France: IPI condemns arrest of investigative journalist Ariane Lavrilleux

Journalist for Disclose detained for alleged violation of national security secrets.

The International Press Institute (IPI) today condemns the arrest and interrogation of French journalist Ariane Lavrilleux and demands her immediate release from custody. IPI further calls on French law enforcement authorities to ensure full respect for international media freedom standards on source protection.

Lavrilleux, a journalist with French non-profit investigative platform Disclose was taken into custody on Tuesday 19 September after a dawn raid on her home by officers from the domestic intelligence agency, the DGSI. Her apartment was searched and her computer was confiscated, in the presence of a judge, according to media reports.

The journalist was taken to the DGSI headquarters in Marseille and questioned for several hours in the presence of her lawyer as part of an investigation into the publication of highly confidential documents in the investigative series, the “Egypt Papers”. She remained in custody overnight and into Wednesday 20 September.

In November 2021, Lavrilleux had co-authored and published the Egypt Papers, an investigative series based on hundreds of leaked documents which revealed how information gathered by French counter-intelligence bodies was abused by the Egyptian military to carry out a campaign of bombings and arbitrary killings of alleged smugglers and innocent civilians.

At the time, Disclose had issued a statement justifying its decision to publish the confidential information, citing the evidence of the French state’s potential complicity in serious human rights abuses committed by a foreign regime, and the public’s right to know about such matters of public interest.

In July 2022, prosecutors in Paris opened an investigation that was later handed over to the DGSI. They alleged the publication had compromised national defence secrets and revealed information that could lead to the identification of a protected agent. It is unclear whether any intelligence official was compromised.

“IPI is highly alarmed by the continued detention and interrogation of Ariane Lavrilleux and urges the General Directorate for Internal Security to proceed with extreme caution and full respect for French law and international legal standards regarding journalistic source protection”, IPI Executive Director Frane Maroevic said. “Any charges against Lavrilleux must be dropped immediately and all pressure on Disclose and its journalists related to their investigative work must cease.

“The arrest of an investigative journalist is extremely serious, as it has major ramifications for press freedom”, he added. “Journalists’ right to protect their sources is enshrined in national and international law as it essential for journalists to expose wrongdoing and hold power to account. The public interest defense of revealing the information published in Disclose’s investigative reporting on the Egyptian military is clear. IPI and our global network stand behind Lavrilleux and her colleagues at Disclose and will continue to monitor the situation closely.”

The arrest of Lavrilleux is believed to be the first time since 2007 that the home of a French journalist had been searched by police.

In a statement released immediately after the arrest, Disclose said: “The aim of this latest episode of unacceptable intimidation of Disclose journalists is clear: to identify our sources that revealed the Sirli military operation in Egypt. In November 2021, Disclose revealed an alleged campaign of arbitrary executions orchestrated by the Egyptian dictatorship of President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, with the complicity of the French state, based on several hundred documents marked ‘defence – confidential”.

Maroevic added that IPI had been in contact with staff at Disclose after the arrest and has offered to help provide legal support through the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a European consortium which offers legal aid. He noted that the arrest was the latest in a number of worrying incidents involving the interrogation of journalists from Disclose in relation to their reporting on the Egyptian government, and its sources for those stories.

This statement was coordinated as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and candidate countries.

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Surveillance: after Pegasus and Predator, the EU is (slowly)…

While the European Parliament’s Commission enquires on the various states where surveillance technologies have been commercialised despite the bans, the emphasis remains on civil society and digital security.

Interview with Lorenzo Bagnoli of IrpiMedia by Paola Rosà

The new technological scenarios entail unprecedented challenges, like the Pegasus case with dozens of journalists, activists, and human rights defenders subjected to surveillance and wiretaps. The EU has responded with the Commission of Inquiry of the European Parliament on the amendments and the regulation on the export of civil and military dual-use technologies. The European Data Protection Authority (EDPS) itself was unequivocal in its analysis published on 15 February 2022: it is not just about the right to privacy and the violation of privacy – fundamental freedoms as well as democracy and the rule of law are also at stake. For this reason, the Authority had recalled, “the entire system of safeguarding our fundamental rights and freedoms must be rethought, because they are endangered by these instruments”. The measures suggested by the EDPS include some changes to the export regulation, so as to “condition the export of technologies suitable for digital surveillance on respect for fundamental rights and privacy”.

Now that several months have passed since those concerned declarations, now that the regulations and reports have been published, many doubts remain about the actual guarantees and protections, while the intra-European surveillance market appears to thrive, which an investigation by IrpiMedia defines “a black hole”.

We talk about it with Lorenzo Bagnoli, senior reporter and editor at IrpiMedia.
What is the focus of your research?

The global surveillance industry. One of our objectives is to understand how the relationship between countries producing and importing surveillance technologies works and to analyse money flows, to look for those who finances this world.

IrpiMedia is an independent, non-profit transnational investigative journalism outlet that covers organised crime, corruption, environment, migration, and justice. How did surveillance enter into the picture?

It has always been a topic of interest, for me even as a freelancer before the foundation of IrpiMedia. It is a pivotal theme on which in the past the collaborative approach that distinguishes our work has been lacking. Our #Sorveglianze series was born from the collaboration with Privacy International, a British organisation that deals with advocacy on the topic, with which we try to identify the most interesting threads.

When looking for a definition of “surveillance system”, what should we think about?

The mass surveillance system is a political and technological infrastructure that a state sets up with the ideal aim of building a safer society through the use of technological tools. In fact, the technological tools used are so invasive that in some cases they damage digital rights, especially among the poorest segments of the population. Those who produce technologies that power surveillance systems have the power to influence the decisions of a nation state.

The alarm was also raised at the European Union level, especially for some countries such as Hungary, Poland, and Cyprus.

We must thank the European Parliament and the Commission of Inquiry established in March 2022. Compared to the past, there are parliamentary groups that are more aware of how mass surveillance can arbitrarily target minorities and oppositions. However, I don’t think there is consensus in European fora to consider the spread of these technologies “alarming”. The presence of Cyprus among the problem countries according to the monitoring of the PEGA Committee is not too surprising, for historical and geographical reasons.

For this reason, at a certain point IrpiMedia also dealt with Cyprus.

Our interest in Cyprus was only due to the sale of Predator and the role the country played as a broker for Israeli technology in Greece. In general, in terms of public attention, since 2019 the spotlight has certainly been on Cyprus after the founder of Intellexa himself – the company involved in the scandal in Greece – had shown in an interview one of his own vans sold by a company of the group full of surveillance technologies.

Business deals passing through Cyprus bypassing the bans have since emerged.

Since at least 2015, around the time of the HackingTeam leak, it has been clear that there is a problem in the functioning of the licensing system for surveillance technologies such as spyware. In the case of Cyprus and the Predator case, the problem is the use of specific technology and the manufacturer NSO. NSO must comply with the export authorisation granted by the Defense Exports Control Agency (DECA) of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, but if the technology is exported by a company owned by NSO but registered in a country like Cyprus then it can create a hole in the control network. Cyprus can apply looser control to exports and, since exports between EU countries are less strictly regulated, at that point the intra-European resale system is the problem. Furthermore, Cyprus is a border country, which manages to use its position to act as a bridge between the EU and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Last January, the Commission of Inquiry produced a recommendation in which it condemns any export of these technologies to countries where human rights are violated and, noting that some abuses have been committed by Cyprus, calls on the government to provide a precise list of all export permits, revoking inappropriate ones, and to collaborate with Europol on alleged cases of spyware use against journalists, lawyers, and members of civil society. But Cyprus is not an isolated case, and the Commission reiterates that in other member states too there is “the presence of a thriving spyware industry which takes advantage of the good reputation, the single market and freedom of movement in the EU, allowing states such as Cyprus and Bulgaria to become clearinghouses for spyware to non-democratic regimes around the world”. The reality is therefore known. Are the solutions only legal or can there be other tools?

It is necessary to put in place a strategy to strengthen the cybersecurity of digital devices, providing both economic support to device manufacturing companies and including new obligations, such as extending security updates to older devices that would otherwise remain vulnerable.

Furthermore, a simplification of access to device analysis could be envisaged, in order to collect telemetry information useful for verifying infections. Until now this activity has been carried out almost exclusively by civil society organisations, let’s think about tools like the one developed by Amnesty Tech , which are very useful because they also allow those without high IT knowledge to carry out a preliminary analysis of a device and understand if there is any trace of infection.

Regulation, however, remains an important point: even just thinking about creating a public list of companies that sell surveillance technologies could be a step forward. At this moment journalists and associations are trying to put together a puzzle whose dimensions and number of pieces are unknown: we are walking in the dark, waiting to discover the name of yet another new company.

Is there something that public opinion could do at European level?

If we think about the behaviour of some member countries during the PEGA Commission’s investigation into the use of spyware such as Pegasus, we realise how some did not want to cooperate and respond to the Commission’s requests. In some cases they even almost sabotaged the works, like Spain with the case linked to Catalonia or Greece. Public opinion could put pressure to ensure that, in the next European elections in 2024, MEPs are much more aware of the risks of these technologies and have a much more incisive approach, also starting from the results of the report and recommendations of the PEGA Commission. Furthermore, public opinion could also ask for greater transparency from their governments regarding data on exports of these technologies: the European Commission collects data on exports but only publishes aggregate data without detailing the activities of each individual member state. States, in turn, barricade themselves behind this fiction of transparency to deny access to any data.

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and candidate countries.

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Greece: Refugee reporting in times of surveillance

It could be the plot of a psychological thriller movie. It’s the true story of a young investigative journalist, Stavros Malichudis, who unintentionally became one of the protagonists of the Greek Watergate. His reports, awarded with many international prizes, told the stories of refugees in Greece.

By Mary Dosopoulos

Originally published by OBCT . Available also in ITA.

There is a new generation of Greek journalists, whose voice stands for a healthy form of active citizenship and human rights-oriented political participation. For them, reporting on topics that have been considered controversial or too ‘sensitive’ for the Greek state, such as refugees or corruption, has been quite challenging. Stavros Malichudis, a reporter covering migration, is one of the journalists who had reportedly been targeted with spyware for investigating the living conditions of a young Syrian boy detained on a Greek island. One year after a hearing organized by the European Parliament’s investigative committee and despite international pressure to proceed with investigations, little has been done at a national level.

Refugee reporting: a brief chronicle of a scandal

It could have been the scenario of a psychological thriller movie. It is an ordinary Saturday, in November 2021. A young journalist, Stavros Malichudis, is scrolling through his Facebook feed, when an interesting title catches his eye: ‘Citizens under surveillance by the National Intelligence Services’. The article, published by a leftist cooperative media outlet called EFSYN (Efimerida ton Syntakton, lit. ‘Newspaper of the Editors’) describes a dystopic landscape for freedom of expression in Greece, claiming that EYP (the Hellenic Intelligence Service) has been monitoring the activity of people engaged into two controversial topics: Refugees and Pandemic denial. Alluding to the ‘Stone Years’, when the government would hold files on citizens based on their ‘ideological status’, the writer reveals, among others, how the secret services had been following every single step of a reporter researching the story of a young refugee boy on a Greek island. It doesn’t take long for Stavros to understand that the article is about him.

This is how journalist Stavros Malichudis unintentionally became one of the protagonists of the Greek Watergate, a wiretapping scandal referring to the prolonged monitoring of the mobile phones of politicians and investigative reporters. While the spying scandal was unfolding, Malichudis was nominated together with Iliana Papangeli for a major European journalism award for their project documenting the stories of unaccompanied minors in Moria’s refugee camp. In 2022, they won the IJ4EU Impact Award . In the same year, the annual World Press Freedom Index classified Greece as the lowest-ranked EU member for press freedom.

The Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) stood since the beginning in solidarity with Malichudis and the journalistic team at Solomon and issued a statement urging the European Commission and European Parliament to seek immediate responses from the Greek government. In light of these serious developments, in September, 8, 2022, the PEGA committee of the European Parliament organized a hearing on the ‘Use of spyware in Greece’, where Malichudis attended as one of the victims of wire-tapping, together with Thanasis Koukakis, journalist targeted with Predator and Eliza Triantafillou, investigative journalist with the Inside story. One month later, the MFRR partner organisations would publicly support ‘the calls for the testing of mobile devices belonging to journalists in Greece who suspect they may have been targets of intrusive spyware or other advanced surveillance’.

Despite the outcry by foreign media outlets, as well as local left-leaning platforms, the dominant media in Greece kept a distance from the scandal, focusing mainly on the cases of politicians under surveillance and often illustrating the story as a complex game of political rivalry. There were also cases of popular media outlets documenting the story, yet highlighting fragmented aspects of it, creating thus, a different impression. The title of an article published in capital.gr in November, 4, 2022, is indicative of this tendency: ‘PEGA Commission: no proof of spyware use was found, but the complaints should be investigated in detail’.

The dominant tv channels of the country were certainly not interested in hearing what the affected reporters had to say, not to mention what their research findings were, despite them gaining international appraisal and recognition. ‘Even until today, I have never been invited to the news to talk about my work’, said Malichudis, interviewed for the OBCT in March 2023. ‘I have talked to the national radio stations of other countries, but not in my own. In Greece, the political reportage has gone extinct’.

One year later: Slow progress, low hope

After more than a year of vigorous investigations, in May, 8, 2023, PEGA adopted its final report and recommendation, introducing an EU-wide regulatory framework and a condition-based moratorium for the use of spyware. One month later, in June, 14, 2023, the Committee published a press release, calling for the conduction of full and credible investigations on the topic and also, for the adoption of institutional and legal safeguards to prevent abuse. The communique mentioned that ‘spyware should only be allowed in exceptional cases and for limited time’, while it also involved targeted recommendations to Greece and Cyprus. MEPs stressed that the illicit surveillance has put ‘democracy itself at stake’ and that ‘when used wrongly by governments, spyware is a huge risk to the rule of law and fundamental rights’. To help uncover and address such phenomena, Parliament proposed the creation of an EU Tech Lab, an independent research institute that would be mandated to investigate surveillance and provide technological support.

The news of these EU-related initiatives barely reached the Greek audience, as they were overshadowed by the deadly shipwreck of a boat carrying refugees that took place in the early hours of the first day, near Pylos; one of the worst accidents in its kind ever recorded in the Mediterranean sea. This dramatic incident triggered a wave of critical questions coming from independent local media regarding the government’s management of the tragedy and its stance towards refugees, overall. The shipwreck would mark the beginning of a turbulent summer for Greece. In the past two months, the country has been tormented by wildfires and deadly floodings; in this context, the focus of national media has been on extreme weather phenomena and alleviation measures for the struggling population. Once again, the government’s response has been heavily criticized by a small part of the media, who have not attributed this catastrophe primarily on climate change, but rather on lack of preparedness, disorganization and mismanagement. These opinions have been circulated mainly on the social media.

Personal implications for reporters and trauma

Looking at the wider picture, PEGA-led developments are certainly positive; at the same time, however, recommendations are vague and leave an open door for ‘exceptional cases’, meaning that governments will still be able to rely on loopholes to justify surveillance of citizens. It could be argued that the Committee has missed the opportunity to voice a strong message against practices that undermine media freedom in its member states, downsizing at the same time, the impact that such practices can have on reporters’ well-being, social circle and career.

Refugee reporting is a controversial issue in Greece. While investigative reporters’ mission is to document and shed light on the turbulences experienced by migrants, legal or not, research findings are limited when it comes to understanding and assessing the implications that this procedure as a whole has on reporters’ wellbeing, starting with the process per se of on-the-ground critical covering on refugee trauma to the implications of getting spied upon. Malichudis shares the impact that the surveillance scandal had on him both as a person and as a professional: “In the beginning, I would be scared to even touch my phone. My main fear was unwillingly putting friends or colleagues on the spotlight. I didn’t know why I had become a target, what these people wanted from me and what their intentions were; this made me feel unsafe and often suspicious. With time, I managed to distance myself from this situation. I understood that it wasn’t personal”. Becoming conscious of how vulnerable one can be to surveillance – or even physical attacks (as in the recent case of Kostas Vaxevanis) – might also have practical implications for one’s daily working routine: Adjusting one’s working space/offices to become less visible and less approachable or learning to work in smaller and more flexible teams are some of the ‘remedies’ that Malichudis and his team have resorted to.

Reporters in Greece, especially the young ones, continue being underpaid and relying on short-term contracts; furthermore, they are frequently reminded that there are some topics that simply should not be researched and some sectors that are meant to be untouched, such as the banking or the shipping sector in Greece. The fact that the biggest media outlets in the country are donor-dependent implies that one should not investigate anything exposing the donor and jeopardizing their interests. In this framework, there is a significant part of independent investigative journalists from Greece, in their majority young, who have chosen to report for foreign media only, driven both by financial reasons, but also by the fact that they enjoy more freedom. In an article written for the New York Times, Lauren Markham and Lydia Emmanouilidou share that ‘any journalist who covers refugee arrivals to the Aegean Islands or the Evros land border with Turkey risks arrest’.

Nevertheless, there is light at the end of the tunnel. Recent survey findings conducted in Greece speak of a gradual shift in public opinion regarding the credibility of information served en masse by the popular local media: For instance, according to the 2023 Digital News Report of the Reuters Institute, recently published in Kathimerini, there is growing mistrust among Greeks towards the ‘social media of well-established news platforms’ and the so-called ‘popular’ or ‘dominant’ news. Malichudis believes that the spyware scandal has helped restore the negative public image of journalists, by debunking the narrative of journalists as pawns of each ruling party. ‘The Greek audience is becoming aware’, says Malichudis. ‘Due to the scandal and all the discussions that it triggered, they are starting to understand that some journalists are, in fact, OK. This is why they are looking for alternative forms of media to access more reliable information. I believe that eventually, people will save Greek journalism’.

This article was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and candidate countries.

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Cyprus: Call for thorough investigations into surveillance of Makarios…

Cyprus: Call for thorough investigations into surveillance of Makarios Drousiotis

We are highly concerned about the alleged surveillance of journalist Makarios Drousiotis, and the lack of prompt, adequate or thorough investigation of the matter.

To:

Office of the Attorney General of the Republic of Cyprus, George L. Savvides

Minister of Justice and Public Order, Anna Koukkides Procopiou

Chief of Police, Stylianos Papatheodorou

19 September 2023

Re: the alleged surveillance of Makarios Drousiotis and the lack of adequate investigations into the matter

Dear Mr Savvides, Ms Koukkides Procopiou and Mr Papatheodorou,

We, the undersigned international media freedom organisations and journalists’ associations, are highly concerned about the alleged surveillance of journalist Makarios Drousiotis, and the fact that there has not been a prompt, adequate or thorough investigation of the matter. As the responsible authorities, we call on you to act at last and ensure a proper investigation and prosecution of those responsible for any wrongdoing.

In recent years, Drousiotis, a well-known and widely-read investigative journalist, has published a series of books in which he has documented corruption in the Cypriot Government. Starting in February 2018, Drousiotis was allegedly spied on by the Cypriot Government using both eavesdropping techniques and spyware, as documented in the Report of the European Parliament on the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance software. At the time, Drousiotis was assistant to the Cypriot EU Commissioner Christos Stylianides. In parallel, he also investigated financial connections between the then-President of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, and Russian oligarchs.

Amidst revelations in the media about NSO Group operating from Cyprus and suspicions voiced by CitizenLab that the country used NSO technologies, Drousiotis noticed several indications of possible infiltration of his phone with Pegasus spyware. These included a suspicious missed WhatsApp call, rapid battery depletion, and frequent overheating of his device while he was not using it. In the following months, Drousiotis faced several intimidation attempts, including the disconnection of security cameras at his home and being followed by unknown persons.

After going public with his story and filing a complaint with the Cypriot police, Drousiotis contacted a private security expert who – unbeknownst to Drousiotis – also appears to cooperate on various projects with the Cypriot Government. The expert installed software on Drousiotis’s computer, which, without his consent, allowed remote access to all archives and data stored on the machine. These included sensitive information identifying Drousiotis’s sources, who had wished to remain anonymous.

Despite repeated requests to the Cypriot police, no progress in the investigation of the breach has been reported. A forensic lab in the Netherlands, which was provided with the same information that was shared with the police, has independently documented the security breach, which Drousiotis described in his book Mafia State: How the Gang Abolished the Rule of Law in Cyprus, published in September 2022.

It is wholly unacceptable that despite complaints to the authorities and repeated follow-ups by Drousiotis and his representatives, there has been no progress in the investigation and prosecution of these grave allegations. Intimidation, harassment and surreptitious surveillance of investigative reporters undermine their watchdog role and the protection of their journalistic sources, which are essential in a functioning democracy.

We call on you to step up and finally take the appropriate investigative measures and prosecutorial action. While respecting the confidentiality of the investigation, we also ask you to respect its basic transparency and duly inform the journalist and the public about the results. We stand in solidarity with Drousiotis and will continue to follow the case closely.

Sincerely,

ARTICLE 19 Europe

Association of European Journalists (AEJ)

European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)

European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)

OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)

Reporters Without Borders (RSF)

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Greece: International press freedom mission to Athens

Between 25 and 27 September 2023, eight international press freedom and freedom of expression organisations will conduct a joint advocacy and fact-finding mission to Athens. Following the parliamentary elections and nomination of the new government, the delegation will examine the challenges to media freedom, pluralism and independence in Greece and the impact of measures taken by the authorities to address them.

The delegation will consist of representatives of the partners in the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), namely ARTICLE 19 Europe, the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF), the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ), Free Press Unlimited (FPU), the International Press Institute (IPI) and the Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT). Representatives of the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and Reporters Without Borders (RSF) join the mission.

During the visit, the delegation will meet with leading media professionals, political officials, state representatives and other important stakeholders. A follow-up to last year’s MFRR online fact-finding mission to Greece, the mission confirms the long-standing commitment of the participating organisations to improving press freedom in the country. It will examine threats to the safety of journalists, impunity of crimes committed against them, surveillance, risks to media pluralism, and legal threats, including Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs).

On 27 September, the delegation will hold a press conference in Athens to present initial observations and recommendations. A detailed mission report will be published in autumn.

This mission was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and candidate countries.

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Polish media grapple with unprecedented challenges and uncertain future…

Polish media grapple with unprecedented challenges and uncertain future as the country faces electoral crossroads

At the conclusion of their press freedom mission to Warsaw from 11-13 September, partner organisations of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) declared that the media and journalists in Poland are facing unprecedented challenges including legal threats, financial precarity, political pressure, regulatory capture and growing polarisation.

The delegation, comprised of representatives of ARTICLE 19 Europe, the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF), the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ), Free Press Unlimited (FPU) and International Press Institute (IPI), met with editors, journalists, regulators, civil society groups, lawyers, the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights and the Ministry of Culture to hear directly about the conditions under which media are currently operating in the build up to the parliamentary elections due on 15 October.

Poland has long enjoyed one of the most robust and pluralistic media markets in central and eastern Europe, however in recent years Poland has witnessed intensifying efforts to assert control and influence over large sections of the media. The situation is further exacerbated by the deep polarisation within the media and between journalists.

Within weeks of the 2015 election, the ruling coalition led by the Law and Justice (PiS) party passed a provisional law to dismiss the board and senior management of public service media enabling it to take full control on the information it aired. The Telewizja Polska (TVP) today occupies approximately a third of the broadcast market and enjoys an annual budget of 2.5 billion Zlotys (550 million euros). According to monitoring figures provided by the Polish National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT) for the second quarter of 2023, the governing coalition dominates TVP news, enjoying 80% of political coverage, of which 73% is dedicated to PiS. Oppositional political parties meanwhile share the remaining 20% of coverage, which is overwhelmingly negative.

These figures alone demonstrate how TVP is failing in the fundamental duty of any public broadcaster to provide fair and balanced political coverage between and during elections.

The private broadcast sector has also come under intense pressure through a variety of means to ensure pliable media that are cautious of holding the government to account.

KRRiT, whose composition is controlled by PiS allies, has used its licensing powers to create business uncertainty and intimidate broadcasters such as TVN and RADIO TOK FM. In the past years, KRRiT has also issued a number of financial penalties against broadcasters for reporting on issues such as the new school history books, questioning the official report into the Smolensk air crash tragedy and child abuse within the catholic church.

Media pluralism was further compromised when the state controlled energy giant PKN Orlen took over the largest regional media company, Polska Press, in 2021 leading to the rapid replacement of most of the editors in chief with journalists from TVP and other pro-PiS media. The purchase has further restricted access to diverse media, particularly in rural areas with limited internet access.

Local independent media are in an exceptionally precarious situation facing financial and distribution troubles, legal threats and uneven competition against media backed by the local authorities.

Meanwhile, many private media are denied access to state advertising funds which PiS has weaponised to fund favourable media outlets and undermine independent journalism. The move exacerbates the financial pressures on media, particularly print media, that are still trying to find sustainable income streams to support the transition to digital.

Polish media are additionally subjected to one of the largest number of vexatious lawsuits, or SLAPPs, in the European Union. Though judicial harassment of journalists is not new, since PiS came to power abusive litigation has become an inherent strategy for weakening critical media. Most SLAPPs are taken by politicians from the governing parties or state companies and public institutions and are therefore financed by public funds.

The overwhelming majority of commentators met by the mission expressed the concern that the country was at a crossroads and that four more years of the current policy would accelerate media capture and push Poland down the path to emulating the situations in Hungary, Turkey or Russia.

The mission will issue its full report in the first week of October.

Event

Funding favourable coverage? Big tech’s influence over independent journalism

11 September, 15:00 CEST.

Through philanthropic funding mechanisms such as the Meta Journalism Project and the Google News Initiative, big tech platforms have extended their reach into the world of journalism and news media. Billed as initiatives to strengthen independent journalism at a time when media sustainability is in crisis, recent research shows that they may have instead fostered a climate of reliance on big tech and provided an opportunity for platforms to reap reputational gain through favourable media coverage from grantees.

This webinar will feature a panel of experts discussing the undue influence of big tech companies over independent media through such mechanisms and their possible impact on press freedom and editorial independence.

Moderator

Mark Dempsey

Senior Advocacy Officer, ARTICLE 19

Speakers

Marius Dragomir

Founding Director of the Media and Journalism Research Centre

Charis Papaevangelou

Postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Information Law of the University of Amsterdam.

Dr. Courtney Radsch

Director of the Center for Journalism and Liberty at the Open Markets Institute

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Greece: Swift investigations required after two attacks against journalists

The undersigned journalists’ and media freedom organisations strongly condemn the recent attacks against Greek journalists Giorgos Papachristos and Kostas Vaxevanis and call on the authorities to swiftly investigate the attacks and ensure that those responsible are held accountable.

On 29 August, Giorgos Papachristos, an editorialist and adviser at the centrist daily Ta Nea, was attacked at a football match in Athens. According to the case filed by the journalist, businessman and ship owner Yiannis Karagiorgis, backed by two bodyguards, punched him in the face and head in an unprovoked attack. Karagiorgis also reportedly threatened to kill Papachristos and ordered his associates to “kill him on the spot”. Papachristos was taken to the Sismanoglio hospital for medical examinations and was treated for injuries. The motive behind the attack is not yet established, however Papachristos had written critical reports on Karagiorgis’s business activities.

On 26 August, Kostas Vaxevanis, a veteran investigative journalist and publisher of the weekly Documento, was attacked along with his family while dining, on the island of Evia. The attack occurred after an individual entered the restaurant, approached the journalist and began swearing at him aggressively: “You are a spoiled brat, I will sort you out but not now. You bastard for daring to write about me because I have money in Switzerland.” The man continued to insult and threaten Vaxevanis, complaining about a name put “on the Lagarde list”. As the situation escalated, Vaxevanis’s mother-in-law was physically assaulted and required treatment for facial injuries. The man fled the restaurant.

As reported on Mapping Media Freedom, Documento journalists conducted research to identify the man and cross-check his name against the Lagarde list, a spreadsheet published by Vaxevanis in 2012, containing around 2,000 potential tax evaders with undeclared accounts at Swiss HSBC bank’s Geneva branch. According to Documento, the attacker was a relative of Michalis Stasinopoulos, one of the richest businessmen in Greece, whose name was included on the list.

Vaxevanis is known for his numerous investigations into corruption, for which he has received numerous threats and death threats. In 2021, he was given increased police protection after the Athens Prosecutor’s Office ordered a preliminary investigation into information about a murder contract issued against him.

The Journalists’ Union of Athens Daily Newspapers published statements condemning both attacks. While our organisations welcome the swift statement of condemnation of the attack on Papachristos by the Greek government spokesperson, we note that no similar denunciation was made regarding the attack against Vaxevanis and his family days previously.

Our organisations further call on the Greek authorities to swiftly investigate the complaints filed by the two journalists and to bring criminal charges against those responsible. These two cases of violence again underscore the worrying situation for the safety of journalists in Greece, and media freedom more widely.

In both cases, the identity of the alleged perpetrators are known to police and the incidents occurred in front of multiple witnesses. Arrests should therefore follow quickly. Those behind these brazen attacks must not be permitted to act with impunity. Our organisations have reported these cases to the Council of Europe’s Platform for the Safety of Journalists and will continue to monitor the situation closely.

Signed by:

European Federation of Journalists
International Federation of Journalists
European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
International Press Institute (IPI)
OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)

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Poland: MFRR to visit Warsaw for press freedom mission

Partner organisations of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) will travel to Warsaw on 11-13 September 2023 to conduct an international press freedom mission ahead of the country’s upcoming general election on 15 October.

The MFRR mission will be joined by representatives of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF), the International Press Institute (IPI), ARTICLE 19 Europe, the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ) and Free Press Unlimited (FPU).

The delegation will assess the current state of play for media freedom and pluralism and identify the biggest challenges facing independent journalism in the context of the election. The visit to Warsaw follows a previous online fact-finding mission conducted by the MFRR in 2020.

During the mission, representatives will meet with leading journalists, editors, media experts, civil society groups, political figures and state representatives. The mission will seek to hear a broad range of views and perspectives from across the political spectrum.

Key themes to be assessed during the visit include independent media regulation, threats to media pluralism, particularly at the regional and local level, public service broadcasting, media capture, and legal threats and Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs).

A report with key conclusions and recommendations for the winner of the October 2023 election on how to improve the situation for media freedom will follow shortly after.

The MFRR monitors violations of press and media freedom in the EU Member States and candidate countries and responds with practical and legal support and advocacy. Since the project’s start in March 2020, it has conducted multiple similar media freedom missions.

This mission is coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and candidate countries.

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Hungary: DDoS cyber attacks pose major new threat to…

Hungary: DDoS cyber attacks pose major new threat to media freedom

The International Press Institute (IPI) today warns that an unprecedented wave of cyber-attacks predominantly targeting independent media outlets in Hungary in recent months represents a serious and growing threat to the free flow of information in what arguably is already the European Union’s worst country for press freedom.

Since April 2023, at least 40 different media websites in Hungary have faced Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, a form of cyber-attack which temporarily slows or crashes websites by overloading their servers with millions of simultaneous access requests, leaving readers unable to access news and information for hours at a time.

While the specific motive of these attacks remains unconfirmed, the majority of portals targeted in the DDoS attacks include many of the country’s leading independent media, including Telex, HVG, 444.hu, Magyar Hang, and Népszava, which are critical of the government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. International media companies hit by hackers include Forbes Hungary.

To date, no media outlet supportive of the ruling Fidesz party has been targeted in the current wave of attacks, according to IPI assessments, indicating a political or ideological motive. Index.hu, a formerly independent publication considered co-opted by, though not overtly supportive of, the government, was also targeted. In some cases, media were targeted for simply reporting on DDoS attacks against others, as in the case of Media1.

While the attacks initially appeared to be isolated incidents, the frequency and severity of the attacks increased in May and June and have caused serious damage and disruption to news websites. In addition to undermining reader’s access to news and information, DDoS attacks also result in financial losses for media companies due to diminished advertising revenue.

Many of the targeted websites were left inaccessible to readers for hours at a time, either until website administrators were able to minimize the damage or the DDoS attacks – which can require considerable costs to execute – were halted by the hackers. Waves of attacks have mostly occurred over successive weekends, when IT staff are most likely not to be working.

With more than 40 different media websites targeted, some multiple times, this campaign of DDoS attacks is understood to be one of the broadest cyber-attacks against an independent media community within a European Union member state to date, according to IPI’s analysis.

While some of the media involved have filed police reports, investigations have so far yielded no discernible progress. Police are understood to be investigating cases individually, rather than as part of a unified national investigation. The perpetrators of DDoS attacks are notoriously challenging to identify due to the variety of tools available to attackers to remain anonymous.

While no actor has claimed responsibility, the hacker or hackers appear to go by the nickname HANO – an acronym in Hungarian for a type of disorder which affects the human body. In recent months, they have also left messages in Hungarian behind in the code of attacks, indicating that they are being coordinated domestically, rather than by foreign actors. The attacker appears to demonstrate a knowledge of the Hungarian media landscape and individual journalists.

In other cases, messages were left in the code of DDoS attacks which warned of future attacks against certain media, only for those attacks to then be carried out at the precise date and time. The costs associated with this scale and duration of DDoS attacks, continuing over several months, also indicates that those responsible are relatively well-funded, according to experts.

Although IPI referred some independent media outlets in Hungary to Cloudflare’s Project Galileo – which provides cyber defences by redirecting overload attempts to its own servers – the attackers have found new ways to crash or drastically slow down websites. This further indicates the sophisticated offensive cyber capabilities of those responsible.

Major democratic and security threat

The DDoS attacks so far appear to follow a pattern of targeting critical and independent media websites and were in some cases aimed at smothering access to certain types of news reporting or investigations. In some cases, DDoS attacks began less than half an hour after the publication of reports critical of the government or entities connected to it.

Examples include a critical report about journalists from independent media not being allowed into a government press conference, or a critical report about the pro-government propaganda outlet Megafon. None of the attacks appear so far to be extortionate in nature, but rather intended to cause maximum disruption.

IPI Deputy Director Scott Griffen said the months-long DDoS campaign represented an insidious form of digital censorship and another form of pressure against critical and independent media in Hungary. He warned that while the current cyber-attacks were worrying enough for media freedom, the potential for them to be weaponized during elections in Hungary – when access to factual and independent journalism are more vital than ever – could also pose a major threat to election integrity and democracy.

“The potential for cyber attackers to cause major obstruction for citizen’s access to independent news reporting during periods like elections or protests are clear”, he said. “What we have been seeing in recent months could be the probing for weaknesses in advance of a major coordinated attack, which is why authorities need to act now to identify and put a halt to this democratic and security threat”, he said.

“IPI today calls on Hungarian law enforcement authorities to consolidate investigations into one major national probe, assisted by expert cybercrime officers and if necessary, intelligence agencies, aimed at identifying the source of these cyber-attacks, what their motive is, and how they are funded. Those responsible should face serious criminal cybercrime charges for their obstruction of free speech online and attacks on important media infrastructure.”

Griffen also called for greater international attention, particularly from the European Union, to the DDoS attacks against media in Hungary and the democratic threat they pose.

While multiple motives for the attacks were possible, he said, another theory could be that they are aimed simply at undermining business operations of independent media companies. DDoS attacks have led both to a loss of advertising revenue and forced some media to invest in stronger cyber defense capabilities, hitting balance books of the smaller news outlets in particular. Independent media in Hungary continue to face major threats to their viability.

DDoS attacks are not new to Hungary. In 2022, the website of the united opposition movement was hit with a powerful DDoS attack as it was in the process of conducting its pre-election for the nominee for Prime Minister. Around the same time, independent media platforms also faced isolated DDoS attacks. In July 2023, the website of the Budapest Pride was crashed for hours on the day it was due to hold LGTBQ+ events in the capital. In a recent attack on Hungarian outlet Media1, the attacker also left messages in the code which admitted that they were responsible for carrying out the attack on the Pride website.

In March 2022, several news websites belonging to right-wing and conservative media supportive of the government were also hit by hackers claiming to be from Anonymous, with the justification that the media were supporting Russia’s war on Ukraine. At the time, the DDoS attacks drew a strong statement from the then Justice Minister Judit Varga. By contrast, no government official has yet condemned the attacks on independent media. The perpetrators of the 2022 cyber attacks were never identified.

Although DDoS attacks affect major media companies around the world, including in Europe in recent months, the financial resources and specialized security apparatus available to larger media companies mean that such cyber attacks are frustrating but cause little disruption.

DDoS attacks are broadly aimed at identifying and then exploiting vulnerabilities in website and server systems. They work by flooding these systems with what appears to be legitimate internet traffic from multiple locations, which overwhelms bandwidth or server capacity, significantly slowing or crashing websites. Efforts to protect against DDoS generally involve blocking the IP addresses of illegitimate access requests. Often this means mitigating attacks rather than stopping them outright. Attacks can be carried out via botnets – networks of infected computers and other digital devices around the world – making it very difficult to trace the perpetrators.

Media1 has been tracking the DDoS attacks on its website. IPI has been documenting these cases on the Mapping Media Freedom (MMF) platform and the Council of Europe Platform for the Safety of Journalists.

IPI has been working with our members and other independent media organizations in Hungary in recent months to help bolster their cyber-security defences.

Click here for more of IPI’s reporting and advocacy on Hungary

This statement was coordinated by the International Press Institute (IPI) as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and candidate countries.