülüklerini yerine getirmeye davet etmektedir.

 

7 Eylül günü saat 23:45 itibarıyla İstanbul’da, X, Instagram, YouTube, TikTok, Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram ve Signal’e yaklaşık 21 saat süreyle bant daraltma uygulandı. 

 

Bant daraltma uygulaması emniyet güçlerinin ana muhalefet partisi Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi’nin (CHP) İstanbul İl Başkanlığı binasını ablukaya aldığı ve bunun üzerine CHP İstanbul Gençlik Kolları’nın 7 Eylül saat 23.00’te parti binası önünde toplanma çağrısı yaptığı sırada başladı. Bu çağrı, partinin il yönetiminin bir ara kararla tedbiren askıya alınıp yerine kayyum atanmasını protesto niteliğindeydi. Kimi hukukçular bu kararın, kararı veren mahkemenin yetkisini aştığı kanısındadır. 11 Eylül’de Ankara’daki bir mahkeme, partinin İstanbul il kongresinin iptaline ilişkin davayı esastan reddetti.

 

Bant daraltma uygulaması, barışçıl toplanma hakkına müdahaleler ve gelişmeleri kamuoyuna aktaran medya kuruluşlarına yönelik artan baskılarla eş zamanlı olarak gerçekleştirilmiştir. 8 Eylül tarihinde emniyet güçleri, mahkemece atanan kayyum ile birlikte CHP İstanbul İl Başkanlığı binasına zorla girmiş; polis, bina içinde ve çevresinde bulunan göstericilere, gazetecilere, parti üyelerine ve çalışanlara karşı biber gazı kullanmıştır. Olaylar sırasında en az on kişinin kelepçelenerek gözaltına alındığı belirtilmektedir. İstanbul Valiliği 7 Eylül saat 20:00’den 11 Eylül’e dek altı ilçede tüm toplu etkinlikleri yasaklamış; Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu (RTÜK) Başkanı, X mecrası üzerinden yaptığı açıklamada ‘toplumsal barışa ve kamu güvenliğine zarar verecek’ şekilde yayın yapan kuruluşların idari para cezası, yayın durdurma ve nihayetinde lisans iptali yaptırımlarıyla karşı karşıya kalacağını sert bir dille belirtmiştir. Son aylarda TELE1, Halk TV ve SZC TV gibi bağımsız yayın kuruluşlarının yayın yasaklarına maruz kalmış olması bu tehditlerin yarattığı baskıyı artırmaktadır. 

 

11 Eylül itibarıyla, henüz bant daraltma uygulamasına ilişkin resmi bir açıklama yapılmamıştır. 5809 Sayılı Elektronik Haberleşme Kanunu’nun 60/10. maddesi uyarınca Cumhurbaşkanlığı, gecikmesinde sakınca bulunan hallerde ulusal güvenlik, kamu düzeni veya Anayasa’nın 22. maddesinde sayılan diğer gerekçelere dayanarak mahkeme kararı olmaksızın Bilgi ve İletişim Teknolojileri Kurumu’na (BTK) iletişimi kısıtlama talimatı verebilmektedir. Yasaya göre bu idari kararlar 24 saat içinde ilgili Sulh Ceza Hakimi’nin onayına sunulur, hakim kararını 48 saat içinde açıklar. Bu, mahkeme kararı olmadan iletişimin 72 saate kadar kesilebileceği anlamına gelmektedir. 60/10. madde, Ağustos 2016’da Olağanüstü Hal Kararnamesi ile Elektronik Haberleşme Kanunu’na eklenmiş ve aynı yılın Kasım ayında aynen kabul edilerek kanunlaşmıştır. 

 

Türkiye, kamusal önem taşıyan olaylar sırasında sosyal medya mecraları ve mesajlaşma hizmetlerine erişimi engellemede alenen bilinen bir kısıtlama geçmişine sahiptir. Örneğin, Şubat 2023’teki depremlerde arama kurtarma faaliyetleri kapsamında kullanılması nedeniyle hayati öneme sahip olan Twitter’a erişim yaklaşık 12 saat süreyle engellenmiştir. Yine Kasım 2022’de gerçekleşen bir bombalı saldırının ardından Instagram, YouTube, Facebook ve Twitter’a bant daraltması uygulanmıştır. 

 

7-8 Eylül tarihlerinde gerçekleşen bant daraltma uygulaması, son aylarda gerçekleşen ikinci benzer uygulamadır. CHP’nin 2028 Cumhurbaşkanı adayı ve tutuklanarak yerine kayyum atanan İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediye Başkanı Ekrem İmamoğlu Mart 2025’te gözaltına alındığında İstanbul’da X, TikTok, YouTube, Instagram ve Telegram’a erişim 42 saat boyunca kısıtlanmıştı. Eylül’de bu listeye Signal ve ülkede en yaygın kullanılan mobil uygulama olan WhatsApp da dahil edildi. VPN’ler aracılığıyla bant daraltmasına maruz kalan mecra ve mesajlaşma hizmetlerine erişmek ise Türkiye’de güvenilir bir alternatif teşkil etmemektedir; zira pek çok VPN hizmeti sunan uygulama da ülkede erişime engellidir. 

 

Elektronik Haberleşme Kanunu kapsamındaki bant daraltma uygulamaları genellikle hiçbir resmi açıklama yapılmadan başlayıp sona ermektedir. Bu uygulamalar toplumu belirsizlik içinde bırakmakta, gazetecilerin toplumsal ve siyasi açıdan önemli gelişmeleri haberleştirme kabiliyetini sınırlamakta, ve açık ve özgür iletişimin en gerekli olduğu dönemlerde siyasi muhalefetin sesini kısmaktadır.

 

Türkiye’nin bant daraltma uygulamaları uluslararası insan hakları hukukunu açıkça ihlal etmektedir. Birleşmiş Milletler İnsan Hakları Yüksek Komiserliği (OHCHR) tarafından vurgulandığı üzere, ‘insan hakları üzerinde ayrım gözetmeyen ve orantısız etkileri nedeniyle, devletler internetin tamamen kapatılmasından kaçınmalıdır’. Belirli mecralara erişimin engellenmesi de dahil olmak üzere ifade özgürlüğüne getirilen her türlü kısıtlama açık bir yasa hükmüne dayanmalı, meşru bir amaca ulaşmak için gerekli olmalı ve bu meşru amaç ile orantılı olarak uygulanmalıdır. OHCHR’ye göre, hedefli kapatmalar da dahil olmak üzere her türlü internet erişimi kısıtlaması, uygulamanın başlamasından önce mahkeme veya diğer bir bağımsız yargı organının iznine tabi olmalı; hizmet sağlayıcılara kapsam ve süreyi içeren bir yasal açıklama ile önceden bildirilmelidir. Bunun yanı sıra, kısıtlamalardan hakları etkilenen kişilere etkili telafi mekanizmaları sağlanmalıdır. Türkiye bu yükümlülükleri tekrarlayan bir biçimde ihlal etmekte, siyasi açıdan hassas dönemlerde toplumun bilgiye erişimini engelleyecek ve kendi eylemlerinin denetlenmesini sınırlayacak şekilde davranmaktadır. 

 

Aşağıda imzası bulunan kuruluşlar, Türkiye’yi sosyal medya mecraları ve çevrim içi mesajlaşma hizmetlerini kısıtlamaktan kaçınmaya çağırmaktadır. Türkiye, muhalif seslere ve medyaya yönelik baskılarını durdurmalı ve uluslararası insan hakları yükümlülüklerini yerine getirmelidir. 

İmzalayanlar

  • ARTICOLO 21
  • Avrupa Basın ve Medya Özgürlüğü Merkezi (ECPMF)
  • Avrupa Gazeteciler Federasyonu (EFJ)
  • Danimarka PEN
  • EuroMed Rights Network
  • ​​Güney Doğu Avrupa Medya Örgütü (SEEMO)
  • İnsan Hakları İzleme Örgütü (Human Rights Watch)
  • İşkence Karşıtı Dünya Koalisyonu (OMCT), İnsan Hakları Savunucularının Korunması için Gözlemevi çerçevesinde
  • Medya ve Hukuk Çalışmaları Derneği (MLSA)
  • Punto24 Bağımsız Gazetecilik Derneği (P24)
  • Sivil Alan Araştırmaları Derneği
  • Uluslararası Basın Enstitüsü (IPI)
  • Uluslararası İnsan Hakları Federasyonu (FIDH), İnsan Hakları savunucularının Korunması için Gözlemevi çerçevesinde
  • Uluslararası PEN

Bu açıklama, AB üye ülkeleri ve aday ülkelerde basın ve medya özgürlüğünün ihlallerini takip eden, izleyen ve bunlara müdahale eden Avrupa çapında bir mekanizma olan Medya Özgürlüğü Acil Müdahale (MFRR) tarafından koordine edildi.

Allgemein

Georgia: Media Freedom groups condemn latest attacks on journalists…

Georgia: Media Freedom groups condemn latest attacks on journalists by ruling party activists and police 

The undersigned media freedom, journalists’, and freedom of expression organizations strongly condemn the recent physical and verbal attacks on independent media by activists of the Georgian Dream ruling party and a police officer.

11.09.2025

These latest serious physical attacks are the result of long-standing impunity for crimes against journalists in Georgia. We demand an independent and thorough investigation into these incidents and that all those responsible be fully held accountable.

 

On the evening of September 8, tensions near Tbilisi Mayor Kakha Kaladze’s campaign office escalated between peaceful protesters and Georgian Dream activists. Reports and footage show GD supporters and activists attacking protesters, including journalists who were there to cover the demonstration.

 

The confrontation began when demonstrators marching from the Public Broadcaster arrived at Kaladze’s office, encountering GD supporters allegedly waiting in parked cars. GD supporters and militants used bottles and batons to attack protesters and journalists, many of whom were clearly identifiable as members of the press.

 

Several journalists were beaten by the group, including Publika.ge’s Aleksandre Keshelashvili and Keto Mikadze, whose phones were also stolen. Other journalists documented GD activists throwing objects, shouting insults, and harassing both press and protesters.

 

Hungarian journalist László Mézes, covering the demonstration for independent Hungarian publisher Magyar Hang, was beaten unconscious, had his finger broken, and his phone stolen.

 

Ketevan Khutsishvili of independent media outlet Netgazeti was verbally abused, physically pushed, and obstructed by the deputy director of the Tbilisi Police Department. In another incident, police reportedly did not react after OC Media co-founder Mariam Nikuradze was doused with water by a GD supporter.

 

All of these journalists were wearing press vests and badges and were clearly identifiable as members of the press.

 

Following the incidents, the Interior Ministry published a statement saying it has “launched an investigation into group violence.” The statement said the police officers “took all relevant measures from the start of the confrontation to cool down the tensions and prevent the further intensification of the conflict.”

 

However, according to footage and reports of independent journalists demonstrate that police either refrained from intervening or directly participated in attacks against journalists.

 

The attacks on journalists on September 8 are not isolated incidents but part of a broader, ongoing pattern of violence against reporters, police inaction, and impunity for crimes against the press in Georgia. The GD authorities have not only failed to condemn these violent acts but have systematically encouraged and promoted them, sharing responsibility for the attacks.

 

The scale of media freedom decline and systematic attacks on journalists in Georgia must not be ignored. We reiterate our call on the international community to exert stronger pressure on the increasingly authoritarian Georgian Dream regime to end its ongoing assault on independent press.

Signed by:

  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Event

MFRR Webinar: Taking stock: 709 attacks on media freedom…

Taking stock:  

709 attacks on media freedom in the first six months of 2025

18 September, 13:00 CET.

Between January and June 2025, the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) documented 709 press freedom violations against 1249 media workers in 36 European countries. In this webinar, we will take a look at what types of attacks media workers faced, who attacked them, and in what context. We will zoom in on developments in four focus countries – Georgia, Serbia, Romania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina – where media workers operated under severe pressure these first six months. Foreign agent laws and narratives are also highlighted as a worrying trend that threatens independent journalists and media outlets in Europe. 

Join us on September 18 to discuss an overview of the report with a special focus on Georgia, Serbia, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and foreign agent narratives. 

Register here

Speakers

Cara Räker

Monitoring Officer, European Centre for Press and Media Freedom

Camille Magnissalis

Press Freedom Monitoring and Communications Officer, the European Federation of Journalists

Ronja Koskinen

Press Freedom Officer, International Press Institute

Teona Sekhniashvili

Europe Network and Advocacy Officer, International Press Institute

Moderator

Gürkan Özturan

Media Freedom Monitoring Officer, European Centre for Press and Media Freedom

EU flags outside the European Commission Allgemein

Media freedom groups welcome Google fine, call on EU…

Media freedom groups welcome Google fine, call on EU to break up the tech giant’s digital advertising monopoly  

The Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) today calls on the European Union to step up its action against Google following the European Commission’s decision to impose a 2.95 billion euro fine on the company for anti-competitive practices through its dominance of the online advertising and advertising technology (adtech) services.  

10.09.2025

The Commission found that Google breached EU antitrust rules by distorting competition in the adtech industry to favour its own digital advertising services, which disadvantaged other adtech services, advertisers, and online publishers – which includes news media outlets. 

 

In addition to the fine, the Commission also ordered Google to resolve its conflict of interests in the adtech supply chain where Google dominates buyer and seller apps (Google Ads and Double Click) and the main ad exchange, AdX.

 

The Commission also restated its preliminary conclusion that “only the mandatory divestment by Google of part of its services would address the situation of inherent conflicts of interest.” It added that the failure to remedy this situation internally would lead the Commission to impose its own “strong remedies” through legal and regulatory means. Google has 60 days to explain how it will respond.

 

The MFRR welcomes the long overdue action taken against Google, and urges the European Commission to go the extra step and insist on the full break up of the company’s advertising services. 

 

Ending Google’s unfair monopoly over digital advertising revenue is a critical step in rebalancing the market and redirecting essential ad revenue to the media and publishers.

 

The three billion euro fine is a modest punishment for a company that posted a global advertising revenue of 248 billion U.S. Dollars in 2024 and generated net profits from advertising in the EU of around 15 billion euros in 2023. The only way to end the abuse of the dominant position in the market is to end the dominant position in the market and to insist that Google breaks up its digital advertising empire.

 

In 2024, European publishers sued Google for 2.1 billion euros for loss of profits as a result of Google’s abuse of the Adtech market. A recent report on the US market estimated that the combined anti-competitive practices of Google and Meta cost U.S publishers 14 billion dollars a year.  

 

Meanwhile, on September 22,  a U.S. Court will start proceedings on whether to force Google to divest its adtech assets following a guilty ruling against the company for maintaining an illegal monopoly in online advertising. 

 

The European Commission has prioritised fighting disinformation and preserving Europe’s stumbling democracies under the Democracy Shield initiative. The most effective way to combat disinformation is to ensure a healthy, pluralistic media sector.

 

Enforcement of anti-trust laws that ensure Europe’s market for news, information and advertising is free and fair and not compromised by big tech’s anti-competitive practices is the surest way to guarantee the future of journalism and combat disinformation in the EU. This must be at the heart of the Democracy Shield.

 

If the EU Commission is serious about fighting disinformation and preserving Europe’s media sector,  then it must order the breakup of Google’s ad businesses.

Signed by:

  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Allgemein

IPI and 16 press freedom organisations, rights groups call…

IPI and 16 press freedom  organisations, rights groups call for the release of journalist Furkan Karabay

The International Press Institute (IPI) and the undersigned organisations strongly condemn the elongated pretrial detention of journalist Furkan Karabay, who faces a prison sentence of 6 to 15 years and call for his immediate release. Karabay has now spent 117 days in prison over his journalistic commentary.

08.09.2025

Türkçe açıklama aşağıdadır…

The undersigned organisations strongly condemn the elongated pretrial detention of journalist Furkan Karabay, who faces a prison sentence of 6 to 15 years and call for his immediate release. Karabay has now spent 117 days in prison over his journalistic commentary.

 

Karabay, who has previously worked as an editor and reporter for news portals outlets such as Gerçek Gündem and 10Haber, has been held in pretrial detention for over 100 days and his indictment was prepared on September 5. He is charged with “making targets of those who were tasked to combat terrorism” and “insulting the Turkish President” over his journalistic reporting and social media commentary. Karabay was taken into custody during a police raid on his home in Istanbul and sent to prison the same day. Since then, multiple appeals submitted by his legal team for his release have been rejected, with judicial authorities citing a purported “risk of flight” as justification for prolonging his detention without an indictment for 114 days.

 

The accusations stem from Karabay’s reference to the names and photos of judicial officials in his reporting on the İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality investigations, which prosecutors claim amounted to “making them potential targets” for terrorist organisations. The second charge, “insulting the president,” is based on Karabay’s public recall of past remarks by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in the context of a local official’s deteriorating health. Karabay denied any wrongdoing, emphasizing that all the information he shared was already in the public domain.

 

Karabay has been previously targeted for his journalistic work, with MapMF documenting five separate incidents since the beginning of 2024. In April 2025, Karabay received a prison sentence of more than two years in a separate case after President Erdoğan and members of his family filed complaints accusing him of “insulting the president” and “defamation” over remarks he made during a YouTube program. The court suspended this sentence. This followed two previous jailings on similar allegations. In December 2023, he was arrested after publishing a report on judicial corruption and bribery allegations. He remained in jail until his release in January 2024. In November 2024, he was detained again over his coverage and social media posts about the investigation into a local opposition mayor who was arrested and replaced by a trustee. He was released later that month.

 

Karabay’s case underscores a broader, alarming clampdown on press freedom in Turkey and mirrors the persecution of other journalists who have faced similar extended pretrial detention periods without indictment. In June 2025, prominent journalist and YouTuber Fatih Altaylı was similarly arrested, due to his comments during an online broadcast that were allegedly “threatening the president,” and was held in pretrial detention for more than a month before his indictment was issued. In February 2025, reporters Yıldız Tar, Ercüment Akdeniz, and Elif Akgül were detained and spent several months in prison before their indictments were prepared. Although the charges were not directly related to their journalism, such cases still illustrate how pretrial imprisonment is being misused to punish and silence critical voices, including in the media.

 

We consider Karabay’s imprisonment and the denial of due process for more than three months as a disproportionate and punitive response to his journalism. Reporting and critical public commentary on government officials must never be criminalised. Equating news coverage and commentary with serious offenses like “targeting officials” is a dangerous distortion.

 

IPI and 16 undersigned organisations, call for the immediate release of journalist Furkan Karabay and for all charges against him to be dropped. We further urge Turkish authorities to cease exploiting vague legal provisions to persecute journalists and release all 17 journalists in jail.

Signed by:

  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)
  • Danish PEN
  • Dicle Fırat Journalists Association
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • IFEX
  • International Fédération of Journalists (IFJ)
  • Media and Law Studies Association (MLSA)
  • Norwegian Helsinki Committee
  • PEN America
  • PEN International
  • PEN Norway
  • PEN Sweden
  • P24 Platform for Independent Journalism
  • Reporters sans frontières (RSF)
  • South East Europe Media Organisation (SEEMO) 

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Basın ve ifade özgürlüğü kuruluşları, gazeteci Furkan Karabay’ın serbest bırakılmasını talep ediyor

 

Uluslararası Basın Enstitüsü (IPI) ve aşağıda imzası bulunan 16 basın özgürlüğü, ifade hürriyeti ve basın meslek kuruluşları, Furkan Karabay’ın gazetecilik faaliyetleri nedeniyle 117 gündür tutuklu yargılanmasını şiddetle kınıyor ve Karabay’ın derhal serbest bırakılmasını talep ediyor.

 

Gerçek Gündem ve 10Haber gibi mecralarda editör ve muhabirlik yapmış gazeteci Furkan Karabay, gazetecilik faaliyetleri ve sosyal medyada yaptığı yorumlar nedeniyle 6 ila 15 yıl arası hapis cezasıyla karşı karşıya ve 15 Mayıs 2025’ten bu yana tutuklu. İstanbul’daki evine düzenlenen polis baskınıyla gözaltına alınıp aynı gün cezaevine gönderilen Karabay, “terörle mücadelede görev almış kamu görevlilerini hedef gösterme” ve “Cumhurbaşkanına hakaret” suçlamalarıyla karşı karşıya. 15 Mayıstan bu yana avukatlarının yaptığı tüm tahliye talepleri “kaçma ihtimali olduğu” gerekçesiyle reddedildi. 5 Eylül’de hakkında bir iddianame hazırlandı.  Karabay, bu tarihe kadar 114 gün boyunca iddianamesiz cezaevinde tutuldu.

 

Suçlamalar, Karabay’ın İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi’ne ilişkin soruşturmalarda görev alan yargı mensuplarının isim ve fotoğraflarını haberlerinde kullanmasına dayanıyor. Savcılık, Karabay’ın yargı mensuplarını “hedef gösterdiği” görüşünde. “Cumhurbaşkanına hakaret” suçlaması ise Karabay’ın, bir yetkilinin sağlık durumuna ilişkin haberinde Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın geçmişteki açıklamasını hatırlatmasına dayandırılıyor. Karabay tüm bilgilerin kamuya açık olduğunu vurgulayarak suçlamaları reddetti.

 

Karabay, gazetecilik faaliyetleri nedeniyle daha önce de hedef alındı. MapMF, 2024 başından bu yana Karabay’a yönelik beş ayrı vakayı belgeledi. Nisan 2025’te de Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan ve aile üyelerinin şikayetiyle açılan dava sonucunda Karabay, bir YouTube programındaki yorumları nedeniyle “Cumhurbaşkanına hakaret” ve “iftira” suçlamalarıyla iki yılı aşkın hapis cezası almış, ancak hükmün açıklanması geri bırakılmıştı.

 

Karabay daha önce de mevcut suçlamalara benzer iddialarla iki kez hapse girdi. Aralık 2023’te yolsuzluk ve rüşvet iddialarına ilişkin bir haberinin ardından gözaltına alınan gazeteci, Ocak 2024’e kadar cezaevinde kalmıştı. Kasım 2024’te ise muhalif bir belediye başkanının tutuklanması ve yerine kayyum atanmasıyla ilgili haber ve sosyal medya paylaşımları nedeniyle tutuklanıp aynı ay serbest bırakılmıştı.

 

İddianamesi hazırlanmadan tutuklu yargılanan diğer gazetecilere yönelik soruşturmaların devamı niteliğindeki bu dava, Türkiye’de basın özgürlüğüne yönelik geniş çaplı baskının çarpıcı bir örneği. Haziran 2025’te benzer şekilde Fatih Altaylı da internet yayınındaki yorumlarının “Cumhurbaşkanını tehdit” olarak nitelendirilmesi sonucu gözaltına alınmış, iddianamesinin hazırlanması ise bir ayı aşmıştı. Şubat 2025’te de gazeteciler Yıldız Tar, Ercüment Akdeniz ve Elif Akgül gözaltına alınarak birkaç ay boyunca iddianameleri hazırlanmadan cezaevinde tutuldu. Her ne kadar bu suçlamalar doğrudan gazetecilik faaliyetleriyle ilgili olmasa da, bu vakalar, tutuklu yargılamanın eleştirel basını cezalandırmak ve susturmak amacıyla kötüye kullanıldığını açıkça gözler önüne sermektedir.

 

Aşağıda imzası bulunan kuruluşlar olarak Karabay’ın yasal sürece aykırı bir şekilde üç aydır tutuklu kalmasını ölçüsüz ve cezalandırmaya yönelik bir uygulama olarak görüyoruz. Gazetecilik faaliyetleri ve eleştirel yorumlar suç olarak değerlendirilemez. Haberciliğin “hedef gösterme” gibi suçlarla eş tutulması son derece tehlikeli bir çarpıtmadır.

 

IPI ve aşağıda imzası bulunan kuruluşlar olarak gazeteci Furkan Karabay’ın serbest bırakılmasını ve tüm suçlamaların düşürülmesini talep ediyoruz. Yetkililere, muğlak yasal düzenlemeleri gazetecileri cezalandırmak için kullanmayı bırakma ve hala cezaevinde bulunan 17 gazeteciyi serbest bırakma çağrısında bulunuyoruz.

Signed by:

  • Uluslararası Basın Enstitüsü (IPI)
  • Avrupa Basın ve Medya Özgürlüğü Merkezi (ECPMF)
  • Avrupa Gazeteciler Federasyonu (EFJ)
  • Dicle Fırat Gazeteciler Derneği
  • Gazetecileri Koruma Komitesi (CPJ)
  • Güney Doğu Avrupa Medya Örgütü (SEEMO)
  • IFEX
  • Medya ve Hukuk Çalışmaları Derneği (MLSA)
  • Norveç Helsinki Komitesi
  • PEN Amerika
  • PEN İsveç
  • PEN Danimarka
  • PEN Norveç
  • Punto24 Bağımsız Gazetecilik Derneği (P24)
  • Sınır Tanımayan Gazeteciler (RSF)
  • Uluslararası Gazeteciler Federasyonu (IFJ)
  • Uluslararası PEN

Bu açıklama, AB üye ülkeleri ve aday ülkelerde basın ve medya özgürlüğünün ihlallerini takip eden, izleyen ve bunlara müdahale eden Avrupa çapında bir mekanizma olan Medya Özgürlüğü Acil Müdahale (MFRR) tarafından koordine edildi.

Allgemein

Serbia: MFRR partners warn against attempt to seize political…

Serbia: MFRR partners warn against attempt to seize political control of last remaining independent TV stations N1 and Nova 

The partners of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) express serious concern over the threat of political interference in the operations of the United Group’s media outlets in Serbia, which owns the major independent television news channels that are active in Serbia, N1 and Nova TV.

04.09.2025

On 27 August 2025, new information revealed by the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and published in collaboration with the investigative outlet KRIK suggested that Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić intends to undermine the independence of N1 and Nova TV.

 

A leaked recording emerged of a conversation between Vladimir Lučić, CEO of Telekom Srbija, and Stan Miller, the CEO of United Group, newly appointed by the British private firm BC Partners, a major owner of United Group, in which the two can be heard discussing Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić’s demand for the dismissal of United Media’s executive director, Aleksandra Subotić, as he is “aware that it is difficult now to change the director of N1”. This conversation clearly suggests a plan to first replace the executive chief of the United Group, who had resisted commercial and political pressure over the years, before interfering with N1.

 

The authenticity of the recording has been confirmed by the United Group. Meanwhile, the President’s spokesperson denied Vučić’s intent to interfere with the management of N1.

 

The MFRR consortium is appalled by the content of the audio recording and condemns any political interference within the United Group that would have a significant impact on independent broadcasters, starting with N1. In July, the MFRR had already expressed concern in a letter to BC Partners regarding the recent change in leadership at United Group.

 

This information is particularly concerning amidst intensified political pressure on independent journalism in Serbia. Back in April, N1 and Nova TV were removed from the satellite television service, leaving viewers with no choice but to watch these channels on the internet. N1 was the most-watched TV channel on the SBB network.

 

In addition, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and his allies have engaged in relentless smear campaigns against the independent reporting of N1 on the student-led protests that emerged since the collapse of the canopy of the railway station in Novi Sad on 1 November 2024. N1, which was labelled by President Vučić as “doing pure terrorism”, is constantly portrayed as an opponent of the state, along with United Media journalists in Serbia. These state rhetorics are also widely and dangerously taken up by private individuals sending regular threats online, including death threats and threats of physical violence. Since January 2025, Mapping Media Freedom has documented 26 instances of intimidation and threats against N1, predominantly online. 

 

Therefore, the MFRR urges the Serbian government to stop all forms of undue influence on private media owners and respect the independence of media houses, while also refraining from applying pressure on editorial policies and decisions through personal relationships or political connections. Smear campaigns aimed to discredit truthful reporting must be immediately stopped. The consortium also calls on the authorities to ensure swift and independent investigations into attacks on journalists. As assessed during the MFRR solidarity mission in April, pending investigations never make it to the end.

 

We also reiterate our calls on BC Partners to reaffirm its commitment to European standards of media freedom and freedom of expression and to defend United Media’s affiliates and employees from political and other forms of interference, also in line with the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA). We support the Manifesto for Independent Journalism, published by United Media editors in Serbia in reaction to the audio recording. 

 

We further call on the European institutions to publicly condemn any attempts by President Aleksandar Vučić and other politicians to interfere with and denigrate the independent broadcaster’s editorial policy. Given the constant, steady decline of media freedom in Serbia, including the surge of physical attacks also perpetrated by law enforcement officers, concrete and stronger actions are needed before the media landscape becomes entirely government-controlled. As of 4 September, Mapping Media Freedom has documented 200 alerts directed against journalists, media outlets, and journalists’ associations in Serbia since 1 November 2024, an unprecedented figure compared to the previous years.

 

Finally, the MFRR stands in full solidarity with the employees of United Media and the journalists of N1, who continue to produce high-quality reporting despite operating in such a highly hostile environment for critical voices.

Signed by:

  • ARTICLE 19 Europe
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

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Turkey: MFRR partners condemn Turkey’s broadcast regulator’s decision to…

Turkey: MFRR partners condemn Turkey’s broadcast regulator’s decision to silence TELE1

The Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) partners condemn the five-day broadcast blackout imposed on TELE1 since September 1, and the escalating use of censorship sanctions by RTÜK, Turkey’s broadcast regulator, against independent critical media outlets. We urge authorities to stop targeting critical and opposing views and uphold media pluralism in line with democratic standards.

04.09.2025

Türkçe açıklama aşağıdadır…

On July 24, 2025, Turkey’s broadcast regulator RTÜK imposed severe penalties against critical broadcasters, including a temporary broadcast blackout and hefty administrative fines targeting TELE1. The punishment was based on remarks by the channel’s editor-in-chief Merdan Yanardağ, who characterized the 2016 failed coup as “an Islamist coup” and held the ruling AKP government as the main responsible actor. RTÜK alleged that Yanardağ’s comments “incited hatred and enmity among the public.”

 

In early August, a court in Ankara suspended RTÜK’s broadcast ban to allow TELE1 to challenge the decision. However, the suspension was overturned on August 27, clearing the way for the blackout to take effect, from August 31 until 5 September.

 

This is not the first time a critical broadcaster has been silenced in Turkey this year. In July, RTÜK imposed a 10-day broadcast ban on SZC TV  over unfavorable comments about the government. Around the same time, on July 8, Halk TV was also hit with a 10-day broadcast blackout. However, the decision was suspended by a court, allowing the channel to remain on air pending an appeal. 

 

Furthermore, RTÜK issued at least 46 sanctions in the first half of 2025 alone, 42 of them targeting critical outlets, with total fines amounting to nearly 100 million Turkish liras (~2 million Euros).

 

More chillingly, all three broadcasters, TELE1, Halk TV, and SZC TV, now risk the permanent revocation of their licenses should they be seen to repeat the violations within the next year.

 

The MFRR partners regard RTÜK’s decision to silence TELE1, and other critical media outlets, as a direct attack against freedom of expression and media pluralism in Turkey. We urge RTÜK to reverse the broadcast ban and respect the role of independent journalism in a democratic society. 

Signed by:

  • ARTICLE 19 Europe
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)

Türkiye: MFRR paydaşları, RTÜK’ün Tele1’e yönelik ekran karartma cezasını kınıyor

 

Medya Özgürlüğü Acil Müdahale (MFRR) paydaşları, 1 Eylül itibariyle Tele1’e uygulanan beş günlük yayın yasağını ve RTÜK’ün eleştirel medya kuruluşlarına yönelik sansür yaptırımlarını kınıyor. Yetkililerden eleştirel ve muhalif görüşleri hedef almayı bırakmalarını ve demokratik standartlara uygun olarak medya çoğulculuğunu korumalarını talep ediyoruz.

 

24 Temmuz 2025 tarihinde RTÜK (Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu), eleştirel yayıncılara ağır cezalar verdi; Tele1’e yönelik beş günlük ekran karartma cezası da bunlar arasındaydı. Ceza, kanalın genel yayın yönetmeni Merdan Yanardağ’ın 2016’daki darbe girişimini “İslamcı darbe girişimi” olarak nitelendirmesi ve AKP iktidarını “temel sorumlu” göstermesine dayandırıldı. RTÜK, Yanardağ’ın yorumlarının “toplumu kin ve düşmanlığa tahrik ettiğini” iddia etti.

 

Ağustosta Ankara 23. İdare Mahkemesi, yürütmeyi durdurma kararı vererek RTÜK’ün yayın yasağını askıya aldı. Ancak bu karar 27 Ağustos’ta iptal edildi ve beş günlük ekran karartma cezası 31 Ağustos’u 1 Eylül’e bağlayan gece başladı.

 

Bu, 2025 yılı içerisinde Türkiye’deki eleştirel bir yayıncıyı susturmaya yönelik verilen ilk ceza değil. Temmuz ayında RTÜK, SZC TV’de hükümet hakkında olumsuz yorumlar yapıldığı gerekçesiyle kanala 10 günlük yayın yasağı getirmiş, Halk TV de 10 günlük yayın karartmasıyla cezalandırılmıştı. Ancak bu karar mahkeme tarafından durdurulmuş, kanalın yayınını sürdürmesine izin verilmişti.

 

RTÜK sadece 2025’in ilk yarısında en az 46 yaptırım uyguladı. Bu cezaların 42’si eleştirel kuruluşları hedef alırken, toplam cezalar neredeyse 100 milyon Türk lirasına (~2 milyon Euro) ulaştı.

 

Daha da endişe verici olanı ise, Tele1, Halk TV ve SZC TV’nin önümüzdeki bir yıl içinde aynı ilkeyi tekrar ihlal etmeleri durumunda lisanslarının kalıcı iptali riskiyle karşı karşıya olmaları.

 

MFRR paydaşları, RTÜK’ün Tele1’i ve diğer eleştirel medya kuruluşlarını susturmaya yönelik kararlarını, Türkiye’de ifade özgürlüğüne ve medya çoğulculuğuna doğrudan bir saldırı olarak görüyor. RTÜK’e Tele1’e yönelik yayın yasağını kaldırması ve demokratik bir toplumda bağımsız gazeteciliğin rolüne saygı göstermesi çağrısında bulunuyoruz.

İmzalayanlar:

  • Uluslararası Basın Enstitüsü (IPI)
  • ARTICLE 19 Avrupa
  • Avrupa Basın ve Medya Özgürlüğü Merkezi (ECPMF)
  • Avrupa Gazeteciler Federasyonu (EFJ)
  • Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT)

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.